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THE FACES OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT 
OUTSIDE THE HOME, TAKE THREE: CRITIQUING 
THE CIRCUIT COURTS USE OF HISTORY-IN-LAW  
 
PATRICK J. CHARLES* 
ABSTRACT 
This article seeks to critique the circuit courts’ varying history-in-law approaches, as 
well as to provide advice on the proper role that history-in-law plays when examining 
the scope of the Second Amendment outside the home. This article sets forth to 
accomplish this task in three parts. Part I argues why history-in-law is appropriate 
when adjudicating Second Amendment decisions outside the home. Part II examines 
the benefits and burdens of utilizing history-in-law as a method of constitutional 
interpretation, while breaking down the alternative approaches employed by circuit 
courts when adjudicating Second Amendment decisions outside the home. Lastly, Part 
III offers practical advice on the use of history-in-law moving forward. 
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In the decade since the Supreme Court decided District of Columbia v. Heller,1 
there has been extenstive commentary on the scope of the Second Amendment outside 
the home.2 And recently, with the Court having granted certiorari in New York State 
Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. City of New York, New York, the topic is of particular 
importance.3 In many instances, given Heller's focus on text, history, and tradition, 
much of the commentary centers on history-in-law; that is, the study of how the law 
has evolved in a particular area, what events and factors caused the law to evolve, and 
how—if at all—this history is important for the courts when adjudicating 
constituitonal questions.4 Understandably, given how much the public, political, and 
                                                          
 1  554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 2  See Eric Ruben & Joseph Blocher, From Theory to Doctrine: An Empirical Analysis of 
the Right to Keep and Bear Arms After Heller, 67 DUKE L.J. 1433, 1439 (2018); Nicholas 
Griepsma, Concealed Carry Through Common Use: Extending Heller's Constitutional 
Construction, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 284, 295 (2017); David B. Kopel & Joseph G.S. Greenlee, 
The Federal Circuits' Second Amendment Doctrines, 61 ST. LOUIS L.J. 193, 196 (2017); Joseph 
Blocher & Darrell A.H. Miller, What Is Gun Control? Direct Burdens, Incidental Burdens, and 
the Boundaries of the Second Amendment, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 295, 338 (2016); Alice Marie 
Beard, Gay Rights Strengthen Gun Rights, 57 S. TEX. L. REV. 215, 220 (2016); Justine E. 
Johnson-Makuch, Statutory Restrictions on Concealed Carry: A Five-Circuit Shoot-Out, 83 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2757, 2759 (2015); Brian Enright, The Constitutional "Terra Incognita" of 
Discretionary Concealed Carry Laws, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 909, 910 (2015); Elizabeth Beaman, 
Who Gets to Determine If You Need Self Defense?: Heller and McDonald's Application Outside 
the House, 12 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 139, 140 (2015); Joseph A. Gonnella, Concealed Carry: 
Can Heller's Handgun Leave the Home?, 51 CAL. W. L. REV. 111, 112 (2014); Nicholas Moeller, 
The Second Amendment Beyond the Doorstep: Concealed Carry Post-Heller, 2014 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 1401, 1401 (2014); Robert Leider, Our Non-Originalist Right to Bear Arms, 123 YALE L.J. 
1486 (2014); Ryan Notarangelo, Carrying the Second Amendment Outside the Home: A 
Critique of the Third Circuit's Decision in Drake v. Filko, 64 CATH. U.L. REV. 235, 237 (2014); 
Darrell A.H. Miller, Text, History, and Tradition: What the Seventh Amendment Can Teach Us 
About the Second, 122 YALE L.J. 852, 929 (2012); Owen McGovern, The Responsible Gun 
Ownership Ordinance and Novel Textual Questions About the Second Amendment, 102 J. CRIM. 
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 471, 483–84 (2012); John C. Frazer, Home, Sweet Home: The Second 
Amendment and the Right to Carry Arms in Public, 4 REGENT J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 1 (2012); 
Lawrence Rosenthal & Joyce Lee Malcolm, McDonald v. Chicago: Which Standard of Scrutiny 
Should Apply to Gun-Control Laws?, 105 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 85, 93 (2010); Eugene 
Volokh, Implementing the Right to Keep and Bear Arms for Self-Defense: An Analytical 
Framework and a Research Agenda, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1443, 1518 (2009); Darrell A.H. Miller, 
Guns as Smut: Defending the Home-Bound Second Amendment, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1278, 
1281–82 (2009); Michael C. Dorf, Does Heller Protect a Right to Carry Guns Outside the 
Home?, 59 SYRACUSE L. REV. 225, 225 (2008). 
 3  N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. City of New York, 2019 U.S. LEXIS 734, 2019 WL 
271961 (U.S. Jan. 22, 2019).  
 4  See Mark Anthony Frassetto, The First Congressional Debate on Public Carry and What 
It Tells Us About Firearms Regionalism, 40 CAMPBELL L. REV. 335, 336 (2018); Saul Cornell, 
The Right to Keep and Carry Arms in Anglo-American Law: Preserving Liberty and Keeping 
the Peace, 80 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 11, 12 (2017); Patrick J. Charles, The Faces of the Second 
Amendment Outside the Home, Take Two: How We Got Here and Why It Matters, 64 CLEV. ST. 
L. REV. 373 (2016) [hereinafter Charles, Faces, Take Two]; David B. Kopel, The First Century 
of Right to Arms Litigation, 14 GEO. L.J. & PUB. POL'Y 127, 129 (2016); Mark Anthony 
Frassetto, The Law and Politics of Firearms Regulation in Reconstruction Texas, 4 TEX. A&M 
L. REV. 95, 96 (2016); Lawrence Rosenthal, The Limits of Second Amendment Originalism and 
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol67/iss2/7
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legal discourse surrounding the Second Amendment has changed over the past two 
centuries, there is a variance of scholarly opinion when it comes to history-in-law and 
the Second Amendment outside the home.5 Some legal commenators have opined that 
the rich history of armed carriage regulations from the thirteenth-century through the 
eighteenth-century is informative.6 Meanwhile, others have signaled that the history 
of the Antebellum South should serve as the constitutional baseline.7 There are indeed 
other opinions, including a small minority of legal commentators who call for 
dispensing with history-in-law altogether.8  
 There is also a variance of history-in-law approaches to the Second Amendment 
outside the home among the circuit courts. Some circuit courts have approached 
history-in-law with scholarly vigor.9 Others have tailored any history-in-law analysis 
to coincide with the historical prouncements in Heller.10 Meanwhile, a handful of 
                                                          
the Constitutional Case for Gun Control, 92 WASH U. L. REV. 1187, 1192 (2015); Eric M. Ruben 
& Saul Cornell, Firearm Regulation and Public Carry: Placing Southern Antebellum Case Law 
in Context, 125 YALE L.J. F. 121, 123 (2015); Jonathan Meltzer, Open Carry for All: Heller and 
Our Nineteenth-Century Second Amendment, 89 IND. L.J. 1587, 1591 (2014); Patrick J. Charles, 
The Statute of Northampton by the Late Eighteenth Century: Clarifying the Intellectual Legacy, 
41 FORDHAM URB. L.J. CITY SQUARE 10, 10 (2013) [hereinafter Charles, Statute of 
Northampton]; Patrick J. Charles, The Second Amendment in Historiographical Crisis: Why the 
Supreme Court Must Reevaluate the Embarrassing "Standard Model" Moving Forward, 39 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1727, 1727 (2012) [hereinafter Charles, Historiographical Crisis]; Patrick 
J. Charles, The Faces of the Second Amendment Outside the Home: History Versus Ahistorical 
Standards of Review, 60 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1, 1 (2012) [hereafter Charles, Faces of the Second 
Amendment]; Saul Cornell, The Right to Carry Firearms Outside the Home: Separating 
Historical Myths from Historical Realities, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1695, 1695 (2012); Michael 
O'Shea, Modeling the Second Amendment Right to Carry Arms (I): Judicial Tradition and the 
Scope of "Bearing Arms" for Self-Defense, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 585, 586 (2012); Patrick J. 
Charles, Scribble Scrabble, the Second Amendment, and Historical Guideposts: A Short Reply 
to Lawrence Rosenthal and Joyce Lee Malcolm, 105 NW. L. REV. 1821, 1822 (2011) [hereinafter 
Charles, Scribble Scrabble]. 
 5  For history on how the public, political, and legal discourse concerning the Second 
Amendment has evolved, see generally PATRICK J. CHARLES, ARMED IN AMERICA: A HISTORY 
OF GUN RIGHTS FROM COLONIAL MILITIAS TO CONCEALED CARRY (2018); Patrick J. Charles, The 
Second Amendment in the Twenty-First Century: What Hath Heller Wrought?, 23 WM. & MARY 
BILL OF RTS. J. 1143, 1144 (2015). 
 6  See, e.g., Cornell, The Right to Keep and Carry Arms in Anglo-American Law, supra note 
4, at 15-44; Charles, Faces of the Second Amendment, supra note 4, at 7–43; Charles, Scribble 
Scrabble, supra note 3, at 1822–40. 
 7  See, e.g., Kopel, The First Century of Right to Arms Litigation, supra note 3, at 127–86; 
O'Shea, supra note 4, at 585–676. 
 8  See, e.g., Griepsma, supra note 2, at 284–311; Beard, supra note 2, at 215–38.  
 9  See, e.g., Peruta v. Cty. of San Diego (Peruta II), 824 F.3d 919, 929 (9th Cir. 2016) (en 
banc); Kachalsky v. Cty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 84 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 10  See, e.g., Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650, 658 (D.C. Cir. 2017); Moore v. 
Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 935 (7th Cir. 2012). 
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circuit courts have made the conscious decision to forego engaging in history-in-law 
altogether.11  
This article sets forth to critique the circuit courts' varying history-in-law 
approaches, as well as provide advice on the proper role that history-in-law should 
play when examining the scope of the Second Amendment outside the home—advice 
that hopefully the Supreme Court will take into account when the Justices hear their 
first Second Amendment outside the home case next term. This article sets forth to 
accomplish this task in three parts. Part I makes the case why history-in-law is 
appropriate when adjudicating the Second Amendment outside the home. Part II 
briefly examines the benefits and burdens of utilizing history-in-law as a method of 
constitutional interpretation, and then proceeds to break down the different approaches 
the circuit courts use when adjudicating Second Amendment outside the home claims. 
Lastly, based on the lessons learned from the different history-in-law approaches used 
by the circuit courts, Part III offers practical advice on the use of history-in-law 
moving forward when adjudicating the Second Amendment outside the home. 
I. WHY HISTORY-IN-LAW WHEN ADJUDICATING THE SECOND AMENDMENT OUTSIDE 
THE HOME? 
The use of history-in-law is a time honored tradition in American jurisprudence.12 
Since the Constitution's inception, lawyers and jurists have relied on history, in one 
form or another, to adjudicate questions and controversies.13 History-in-law is 
particularly applicable when courts hear constitutional cases of the first impression.14 
The reason for this is straightforward; without case precedent to guide or instruct the 
courts, courts will seek solace in another form of precedent—history. Whether it is 
historical texts, events, or tradition, history provides the courts with an authoritative 
starting point from which to judicially reason. This is not to say that history-in-law is 
                                                          
 11  See Gould v. Morgan, 907 F.3d 659, 670 (1st Cir. 2018) (implying via Heller's "tea 
leaves" that "the Second Amendment is not limited to the home"); Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 
431 (3d Cir. 2013) (refusing to engage "in a full-blown historical analysis given other courts' 
extensive consideration of the history and tradition of the Second Amendment"); NRA of Am., 
Inc. v. McCraw, 719 F.3d 338, 347 (5th Cir. 2013) (holding age-based restrictions on concealed 
carry licenses to be longstanding without any history-in-law analysis); Woollard v. Gallagher, 
712 F.3d 865, 875 (4th Cir. 2013) (declining to "impart a definitive ruing" on the scope of the 
Second Amendment outside the home); United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 466 (4th 
Cir. 2011).  
 12  Patrick J. Charles, History in Law, Mythmaking, and Constitutional Legitimacy - 
Symposium: History and Meaning of the Constitution, 63 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 23, 23 (2014). 
 13  See, e.g., PATRICK J. CHARLES, HISTORICISM, ORIGINALISM AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE 
USE AND ABUSE OF THE PAST IN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 1–31 (2014); JACK RAKOVE, 
ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION (1996); 
LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS' CONSTITUTION (1988); John Philip 
Reid, Legal History, 1966 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 669, 670 (1966); Paul Murphy, Time to Reclaim: 
The Current Challenge of American Constitutional History, 69 AM. HIST. REV. 64, 64 (1963); 
Charles E. Wyzanski, Jr., History and Law, 26 U. CHI. L. REV. 237, 237 (1959). 
 14  See generally Lorianne Updike Toler et al., Pre-Originalism, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 
277 (2012) (providing data on the different uses of history by the Supreme Court when 
adjudicating cases and controversies of first impression). 
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol67/iss2/7
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never used when adjudicating cases that are not of the first impression.15 It should be 
noted, however, that the more case precedent there is relevant to a particular 
constitutional question, the less likely it is that a court will lean towards using history-
in-law as a jurisprudential tool.16 In other words, there is a precedential sliding scale 
when it comes to the courts using history-in-law. The less case precedent that is 
available regarding any particular constitutional question, the more likely it is that a 
court will resort to history-in-law. 
This precedential sliding scale on the use of history-in-law has been front and 
center as circuit courts have wrestled with the question: "What is the scope of the 
Second Amendment outside the home?"17 There are two underlying reasons for this. 
First, Heller left this question open (as well as many other Second Amendment 
questions),18 and this in itself is justification for the use of history-in-law.19 Second, 
there is virtual unanimity among the circuit courts that Heller strongly suggests 
history-in-law must serve as a jurisprudential guide.20 Essentially, the way the circuit 
                                                          
 15  See, e.g., Binderup v. AG of United States, 836 F.3d 336, 348 (3rd Cir. 2016). 
 16  See Masciandaro, 638 F.3d at 466. 
 17  Compare Bonidy v. United States Postal Serv., 790 F.3d 1121, 1124 (10th Cir. 2015), 
and Culp v. Madigan, 840 F.3d 400, 403 (7th Cir. 2016), with Peterson v. Martinez, 707 F.3d 
1197, 1209–11 (10th Cir. 2013), and Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 936–37 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 18  See Peruta v. Cty. of San Diego (Peruta I), 742 F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 2014), rev'd en 
banc, 824 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 2016) ("It doesn't take a lawyer to see that straightforward 
application of the rule in Heller will not dispose of this case. It should be equally obvious that 
neither Heller nor McDonald speaks explicitly or precisely to the scope of the Second 
Amendment right outside the home or to what it takes to ‘infringe' it."); Drake v. Filko, 724 
F.3d 426, 431 (3d Cir. 2013) ("It remains unsettled whether the individual right to bear arms for 
the purpose of self-defense extends beyond the home."); Kachalsky v. Cty. of Westchester, 701 
F.3d 81, 88 (2d Cir. 2012) ("Heller provides no categorical answer to this case. And in many 
ways, it raises more questions than it answers."); id. at 89 ("What we do not know is the scope 
of [the Second Amendment] beyond the home and the standards for determining when and how 
the right can be regulated by a government."); Masciandaro, 638 F.3d at 466 ("But in [deciding 
Heller], the Court did not define the outer limits of the Second Amendment right to keep and 
bear arms."). 
 19  The only constitutional question that Heller definitively answered is that the Second 
Amendment protects an actionable individual right to "keep and bear arms," and it is a right that 
expressly prohibits the federal, state, and local governments from banning the ownership of 
common use firearms for armed self-defense of one's home. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 
554 U.S. 570, 634–35 (2008). 
 20  See Tyler v. Hillsdale Cty. Sheriff's Dep't, 837 F.3d 678, 687 (6th Cir. 2016) ("Heller's 
analytical structure and its conclusions command resort to historical evidence in determining 
the scope of the Second Amendment."); Peruta v. Cty. of San Diego (Peruta II), 824 F.3d 919, 
929 (9th Cir. 2016) ("In analyzing the meaning of the Second Amendment, the Supreme Court 
in Heller and McDonald treated its historical analysis as determinative . . . . In determining 
whether the Second Amendment protects the right to carry a concealed weapon in public, we 
engage in the same historical inquiry . . . ."); GeorgiaCarry.org, Inc. v. Georgia, 687 F.3d 1244, 
1261 (11th Cir. 2012) ("Heller commands that . . . courts must read the challenged statute in 
light of the historical background of the Second Amendment."). The notable exception to 
Heller's reliance on history is the list of "presumptively lawful" regulations, which the court 
majority did not expound upon. These regulations include "longstanding prohibitions on the 
possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms 
in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and 
5Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2019
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courts see it, is that Heller's dependence upon history-in-law is a signal to lower courts 
that they too must attempt a "historical inquiry into any question concerning the right 
to keep and bear arms" before resorting to other jurisprudential tools.21 
Thus far, it appears that every circuit court has acquiesced to Heller's history-in-
law suggestion, and each has done so by adopting a two-step inquiry when 
adjudicating Second Amendment cases.22 The first step involves the courts examining 
whether the challenged conduct is within the scope of the Second Amendment. In 
completing this step, if the case is one of first impression, the courts often resort to 
history-in-law.23 If the challenged conduct does not fall within the scope of the Second 
Amendment, the case is extinguished.24 However, if the conduct is viewed within the 
scope of the Second Amendment (or presumed to be within the scope of the Second 
Amendment), the courts then proceed to step two, which involves applying some level 
of means-ends scrutiny to the challenged law or regulation.25  
There is much to be said about how the circuit courts employ the entire two-step 
inquiry. It is indeed a subject of much scholarly discussion.26 But, because this article 
is focused on critiquing the use of history-in-law when adjudicating Second 
Amendment outside the home claims, Part II will only explore how the different circuit 
courts have used history-in-law at step one.  
                                                          
qualifications on the commercial sale of arms." Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27. But see Patrick J. 
Charles, The Second Amendment Standard of Review After McDonald, "Historical Guideposts" 
and the Missing Arguments in McDonald v. City of Chicago, 2 AKRON J. CONST. L. & POL'Y 7, 
23–26 (2011) (providing historical support for some of Heller's "presumptively lawful" 
regulations). 
 21  Miller, Text, History, and Tradition, supra note 2, at 861–62; see also Masciandaro, 638 
F.3d at 470 (observing that "historical meaning enjoys a privileged interpretative role in Second 
Amendment context"). 
 22  See, e.g., Gould v. Morgan, 907 F.3d 659, 666 (1st Cir. 2018); Binderup v. AG of the 
United States, 836 F.3d 336, 345 (3rd Cir. 2016); Kolbe v. Hogan, 813 F.3d 160, 171–72 (4th 
Cir. 2016); N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Cuomo, 804 F.3d 242, 254 (2d Cir. 2015); United 
States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1136 (9th Cir. 2013); NRA of Am. v. Bureau of Alcohol, 700 
F.3d 185, 194–95 (5th Cir. 2012); United States v. Greeno, 679 F.3d 510, 518 (6th Cir. 2012); 
GeorgiaCarry.org, 687 F.3d at 1261 n.34; Heller v. District of Columbia, 670 F.3d 1244, 1252 
(D.C. Cir. 2011); Ezell v. City of Chi., 651 F.3d 684, 701–03 (7th Cir. 2011); United States v. 
Reese, 627 F.3d 792, 800–01 (10th Cir. 2010); United States v. Johnson, No. CR15-3035-
MWB, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5731, at *18 (N.D. Iowa Jan. 19, 2016). 
 23  See, e.g., Binderup, 836 F.3d at 348. 
 24  See, e.g., Gould, 907 F.3d at 669. 
 25  It should be noted that there are some minor differences as to how each circuit court 
applies this two-step approach. For some examples, see Heller, 670 F.3d at 1252; Ezell, 651 
F.3d at 701–04; Reese, 627 F.3d at 800–01; United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89 (3d 
Cir. 2010). 
 26  For some scholarly articles on this topic, see Kopel & Greenlee, supra note 2, at 196–
314; Allen Rostron, The Continuing Battle over the Second Amendment, 78 ALB. L. REV. 819 
(2015) [hereinafter Rostron, Continuing Battle]; Alan Gura, The Second Amendment as a 
Normal Right, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 223 (2014); Allen Rostron, Justice Breyer's Triumph in the 
Third Battle over the Second Amendment, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 703 (2012).  
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II. HISTORY-IN-LAW, THE SECOND AMENDMENT OUTSIDE THE HOME, AND THE 
CIRCUIT COURTS 
As a matter of constitutional interpretation, the late Justice Antonin Scalia, who 
authored the majority opinion in Heller, once characterized history-in-law as the "best 
means available in an imperfect world."27 Scalia offered three arguments in support 
of this characterization.28 One is that the practice of history-in-law is far better than 
other methods of constitutional interpretation because, in the end, it intruded far less 
"upon the democratic process" given that only history can properly inform jurists on 
the origins of rights.29 Scalia also advanced the argument that the "methodological 
differences that divide historians, and the varying interpretive assumptions they bring 
to their work, are nothing compared to the differences of the American people[.]"30 
Here, Scalia's point was simply that history-in-law, unlike other forms of 
constitutional interpretation, is based upon reasoned facts rather than the tenets of 
moral philosophy.31 This brings us to Scalia's third and last argument for favoring 
history-in-law over other forms of constitutional interpretation—namely that history-
in-law ultimately produces far "less subjective" outcomes.32  
On its face, Scalia's "less subjective" claim is most persuasive. Few, if anyone, will 
disagree that historical facts are historical facts no matter who presents them, and the 
more historical facts available from which to judicially reason, the less subjective the 
judicial outcome will be.33 However, a closer examination of Scalia's "less subjective" 
argument for utilizing history-in-law proves to be more nominal than real. The 
unabashed reality is, like other methods of constitutional interpretation, legal 
professionals, and jurists can manipulate history-in-law in any number of ways.34  
                                                          
 27  McDonald v. City of Chi., 561 U.S. 742, 804 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 28  Id. 
 29  Id. 
 30  Id. (citations omitted). 
 31  ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL 
TEXTS 402 (2012). 
 32  McDonald, 561 U.S. at 804 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 33  See David B. Kopel & Clayton E. Cramer, Credentials Are No Substitute for Accuracy: 
Nathan Kozuskanich, Stephen Halbrook, and the Role of the Historian, 19 WIDENER L.J. 343, 
378 (2010). 
 34  For some scholarly discussions, see CHARLES A. MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE 
USES OF HISTORY (Harvard University Press, 1969); Raoul Berger, Mark Tushnet's Critique of 
Interpretivism, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 532 (1983); Robert W. Gordon, The Arrival of Critical 
Historicism, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1023 (1997); Robert W. Gordon, Historicism in Legal 
Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1017 (1981); Buckner F. Melton, Clio at the Bar: A Guide to 
Historical Method for Legists and Jurists, 83 MINN. L. REV. 377 (1998); William E. Nelson, 
History and Neutrality in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 1237 (1986); Martin H. 
Redish, Interpretivism and the Judicial Role in a Constitutional Democracy, 19 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL'Y 525 (1996); John Phillip Reid, Law and History, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 193 (1993); 
Neil M. Richards, Clio and the Court: A Reassessment of the Supreme Court's Uses of History, 
73 J.L. & POL. 809 (1997); Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of 
Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781 (1983); William M. Wiecek, Clio 
as Hostage: The United States Supreme Court and the Uses of History, 24 CAL. W. L. REV. 227 
(1987). For some useful discussions on history in law by jurists, see Robert H. Jackson, Full 
7Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2019
204 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:197 
 
Perhaps the most common method is cherry-picking historical evidence that only 
supports one side of an argument and minimizing or discarding the rest as insignificant 
and unpersuasive.35 This method is commonly referred to in historical academia as 
"law office history" or "history lite."36 Another method often used to produce a desired 
outcome is to simply manufacture historical findings through legal inference, all the 
while presenting those findings as being substantially supported by the evidentiary 
record.37 This author has referred to this method in other writings as "explaining away 
history."38 What it entails is lawyering the content of historical texts to bolster a 
particular legal argument rather than providing substantiated historical evidence that 
actually confirms it.39 To state this differently, when a legal professional or jurist 
explains away history, they are merely presenting a historically based interpretation 
                                                          
Faith and Credit: The Lawyer's Clause of the Constitution, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1945); Jeffrey 
S. Sutton, The Role of History in Judging Disputes About the Meaning of the Constitution, 41 
TEX. TECH L. REV. 1173 (2009); Amanda L. Taylor et al., A Dialogue with Federal Judges on 
the Role of History in Interpretation, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1889 (2012). 
 35  For criticisms of this approach in Second Amendment scholarship, see Charles, 
Historiographical Crisis, supra note 4, at 1753–60. See also Saul Cornell, Heller, New 
Originalism, and Law Office History: "Meet the New Boss, Same as the Old Boss," 56 UCLA 
L. REV. 1095 (2009); Saul Cornell, Originalism on Trial: The Use and Abuse of History in 
District of Columbia v. Heller, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 625 (2008); David Thomas Konig, Heller, Guns, 
and History: The Judicial Invention of Tradition, 3 N.E. U. L.J. 175 (2011); David Thomas 
Konig, Why the Second Amendment Has a Preamble: Original Public Meaning and the Political 
Culture of Written Constitutions in Revolutionary America, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1295 (2009); 
William G. Merkel, Heller as Hubris, and How McDonald v. City of Chicago May Well Change 
the Constitutional World as We Know It, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1221 (2010); William G. 
Merkel, District of Columbia v. Heller and Antonin Scalia's Perverse Sense of Originalism, 13 
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 349 (2009). 
 36  See, e.g., Martin S. Flaherty, History "Lite" in Modern American Constitutionalism, 95 
COLUM. L. REV. 523 (1995); Alfred H. Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 
SUP. CT. REV. 119 (1965); Gordon S. Wood & Scott D. Gerber, The Supreme Court and the 
Uses of History, 39 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 435, 443 (2013). 
 37  See, e.g., J.G.A. POCOCK, VIRTUE, COMMERCE, AND HISTORY 7 (1985) ("The non-
historical practitioner is not concerned with what the author of the statement made in a remote 
past meant by it so much as with what he in his present can make it mean."); J.G.A. Pocock, 
Virtues, Rights, and Manners: A Model for Historians of Political Thought, 9 POL. THEORY 353, 
362–64 (1981) (discussing how "law-centered" paradigms lead to "liberal" historical claims 
because they do not take into account the whole). These unproven inferences can create a 
domino chain of inaccurate history that can have far reaching negative effects in law, history, 
and politics. HERBERT BUTTERFIELD, THE WHIG INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 6 (1931) ("the 
more [historians] are making inferences instead of researches, then the more whig our history 
becomes if we have not severely repressed our original error . . . ."); See CHARLES, HISTORICISM, 
supra note 13, at 90–98. 
 38  Charles, Historiographical Crisis, supra note 4, at 1769–76.  
 39  This would be the academic equivalent of a historian presenting an unsubstantiated 
historical theory as a viable historical thesis. See CHARLES, HISTORICISM, supra note 13, at 87–
90.  
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of text or texts that appears plausible. But, this is not factually-based or contextual 
history. It is mythmaking.40  
There are indeed other methods in which history-in-law can be manipulated to 
produce a desired result, and at different parts in this article, said methods will be 
expounded upon. For now, the point to be made is any notion of history-in-law being 
a less subjective form of constitutional interpretation is demonstrably false. This 
criticism of history-in-law is in not in any way meant to suggest altogether eliminating 
the use of history when adjudicating constitutional questions. Such a bold step would 
unravel the entire legal system. The fact of the matter is, that history and the law are 
inseparably bound together. It has always been that way and will always be that way. 
To quote from Judge Richard A. Posner, the law is the "most historically oriented, or 
if you like the most backward-looking, the most 'past dependent,' of the professions."41 
Another criticism of history-in-law worth mentioning is it can often bind lower 
courts to accept historical myth as historical fact.42 This is often the case when a court 
of final appellate jurisdiction poorly or incorrectly analyzes history in a ruling. Perhaps 
the most well-known example is the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause. In 1873, despite the congressional 
record and other historical evidence strongly suggesting that the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause was drafted and ratified with the purpose of incorporating the Bill 
of Rights to the states, the Supreme Court came to the historical conclusion that the 
clause was merely intended to constitutionally differentiate between rights associated 
with federal and state citizenship.43 To this day, despite an ever growing body of 
scholarship showing numerous history-in-law inaccuracies with the Supreme Court's 
historical conclusion on the Privileges or Immunities Clause,44 this 1873 history-in-
law assessment remains legally binding on the lower courts.45  
There is an argument to be made that Heller has placed the lower courts in a similar 
history-in-law situation—at least that is how some circuit courts have interpreted 
                                                          
 40  For more on what separates historical fact from historical myth, see Peter Heehs, Myth, 
History, and Theory, 33 HISTORY & THEORY 1, 1–2 (1994); Paul Horwitz, The Past, Tense: The 
History of Crisis and the Crisis of History in Constitutional Theory, 61 ALBANY L. REV. 459, 
505 (1997); Joseph Mali, Jacob Burckhardt: Myth, History, and Mythistory, 3 HIST. & MEMORY 
86, 86–88 (1991). 
 41  Richard A. Posner, Past-Dependency, Pragmatism, and Critique of History in 
Adjudication and Legal Scholarship, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 573, 573 (2000). 
 42  For more on this, see Patrick J. Charles, History in Law, Mythmaking, and Constitutional 
Legitimacy, 63 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 23, 40–53 (2014). 
 43  Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 74 (1873). 
 44  The breadth of scholarship on this point is too large to list here, but a few worth 
mentioning include: Richard L. Aynes, Ink Blot or Not: The Meaning of Privileges and/or 
Immunities, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1295 (2009); Richard L. Aynes, Enforcing the Bill of Right 
Against the States: The History and the Future, 18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 77 (2009); 
Michael Kent Curtis, The Bill of Rights and the States: An Overview from One Perspective, 18 
J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 3 (2009); Kurt T. Lash, The Origins of the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause, Part II, 99 GEO. L.J. 329 (2011); Bryan H. Wildenthal, Nationalizing the Bill of Rights: 
Revisiting the Original Understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1866–67, 66 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 1509 (2007). 
 45  McDonald v. City of Chi., 561 U.S. 742, 54–56 (2010). 
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Heller.46 However, other circuit courts have read Heller as permitting them to examine 
portions of the historical record anew.47 Heller infers as much. In the majority opinion, 
Scalia cautioned that Heller should not be interpreted to be "an exhaustive historical 
analysis" on the scope of the Second Amendment, nor is intended to prohibit future 
"historical justifications" for upholding "longstanding" gun control regulations.48 
Whether Heller does or does not bind lower courts in utilizing history-in-law is merely 
one of many issues in which the circuit courts have disagreed when adjudicating 
Second Amendment claims. These disagreements will be outlined below, and we 
begin with the Eleventh Circuit, which was the first circuit court to use history-in-law 
to adjudicate a Second Amendment outside the home claim.49  
A. Georgiacarry.org v. Georgia—History Narrowly Tailored  
In 2010, Georgia enacted a law that prohibited the carrying of weapons and long 
guns in certain locations unless the property owner or custodian gave permission.50 
Among the locations included in the Georgia law were state and local government 
buildings, courthouses, jails, prisons, bars, mental health facilities, polling places, and 
places of worship.51 The Georgia law was subsequently challenged as a violation of 
the Second Amendment, particularly as it applied to places of worship.52 In resolving 
this constitutional question, the Eleventh Circuit turned to history-in-law, but made 
sure to narrowly tailor the issue as to whether Second Amendment protects a right to 
bring a firearm on the private property of another against the wishes of the owner.53 
The Eleventh Circuit also made sure to narrowly tailor its use of history-in-law by 
focusing the bulk of its historical analysis on individual rights as they were understood 
late eighteenth-century.54 The Eleventh Circuit's rationale for this was straightforward. 
Because Heller held that the Second Amendment protects a "pre-existing right," it was 
proper that such a right be contemporaneously weighed against other individual rights. 
                                                          
 46  See, e.g., Young v. Hawaii, 896 F.3d 1044, 1051–61 (9th Cir. 2018); Moore v. Madigan, 
702 F.3d 933, 936–37 (7th Cir. 2012); see also Charles, Historiographical Crisis, supra note 4, 
at 1846–47 (outlining why Heller's history-in-law analysis could be interpreted as legally 
binding). 
 47  See, e.g., Kachalsky v. Cty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 89–97 (2d Cir. 2012); Peruta II 
v. Cty. of San Diego, 824 F.3d 919, 929–38 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc); see also Charles, 
Historiographical Crisis, supra note 4, at 1848–54 (providing prudential reasons why Heller's 
history-in-law analysis should not be legally binding). 
 48  District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626–27, 635 (2008). 
 49  The Fourth Circuit Court was the first circuit court to adjudicate a Second Amendment 
outside the home claim. However, the Fourth Circuit sidestepped any history-in-law analysis 
and went straight to analyzing the challenged law under intermediate scrutiny. See United States 
v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 469–73 (4th Cir. 2011). 
 50  GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-127 (2015). 
 51  Id. 
 52  Georgiacarry.org, Inc. v. Georgia, 687 F.3d 1244, 1250 (11th Cir. 2012). 
 53  Id. at 1261. 
 54  Id. at 1261–63. 
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In this case, the rights that the Second Amendment needed to be weighed against were 
individual property rights.55 
Ultimately, by narrowly tailoring the constitutional issue and confining the history-
in-law analysis to the late eighteenth-century, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the 
"pre-existing right codified in the Second Amendment does not include protection for 
a right to carry a firearm in a place of worship against the owner's wishes."56 As the 
Eleventh Circuit noted, not only would recognition of such a Second Amendment right 
conflict with centuries of precedent relating to property law, tort law, and criminal 
law, but there was not one iota of historical evidence—at least not in historical 
context—to suggest that people living in the late eighteenth-century interpreted the 
Second Amendment as protecting a right to carry weapons on the property of 
another.57 The only historical evidence that the plaintiffs could muster to the contrary 
was a colonial Georgia law that required all persons attending church services to carry 
firearms for the "necessary . . . security and defence of [the] province from internal 
dangers and insurrections[.]"58 But, as the Eleventh Circuit pointed out, to interpret 
this colonial Georgia law as enshrining a right to carry firearms on private property 
would break the bands of historical elasticity.59 The law's purpose was simply to 
"defend the community against an internal or external threat," and was "practical" for 
those Americans living at that time.60 Nothing more. 
In conducting its analysis, however, there is one historical aspect of the colonial 
Georgia law that the Eleventh Circuit overlooked. The colonial Georgia law was 
merely one of many in Anglo-American statute books pertaining to compulsory arms 
bearing.61 These laws obligated citizens to keep and/or carry arms for the public 
defense, whether it be for militia service, security patrols, the hue and cry, or 
watchman duty.62 And, contrary to historical assertions of the plaintiffs in this case, 
                                                          
 55  Id. at 1262. 
 56  Id. at 1264.  
 57  See Rostron, Continuing Battle, supra note 26, at 830 (noting that there is no historical 
evidence that "specifically addresse[s] the intersection of property and gun rights"). Even if the 
Eleventh Circuit had placed history-in-law aside in this case, the plaintiffs would have faced the 
burden of overcoming Heller's list of presumptively lawful regulations—a list that included 
"laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government 
buildings . . . ." District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008). 
 58  See "An Act for the Better Security of the Inhabitants, By Obliging the Male White 
Persons to Carry Fire Arms To Places of Public Worship" (Ga. 1770), reprinted in A DIGEST OF 
THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA 157–58 (1800). 
 59  Georgiacarry.org, 687 F.3d at 1265.  
 60  Id. at 1264 n.42. 
 61  Saul Cornell, The Early American Origins of the Modern Gun Control Debate: The Right 
to Bear Arms, Firearms Regulation, and the Lessons of History, 17 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 567, 
575–76 (2006). 
 62  Compulsory arms bearing laws date back as far as the 1285 Statute of Winchester. See 
Statute of Winchester, 13 Edw. I, St. 2 (1285) (Eng.); MICHAEL DALTON, THE COUNTREY 
JUSTICE 140–41(1630); Henry Summerson, The Enforcement of the Statute of Winchester, 
1285–1327, 13 J. LEGAL HIST. 232 (1992). It is also worth noting that compulsory arms-bearing 
was a legal exception to the Statute of Northampton, which prohibited the carrying of dangerous 
weapons in the public concourse. See, e.g., EDWARD COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES 
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there is nothing in the historical record that even remotely suggests compulsory arms 
bearing laws were enacted with the underlying purpose of recognizing a right to go 
publicly armed.63 If the historical record informs us of anything, it is that the opposite 
was true; that is, the government could stipulate specific time, place, and manner 
restrictions on arms bearing, particularly in public places.64 Although the Eleventh 
Circuit overlooked these historical details, its absence does nothing to diminish the 
court's overall analysis.65 The court would have still determined that any Second 
Amendment rights outside the home can be limited or restricted altogether upon 
entering the private property of others. It was an easy case for the Eleventh Circuit to 
get right.66   
                                                          
OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 161 (1644); JOSEPH KEBLE, AN ASSISTANCE TO THE JUSTICES OF THE 
PEACE FOR THE EASIER PERFORMANCE OF THEIR DUTY 147, 646, 711 (2d ed. 1689); JOHN LAYER, 
THE OFFICE AND DUTIE OF CONSTABLES, CHURCHWARDENS, AND OTHER THE OVERSEERS OF THE 
POORE 16 (1641). 
 63  The fallacy of this line of historical argument has been previously expounded upon. See 
Charles, Faces, Take Two, supra note 4, at 479 ("[Advocates for broad Second Amendment 
rights often] conflate compulsory arms bearing for militia service, security patrols, and the hue 
and cry with a right to ‘peaceably carry' firearms in the public concourse. The fallacy embodied 
by this line of historical argument is obvious. While [advocates for broad Second Amendment 
rights] are indeed correct that late eighteenth-century citizens were often obligated to take part 
in providing security, they omit that such armed carriage and firing of those arms was at the 
license of government, not at the whim or discretion of individual citizens. This is an important 
legal and historical distinction, yet it is omitted [by these advocates]."). 
 64  See Patrick J. Charles, The 1792 National Militia Act, the Second Amendment, and 
Individual Militia Rights: A Legal and Historical Perspective, 9 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 323, 
326 n.17 (2011); Charles, Scribble Scrabble, supra note 4, at 1833–34. 
 65  As a historical side-bar, the Eleventh Circuit could have also examined late eighteenth-
century hunting law and tradition to support its analysis. See Joseph Blocher, Hunting and the 
Second Amendment, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 133, 161–65 (2015). Even by the early twentieth-
century, there was virtual unanimity among sportsmen and hunters that private property rights 
superseded any rights or privileges pertaining to hunting. See, e.g., John B. Burnham, A Hunting 
License Test, FIELD & STREAM, Jan. 1931, at 15; Enforcing the New Game Laws, SPORTS 
AFIELD, Oct. 1931, at 35; Hugh Grey, Let's Outlaw the Game Violators, FIELD & STREAM, Mar. 
1947, at 28; Gilbert Irwin, Etiquette for Your Sports Afield, AM. RIFLEMAN, Aug. 1932, at 8, 30; 
Archibald Rutledge, The Sportsman's Best Friend, FIELD & STREAM, Dec. 1940, at 15. This 
understanding continued into the mid-twentieth century. See, e.g., Louis F. Lucas, Only Hunters 
Can Save Public Hunting, AM. RIFLEMAN, Sept. 1959, at 16 ("When our forefathers established 
our government, it was decreed that wild game belongs to the states in their sovereign capacity 
for the use and enjoyment of all the people. At the same time, it was decreed that the landowner 
has the right to determine who many come upon his land to hunt game."). 
 66  See JOSEPH BLOCHER & DARRELL A.H. MILLER, THE POSITIVE SECOND AMENDMENT: 
RIGHTS, REGULATION, AND THE FUTURE OF HELLER 7 (Cambridge University Press, 2018) ("Most 
pernicious . . . is the extent to which the Second Amendment is routinely invoked to address 
issues that aren't even constitutional. For example . . . only government actors are subject to 
constitutional rules. As a matter of law, then, it is simply wrong to invoke the Second 
Amendment against private companies . . . Gun rights advocates can of course argue that 
allowing firearms onto private property is good policy, and supporters of gun regulation can 
argue the opposite, but that debate has nothing to do with Second Amendment law."); see also 
Blocher & Miller, What Is Gun Control?, supra note 2, at 313–23; Joseph Blocher, The Right 
Not to Keep or Bear Arms, 64 STAN L. REV. 1, 41–45 (2012). But see Volokh, Implementing the 
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B. Kachalsky v. County of Westchester—History as a Guidepost 
Not long after the Eleventh Circuit decided Georgiacarry.org v. Georgia, the 
Second Circuit held oral arguments in Kachalsky v. County of Westchester.67 The issue 
before the Second Circuit was the constitutionality of New York's concealed carry 
license scheme, which requires applicants to first demonstrate a "proper cause" or 
"justifiable need" before being able to publicly carry a concealed handgun for self-
defense.68 While the plaintiffs argued that any "proper cause" requirement to obtain a 
concealed carry license was an affront to the Second Amendment, the defendants 
countered that armed carriage restrictions in public were longstanding, and therefore, 
presumptively constitutional.69 Both the plaintiffs and defendants relied on history-in-
law to bolster their arguments.70 
The Second Circuit started its history-in-law analysis by addressing the heart of 
the plaintiffs' history-in-law claim—the claim being that in the nineteenth-century the 
prevailing rule of law was that state and local governments could categorically ban the 
concealed carriage or open carriage of dangerous weapons, but not both.71 In other 
words, according to the plaintiffs, nineteenth-century law dictated that if a state or 
local government categorically banned the concealed carriage of dangerous weapons 
in public, it could not simultaneously ban their open carriage, and vice-versa.72 
Ultimately, the Second Circuit concluded that this line of argument was historically 
disingenuous.73 Indeed, the plaintiffs were correct that some nineteenth-century courts 
issued opinions that embodied this rule of law.74 However, as the Second Circuit 
noted, this alternative outlet conception of the Second Amendment outside the home 
was "hardly . . . universal."75 The truth was that there were a variety of opinions on 
the right to keep and bear outside the home in the nineteenth-century.76 This historical 
observation ultimately set the tone for the remainder of the Second Circuit's history-
in-law analysis.  
                                                          
Right to Keep and Bear Arms, supra note 2, at 1527 (stating laws that ban armed carriage on 
private property or in "sensitive places" substantially burden the right of self-defense). 
 67  Kachalsky v. Cty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 68  N.Y. PENAL LAW § 400.00(2)(f) (Consol. 2018). 
 69  Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 88.  
 70  Id. 
 71  Id. at 89. 
 72  Id. 
 73  Id. at 90. 
 74  See State v. Chandler, 5 La. Ann. 489, 489–90 (1850); Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243, 243 
(1846); State v. Reid, 1 Ala. 612, 617–18 (1840).  
 75  Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 90.  
 76  See CHARLES, ARMED IN AMERICA, supra note 5, at 139–50; Joseph Blocher, Firearms 
Localism, 123 YALE L.J. 82, 108–21 (2013); Ruben & Cornell, Firearms Regionalism, supra 
note 4, at 124–35.  
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From the perspective of the Second Circuit, given that history did not "speak with 
one voice,"77 it was best to take a restrained approach to history-in-law. The Second 
Circuit accomplished this by intently focusing on the one historical theme that the 
parties did not dispute—the government's justification for regulating firearms outside 
the home has almost always been more substantial than inside the home.78 In support 
of this historical conclusion, the Second Circuit outlined the history of armed carriage 
laws from the late eighteenth-century to the close of the nineteenth-century.79 The 
Second Circuit stopped short, however, of invoking the power of history to 
categorically dismiss the plaintiffs' Second Amendment claim. Rather, history merely 
guided the Second Circuit to apply the proper level of means-end scrutiny 
(intermediate scrutiny), which then led the panel to unanimously uphold New York's 
"proper cause" requirement as "substantially related to the states' important public 
safety interest."80 
The Second Circuit's rationale for not invoking the power of history to 
categorically dismiss the plaintiffs' Second Amendment outside the home claim was 
two-fold. First, the Second Circuit agreed with the plaintiffs that the Second 
Amendment "must have some application" outside the home.81 Second, the Second 
Circuit was unable to find any historical evidence that "directly" addressed the 
constitutional issue before the court: "Can New York limit handgun licenses to those 
demonstrating a special need for self-protection?"82  
The first rationale makes perfect judicial sense, for if the Second Amendment 
protects an individual's right to own what Heller describes as "common use" 
weapons,83 individuals must possess some basic ancillary right to acquire said 
weapons in commerce, transport them for lawful purposes, and so forth.84 The second 
rationale, however, is completely misguided. This is because the Second Circuit 
unknowingly omitted that there is a long history of requiring individuals to 
demonstrate a special need before being able to carry dangerous weapons in public.85 
Such laws began appearing in statute books in the early to mid-nineteenth century.86 
These laws were a variant of the 1328 Statute of Northampton and generally 
stipulated:  
 
                                                          
 77  Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 91. 
 78  Id. at 94. 
 79  Id. at 94–96. For a more detailed history of armed carriage to the close of the nineteenth-
century, see Charles, Faces, Take Two, supra note 4, at 378–431. 
 80  Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 98. 
 81  Id. at 89. 
 82  Id. at 91. 
 83  District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008). 
 84  See, e.g., Charles, Faces, Take Two, supra note 4, at 434, 461; Don B. Kates, Handgun 
Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second Amendment, 82 MICH. L. REV. 204, 267 
(1983); Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Second Amendment Penumbras: Some Preliminary 
Observations, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 247, 248–49 (2012). 
 85  Charles, Faces, Take Two, supra note 4, at 433. 
 86  See, e.g., 1835 Mass. Acts 750. 
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If any person shall go armed with a dirk, dagger, sword, pistol, or other 
offensive and dangerous weapon, without reasonable cause to fear an 
assault or other injury, or violence to his person, or to his family or 
property, he may on complaint of any person having reasonable cause to 
fear an injury, or breach of the peace, be required to find sureties for 
keeping the peace.87  
 
In accord with the Statute of Northampton, these laws prohibited the act of carrying 
dangerous weapons in public.88 What distinguished this nineteenth-century variant 
from its English predecessor was the former provided a statutory exception if the 
individual was able to demonstrate an "imminent" or "reasonable" fear of assault or 
injury to their person, family, or property.89  
From a micro level, there is indeed an argument to be made that these nineteenth-
century variants of the Statute of Northampton are dissimilar to modern laws that 
require individuals to demonstrate a special need before obtaining a license to carry 
dangerous weapons in public. The former clearly allows some personal discretion in 
determining when it was in fact necessary to carry dangerous weapons in public. 
Meanwhile, the latter requires individuals to first obtain a license. But, from a macro 
level, the two laws are not all that different, for both effectively serve the same purpose 
                                                          
 87  Id.; see also THE REVISED STATUTES OF THE STATE OF WISCONSIN, PASSED AT THE 
ANNUAL SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE COMMENCING JANUARY 13, 1858, AND APPROVED MAY 
17, 1858, 985 (1858) ("If any person shall go armed with a dirk, dagger, sword, pistol or pistols, 
or other offensive and dangerous weapon, without reasonable cause to fear an assault or other 
injury or violence to his person"); EDWARD C. PALMER, THE GENERAL STATUTES OF MINNESOTA 
629 (1867) ("Whoever goes armed with a dirk, dagger, sword, pistol or pistols, or other 
offensive and dangerous weapon, without reasonable cause to fear an assault or other injury or 
violence to his person"); JOHN PURDON, A DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF PENNSYLVANIA, FROM THE 
YEAR ONE THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED TO THE TWENTY-FIRST DAY OF MAY, ONE THOUSAND 
EIGHT HUNDRED AND SIXTY-ONE, at 250 (Frederick C. Brightly ESQ. ed., 9th ed.1862) ("If any 
person, not being an officer on duty in the military or naval service of the state or of the United 
States shall go armed with a dirk, dagger, sword or pistol, or other offensive or dangerous 
weapon, without reasonable cause to fear an assault or other injury or violence"); THE REVISED 
STATUTES OF THE STATE OF MAINE PASSED OCTOBER 22, 1840, 709 (1841) ("Any person, going 
armed with any dirk, dagger, sword, pistol, or other offensive and dangerous weapon, without 
a reasonable cause to fear an assault on himself"); THE REVISED CODE OF THE DISTRICT OF 
COLUMBIA 570 (1857) ("If any person shall go armed with a dirk, dagger, sword, pistol, or other 
offensive and dangerous weapon, without reasonable cause to fear an assault or other injury or 
violence to his person"); REVISED STATUTES OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE, TO THE YEAR OF OUR 
LORD ONE THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED AND FIFTY-TWO, 333 (1852) ("Any justice of the peace 
may also cause to be arrested . . . all who go armed offensively to the terror of the people, or are 
otherwise disorderly and dangerous."); THE STATUTES OF OREGON ENACTED AND CONTINUED IN 
FORCE BY THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY AS THE SESSION COMMENCING 5TH DECEMBER, 1853, 220 
(1854); 1870 W. Va. Laws 702, 703, ch. 153, § 8. 
 88  Compare 2 Edw. 3, c. 3 (1328) (Eng.), with 1835 Mass. Acts 750. 
 89  See A PRACTICAL TREATISE, OR AN ABRIDGEMENT OF THE LAW APPERTAINING TO THE 
OFFICE OF JUSTICE OF THE PEACE 184 (C.A. Mirick & Co. West Brookfield 1841); PETER 
OXENBRIDGE THACHER, TWO CHARGES TO THE GRAND JURY OF THE COUNTY OF SUFFOLK FOR 
THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, AT THE OPENING OF TERMS OF THE MUNICIPAL 
COURT OF THE CITY OF BOSTON, ON MONDAY, DECEMBER 5TH, A.D. 1836 AND ON MONDAY, 
MARCH 13TH, A.D. 1837, at 27–28 (Dutton & Wentworth, Boston 1837).  
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of restricting the carrying of dangerous weapons in public unless it is absolutely 
necessary to do so.90 It is a point of historical emphasis that, throughout the nineteenth-
century, the habitual or promiscuous toting of weapons was denounced as a 
"cowardly," "immoral," "evil," "wicked," "uncivilized," "lawless," and "barbarous" 
practice that was inconsistent with a well-regulated society.91 Even the late nineteenth-
century's foremost advocates of using the pistol for self-defense, whether it was in the 
home or in public, denounced the practice: 
 
As for the practice of constantly carrying pistols during ordinary business 
hours . . . too much cannot be said in condemnation of it. There is no 
possible ground for which it can be justified. Aside from the liability to 
accident . . . it begets a swaggering, reckless air in those who indulge in it. 
No man who has any regard for himself, or for the feelings of others, will 
ever put a pistol in his pocket without asking himself: "Is it necessary that 
I should go armed on this occasion?" In nine cases out of ten the answer 
will be in the negative.92 
 
Still, even if the Second Circuit, or any circuit court for that matter, thought it 
prudent to place aside these nineteenth-century variants of the Statute of Northampton 
as historically incompatible with modern "proper cause" armed carriage licensing 
laws, it is undisputed that laws requiring individuals to first obtain a license before 
carrying dangerous weapons in public are one of the most longstanding firearms 
                                                          
 90  For some examples of how these nineteenth-century variants of the Statute of 
Northampton were adjudged by nineteenth-century courts, see CHARLES, ARMED IN AMERICA, 
supra note 4, at 143–45, 154–55; State v. Barnett, 34 W. Va. 74 (1890); Tipler v. State, 57 Miss. 
365 (1880); State v. Duke, 42 Tex. 455 (1875); see also Concealed Weapons, THE CRIM. L. 
MAG. AND REP. 1886, at 403, 413–14 (summarizing the rule of law as to when there was an 
"imminent" threat and armed carriage was "reasonable"). 
 91  See CHARLES, ARMED IN AMERICA, supra note 5, at 143–44, 147, 153, 165, 172. 
 92  THE PISTOL AS A WEAPON OF DEFENSE: IN THE HOUSE AND ON THE ROAD 12 (1875); see 
also id. at iv ("while we would be all means discourage the indiscriminate carrying of firearms, 
we would recommend every one to acquire a thorough knowledge of the best methods of using 
them . . . . The author, although a firm believer in the value of the pistol, practically skilled in 
its use, and never during the last twenty years without a good one in his possession, has never, 
in all that time, carried one on more than five occasions."). It is also worth noting that the authors 
of this book conveyed the importance of obeying the armed carriage laws in different 
jurisdictions, as well as having been properly trained in the interests of public safety. Id. at 9–
10 ("It is not every one that has the right to carry an instrument which may at any moment be 
so used to cause the death of others; without hesitation we exclude from this category children 
and imbeciles, but the further question arises: Shall every man that in ordinary business matters 
is accounted of sound mind, be allowed to carry a pistol, when he chooses to do? So far as legal 
enactments are concerned, nothing can be done to discriminate between the most nervous 
individual, and the coolest and bravest man in existence. But upon those with whom moral and 
prudential considerations have as great weight as the laws of the statute book, we would urge 
that no man has a right to carry such a terribly efficient instrument of destruction unless he is 
perfectly assured of his power of self control, and of his ability to use the weapon without 
incurring the danger of injuring friends and innocent persons. Nervous and excitable persons; 
those who in any trying emergency are liable to lose their self control, and to fire at random, 
should never carry a pistol under any circumstances whatever."). 
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regulations. The first "proper cause" armed carriage licensing laws began appearing 
in the ordinance books in the mid nineteenth-century, and subsequently spread in cities 
and towns throughout the United States.93 These laws appeared everywhere, from 
Milwaukee, Wisconsin, to New York City, to Wheeling, West Virginia.94 "Proper 
cause" armed carriage laws were in fact so well accepted, that they were supported by 
both proponents and opponents to armed carriage restrictions.95 As one newspaper 
correspondent put it, discretionary armed carriage laws were preferred to others, 
particularly outright prohibitions, because they permitted "law abiding persons to go 
armed" when "forced to do so by imperative circumstances," and placed them "under 
legal responsibility in reference to the methods of its employment," yet denied the 
"highwayman, the burglar, the thief, the town brawler, and the known loafer and 
vagabond" the privilege.96  
What is perhaps most historically relevant about the spread of these first armed 
carriage licensing laws is not one nineteenth-century court—at least not that any legal 
scholar or historian has found—held such laws to be unconstitutional.97 As far as any 
historian has been able to find, only one legal challenge to armed carriage licensing 
laws was recorded.98 It was an 1883 case involving Wheeling, West Virginia's 
ordinance which prohibited the concealed carriage of "any pistol, dirk, bowie knife, 
                                                          
 93  See Charles, Faces, Take Two, supra note 4, at 419–22 n.245. 
 94  See ORDINANCES OF THE MAYOR, ALDERMEN AND COMMONALTY OF THE CITY OF NEW 
YORK, IN FORCE JANUARY 1, 1881, at 214–15 (Elliott F. Shepard & Ebenezer B. Shafer eds., 
1881); LAWS AND ORDINANCES FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE CITY OF WHEELING, WEST 
VIRGINIA 206 (1891) (1881 ordinance requiring a "permit in writing from the mayor" to carry 
"any pistol, dirk, bowie knife or weapon of the like kind," as well as prohibiting certain 
concealed weapons); THE GENERAL ORDINANCES OF THE CITY OF MILWAUKEE TO JANUARY 1, 
1896: WITH AMENDMENTS THERETO AND AN APPENDIX 692–93 (Charles H. Hamilton ed., 1896). 
For a detailed list of mid-to late nineteenth-century armed carriage licensing laws, see Charles, 
Faces, Take Two, supra note 4, at 419–22 n.245.  
 95  See Charles, Faces, Take Two, supra note 4, at 422, 424–25. 
 96  Carrying Deadly Weapons, ALBANY JOURNAL, Jan. 29, 1867, at 2. 
 97  CHARLES, ARMED IN AMERICA, supra note 5, at 158. 
 98  From a historiography standpoint, it is worth noting that not every nineteenth-century 
case pertaining to armed carriage laws (or any category of law for that matter) was fully 
recorded or published in a legal digest or case volume. The 1878 Missouri Supreme Court case 
of State v. Reando provides the perfect a case in point. The findings in the case seems to have 
only survived through a newspaper reprint of the opinion. See The Supreme Court: On Carrying 
Concealed Weapons, STATE JOURNAL (Jefferson City, MO), Apr. 12, 1878, at 2. Reando is not 
even listed in the Missouri Supreme Court Historical Database. However, Reando was briefly 
reported in an 1878 issue of the Central Law Journal. See Abstract of Decisions of the Supreme 
Court of Missouri: October Term, 1877, 6 CENTRAL L. J. 16, (1878) ("The act of the legislature 
prohibiting the conveying of fire-arms into courts, churches, etc. . . . is constitutional. It is a 
police regulation not in conflict with the provisions of the organic law . . . . State v. Reando."). 
It is also worth noting as a matter of historiography that an overwhelming majority of armed 
carriage court proceedings have been lost to history. A quick perusal of nineteenth-century 
newspapers and local police arrest records underscores this point. While there historical sources 
show the frequent enforcement of armed carriage laws, the full details of the actual court 
proceedings were rarely made public.  
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or weapon of the like kind, without a permit in writing from the mayor to do so."99 
Presiding over the case was West Virginia Circuit Judge Henry Brannon.100 Before 
the court, the defendant argued that Wheeling's armed carriage licensing law was 
unconstitutional because it infringed upon the Second Amendment and violated the 
Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities and Equal Protection Clauses.101 
In issuing his judgment, in accord with other nineteenth-century jurists, Brannon 
embraced the armed citizenry model of the Second Amendment, as well as the 
"civilized warfare" test regarding what types of arms were constitutionally 
protected.102 Brannon, however, rejected the claim that "proper cause" armed carriage 
licensing laws were even remotely in conflict with the Constitution:  
 
In this case it is urged that this act is void, because in violation of the Second 
Amendment of the Federal Constitution, which provides that "a well 
regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of 
the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed, and also because it 
grants the right to carry weapons for self-defense only to persons who are 
quite and peaceable citizens of good character and standing, and thus 
violated the fundamental principle that all citizens stand equal before the 
law: and violates that provision of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibiting 
States from passing "any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities, or deny to any person within their jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws." 
It is a very grave act for a court to overthrow and defeat an act of the 
Legislature, and should be done only when its unconstitutionality is 
manifest. Where the repugnance to the Constitution is undoubted, the judge 
must yield to that high duty of respecting the highest law, the will of the 
people expressed in the Constitution, rather than the will of the Legislature; 
but never where he is doubtful, and all doubts go in favor of the act. All 
courts hold this doctrine . . . . 
Is it the right of the citizen to wear abroad the small and insidious arms 
prohibited by this act? Or does the second amendment only guarantee the 
right to bear large arms, such as are useful in war and in defense of liberty 
                                                          
 99  LAWS AND ORDINANCES FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE CITY OF WHEELING, supra note 
94, at 206.   
 100  Judge Brannon was later appointed to the West Virginia Supreme Court and wrote one 
of the most comprehensive treaties on the constitutional meaning and purpose of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. See HENRY BRANNON, A TREATISE ON THE RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES GUARANTEED 
BY THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1901). In the 
treatise, Judge Brannon reiterated how neither the Second nor Fourteenth Amendments 
guaranteed a right to armed carriage in public: "The second [amendment] does not grant the 
right to carry a weapon . . . [nor does it] impair the state power of regulation and police in this 
respect." Id. at 92; see also id. at 290. 
 101  Concealed Weapons: Judge Brannon's Decision on This Subject, WHEELING REGISTER, 
Oct. 15, 1883, at 1. 
 102  Both the armed citizenry model of the Second Amendment and the "civilized warfare" 
test came to prominence in the early to mid-nineteenth century. See CHARLES, ARMED IN 
AMERICA, supra note 4, at 122–41. 
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against arbitrary power? Clearly the latter only. In days of tyranny long ago, 
when non archical power sought supreme way and to trample down 
freedom, history tells us that one of its favorite methods was the disarming 
of the people and wrenching from their hands and homes those arms useful 
and effective in defense of liberty and dangerous only to tyrants. In this free 
country this amendment was incorporated [via the Fourteenth 
Amendment's Privileges and Immunities Clause] to avoid the dangers of 
the past. Another reason for its adoption was this: Standing armies had been 
engines of oppression in the past, and American sentiment was opposed to 
them, and as a substitute reliance was placed on the citizen-militia, and to 
render it efficient it was desirable to train it to the use of arms common in 
war. The intimate connection in the amendment of this provision about 
learning arms with the language, "a well regulated militia being necessary 
to the security of a free state," shows that military efficiency and popular 
liberty were in the mind of its draftsman rather than individual privilege. It 
intended, it defends individual privilege to save the right of the citizen to 
keep at his home and premises arms ordinarily used in war, and has no 
reference to small weapons which may be hidden in in the pocket and first 
seen when drawn to people and the public peace are the highest objects of 
protection of the law, and this act has these high objects in view. The pistol, 
the bowie-knife, the stiletto, the slung shot, the billy, and the knuckles are 
weapons of the ruffian and law breaker, are used in the riot or affray, are 
dangerous in moments of anger or intoxication, and from them a vast 
amount of murder, bodily injury and family disasters arise, and from them 
many a bitter tear has flowed. Certainly it was never intended by the 
constitution to prohibit the Legislature from protecting the lives of the 
people and the public peace from their greatest foes; it was not intended to 
withhold the power to regulate within the bounds of prudence and 
usefulness the bearing of these weapons. It certainly cannot be converted 
into a license to the evil disposed to make their persons walking arsenals to 
run rampant over the peace of the State, and disarm the Legislature of 
power to regulate or check it. Such a construction would make the 
Constitution defend lawlessness, tumult, and anarchy, and sacrifice law, 
order and public security. I cannot wield to this dangerous construction. 
The construction of law must be reasonable. The act is wise and salutary, 
is doing good in this State, and the courts should sustain it . . . . 
. . . Remember that this act recognizes the right to keep and carry a pistol 
about one's dwelling house or premises, carrying it from the place of 
purchase [to] home, and from home to a place of repair and back again, and 
only prohibits their carriage on the premise of others and in public places. 
For the purposes of self-defense in immediate danger it[] allows a 
peaceable citizen of good character to carry weapons. These exceptions in 
the act are useful and necessary; but who will say that it is a useful or 
necessary privilege to the citizen to go abroad through the land wearing 
these deadly weapons?103 
                                                          
 103  Concealed Weapons: Judge Brannon's Decision on This Subject, supra note 101, at 1. 
As outlined in supra note 98 (discussing Reando), not every nineteenth-century case pertaining 
to armed carriage laws was fully recorded or published in a legal digest or case volume. This 
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It was at this juncture that Brannon responded to the defendant's argument that the 
discretionary portion of the armed carriage licensing law violated the Fourteenth 
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. Hereto though, considering the broad police 
powers retained by state and local governments to ensure the public safety, Brannon 
did not find the defendant's argument legally sufficient: 
 
[I]t is argued . . . that the act discriminates between citizens, by allowing 
persons of good character the right of self-defense, while denying it to 
others. It does not deny the right of self-defense, for if a person of the worst 
character were assailed and in such danger as to warrant the exercise of the 
right of self-defense and with his pistol were to slay his adversary, he could 
plead self-defense on trial for murder, whilst he might be indicted for 
carrying a pistol beforehand. It is not a denial of the plea of self-defense; it 
only denies to bad, dangerous persons the right to arms beforehand and 
carry weapons, because they are a danger to the place, whereas the law-
abiding are not. 
The power of regulation visited in the Legislature for police purposes and 
the maintenance of morals, law and order for the good of society are 
necessarily wide, even though it may seem to work discrimination between 
persons. 
The right to earn a livelihood is a great right; yet no on[e] can practice law, 
keep a hotel or sell liquor without proving a good moral character. Such 
has been the law for years, and no one has questioned its validity. A doctor 
must now prove a good character to practice. These powers of apparent 
discrimination must exist ex necessitate rei, from the necessity of the case. 
Liberty to the citizen is a great attribute and deserving of all protection; but 
it must be liberty regulated by law and consistent with the behests of 
organized civil society, not mere self-willed, arbitrary license.104  
 
Unmistakably, Brannon's opinion, and the history of nineteenth-century armed 
carriage licensing laws, is historical evidence that speaks "directly" to the 
constitutional issue that was before the Second Circuit: "Can New York limit handgun 
licenses to those demonstrating a special need for self-protection?"105 However, much 
like the Eleventh Circuit in Georgiacarry.org v. Georgia, these omissions would have 
done nothing to alter the Second Circuit's final judgment. The Second Circuit would 
have still upheld New York's "proper cause" requirement for public armed carriage. 
C. Moore v. Madigan—Precedent Defines History 
Just two weeks after the Second Circuit decided Kachalsky v. County of 
Westchester, the Seventh Circuit offered its opinion on the Second Amendment 
                                                          
case provides historians with another example. To the best of author's knowledge, the case was 
only published in the Wheeling Register. However, there may also be an unknown copy in either 
in the holdings of the National Archives or West Virginia State Archives that this author has 
been unable to locate. 
 104  Id.  
 105  Kachalsky v. Cty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 91 (2d Cir. 2012). 
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outside the home.106 The case was Moore v. Madigan, and the issue before the Seventh 
Circuit was the constitutionality of an Illinois law forbidding the carrying of an 
operable firearm for self-defense in public, either concealed or openly.107 The Illinois 
law outlined three legal exceptions: individuals carrying an operable firearm (1) on 
their own property (owned or rented); (2) within their place of business; or, (3) on the 
property of another, but only on the condition that the property owner or custodian 
had given consent to do so.108  
The legal arguments made for and against the constitutionality of the Illinois law 
mirrored those made before the Second Circuit. While the plaintiffs argued the law 
violated the Second Amendment as defined by Heller, the defendants responded that 
Heller's core holding of having access to an operable firearm for armed self-defense 
did not apply outside the home.109 Hereto, the parties relied heavily on history-in-law 
as a means to bolster their respective arguments, and it seemed that another circuit 
court was going to wade through the competing, and often contrasting, historical 
narratives on the scope of the Second Amendment outside the home.110 This ultimately 
turned out not to be the case. 
In a split opinion written by Judge Richard A. Posner, the Seventh Circuit ruled 
that it was unnecessary to look at the competing history-in-law claims given that 
Heller already provided the answer.111 What particularly stood out for Posner was 
Heller's pronouncement that the Second Amendment protects "the individual right to 
possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation."112 This made Moore an easy case 
for Posner to decide.113 The way Posner rationalized it, given that the Supreme Court 
interpreted "bear arms" to mean "carry arms," any Second Amendment rights to armed 
self-defense that exist within the home must equally apply outside the home, and 
therefore any law that completely prohibited armed self-defense in public places must 
be unconstitutional on its face.114  
                                                          
 106  Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 934–35 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 107  Id. 
 108  720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/24-1(a)(4), (10) (2018). 
 109  Moore, 702 F.3d at 934–35. 
 110  Id. at 935. 
 111  Id. ("The appellees ask us to repudiate the [Supreme] Court's historical analysis [in 
Heller]. That we can't do. Nor can we ignore the implication of the analysis that the 
constitutional right of armed self-defense is broader than the right to have a gun in one's 
home."); id. at 942 ("We are disinclined to engage in another round of historical analysis to 
determine whether eighteenth-century American understood the Second Amendment to include 
a right to bear guns outside the home. The Supreme Court has decided that the amendment 
confers a right to bear arms for self-defense, which is as important outside the home as inside."). 
 112  District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 592 (2008). 
 113  Moore, 702 F.3d at 936 ("[O]ne doesn't have to be a historian to realize that the right to 
keep and bear arms for personal self-defense in the eighteenth century could not rationally be 
limited to the home.").  
 114  Id. at 936–42. 
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Precedentially speaking, it is difficult to argue with Posner's reasoning.115 The 
Seventh Circuit is indeed bound by the historical pronouncements of the Supreme 
Court. Often times this includes any historical analysis in support of said 
pronouncements. The point is that Heller's failure to provide the lower courts with any 
jurisprudential guidance has left jurists with one of two choices when it comes to 
deciding Second Amendment cases. The first is to wrestle with Heller's conflicting 
dicta and examine each case on its merits.116 The second is to accept Heller's historical 
pronouncements on the right to armed self-defense at face value.117 As it stands today, 
either choice is arguably correct.118 Posner and the Seventh Circuit were simply the 
first to make the second choice. In Posner's mind, it was the best way to make judicial 
sense out of the "vast terra incognita" left in the wake of Heller.119 As it turns out—
as is often the case in constitutional law—there can be multiple answers to the same 
question, each of which are doctrinally persuasive. 
This is not to say that Posner's opinion is immune from history-in-law criticism. In 
fact, it is fair to characterize Posner's analysis as historical hyperbole at best.120 This 
is because of the three paragraphs in the opinion that Posner actually dedicates to the 
Founding Era, not one of the historical pronouncements contained within them 
survives rigorous academic scrutiny.121 What further undermines Posner's history-in-
law analysis is there is no substantiated historical evidence, nor positive historical 
pronouncements that suggests the Founding Fathers drafted, promulgated, or ratified 
the Second Amendment with the purpose of carrying a ready operable firearm for 
armed self-defense in public places.122  
Another history-in-law criticism of Posner's opinion in Moore is it seeks to roll 
back the Constitution to a particular time and era, all the while rejecting all other times 
and eras as inconsequential. Here, Posner chose the Founding Era as instructive, and 
understandably so, given the Second Amendment was drafted, promulgated, and 
                                                          
 115  Given Posner's previous criticism of Heller, one might view his opinion in Moore as 
surprising. See Richard A. Posner, The Incoherence of Antonin Scalia, NEW REPUBLIC (Aug. 24, 
2012), https://newrepublic.com/article/106441/scalia-garner-reading-the-law-textual-
originalism; Richard A. Posner, In Defense of Looseness, NEW REPUBLIC (Aug. 27, 2008), 
https://newrepublic.com/article/62124/defense-looseness. But a closer examination of Posner's 
judicial philosophy explains why he relied so heavily on Heller's historical pronouncements. 
See Posner, Past-Dependency, supra note 40, at 573–606; Lincoln Caplan, Rhetoric and Law: 
The Double Life of Richard Posner, America's Most Contentious Legal Reformer, HARV. MAG., 
Jan–Feb 2016. But see Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 280 (1897) (stating in dicta that 
"the right of the people to keep and bear arms is not infringed by laws prohibiting the carrying 
of concealed weapons"); Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 267 (1886) (holding that the Second 
Amendment does not protect an independent right to assemble, drill or parade with arms). 
 116  Compare Heller, 554 U.S. at 592, with Moore, 702 F.3d at 933.  
 117  See Heller, 544 U.S. at 594–95. 
 118  Moore, 702 F.3d at 943 (Williams, J., dissenting) ("The majority opinion presents one 
reading of Heller and McDonald in light of the question presented here, and its reading is not 
unreasonable."). 
 119  Id. at 942. 
 120  Id. at 943–47 (Williams, J., dissenting). 
 121  Compare id. at 936–37, with Charles, Faces, Take Two, supra note 4, at 378–401.  
 122  See CHARLES, ARMED IN AMERICA, supra note 5, at 93–98, 110–20. 
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ratified in the late eighteenth-century.123 However, by making this history-in-law 
choice, Posner in essence muted the bulk of the historical record, including the lessons 
of the American experience relating to armed carriage—lessons that significantly 
contradict Posner's decision to give Second Amendment rights outside the home the 
same force of law as inside the home. 
While there are many historical lessons that illustrate this point succinctly, one 
stands out. This lesson being that throughout most of the twentieth-century, not even 
gun-rights advocacy groups claimed there was a Second Amendment right to carry 
firearms in public places.124 From the early twentieth-century, when the editors of 
sports, hunting, and shooting magazines organized the first gun-rights movement, to 
the late 1970s, when the National Rifle Association (NRA) was leading the gun rights 
movement, time and time again, when pressed on the issue, gun-rights advocacy 
groups conceded that the Second Amendment did not protect a right to carry firearms 
in public.125 This included the NRA at one point noting that the Founding Fathers did 
not subscribe to such a right.126 Indeed, the gun-rights advocacy groups of today 
                                                          
 123  Moore, 702 F.3d at 943 (Williams, J., dissenting) (agreeing with the majority that the 
"relevant date" for any history-in-law analysis is 1791). 
 124  CHARLES, ARMED IN AMERICA, supra note 5, at 173–74, 209–11, 228, 282–83; see also 
Charles, Faces, Take Two, supra note 4, at 433–66. 
 125  See, e.g., A Joint Resolution of the National Police Officers Association and the National 
Shooting Sports Foundation, in FACT PACK II ON FIREARMS OWNERSHIP 99–101 (1970); 
Transporting Your Firearms, AM. RIFLEMAN, June 1970, at 41; National Rifle Association, 
Statement of the National Rifle Association of America at its 94th Annual Members Meeting, 
April 3, 1965, in James V. Bennett Personal Papers, Subject File, 1933–1966, box 11, National 
Rifle Association Literature (Boston: John F. Kennedy Presidential Library); NATIONAL 
FIREARMS ACT: HEARING BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS HOUSE RESOLUTION 
59 (1934); United States Revolver Association (USRA), The Case against the Anti-Revolver 
Law, in HEARING BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
ON THE PROPOSED REVENUE ACT OF 1918, PART II, at 1190–94 (Government Printing Office, 
1918); The Effects of Revolver Legislation upon Hardware Dealers, AM. ARTISAN, May 25, 
1912, at 3; see also HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM 
STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-FOURTH ANNUAL MEETING 714 (1924) (noting 
how the USRA advocates that "[g]reat care should be exercised in the drafting of a provision 
concerning the carrying of concealed weapons," and "convincing evidence of necessity should 
be required before such a permit is granted."); Anti-Pistol Legislation and Its Tendencies: A 
Bullet-Proof Revolver Law, HARDWARE REPORTER, March 21, 1913, at 59 (noting that the 
USRA, arms manufacturers, and a "great majority of dealers" favored "laws which prohibit the 
carrying of firearms, except by those persons who have secured permits from the proper 
authorities"). 
 126  See NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR AND 
SECRETARY TO THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS FOR THE CALENDAR YEAR 18 (1947) ("Most States 
have regulatory legislation of some kind. Regulations covering the carrying of weapons into 
places of public assembly were common during the Colonial period.") (on file with author). 
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maintain a much different, more expansive view,127 but it is historically indisputable 
that the chief gun-rights advocates of years past did not.128 
Consider, for instance, a statement by Stanley Spisiak before the 1967 New York 
State Constitutional Convention, written to support an amendment that would have 
enshrined the "right to possession of firearms by the people of the state for protection 
of their homes and their persons and for recreational purposes" in the New York 
Constitution.129 A former director of the NRA affiliated Erie County Sportsmen's 
                                                          
 127  See CHARLES, ARMED IN AMERICA, supra note 5, at 276–95 (examining how the meaning 
of the Second Amendment transformed at the behest of gun rights advocates in the late 
twentieth-century). 
 128  Consider the Firearms Lobby of America (FLA), which in 1970 advocated for "common 
sense" legislation regarding the "legitimate carrying of firearms." See Letter from Morgan 
Norval, Director FLA, to H. Ertle, Feb. 18, 1970, in William B. Saxbe Papers, box 27, folder 4, 
Crime-Fire Arms Control (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Archives) [hereinafter Saxbe 
Papers]. What the FLA meant by the "legitimate carrying of firearms" was not the preparatory 
carriage of loaded firearms in public places. Rather, "legitimate carrying" was the transportation 
of firearms, "properly cased and unloaded," from one jurisdiction to another without being 
hampered by local firearms laws. See Sportsmen's Bill of Rights!, AIM & FIRE: THE OFFICIAL 
PUBLICATION OF THE "FIREARMS LOBBY OF AMERICA," no. 3, at 2, in William B. Saxbe Papers, 
box 27, folder 4, Crime-Fire Arms Control. This right to transport unloaded and cased firearms 
was not intended to preempt local firearms laws altogether. Such laws "would still be in force 
for the residents of the jurisdiction and if our traveler were involved in any crime of violence 
utilizing a firearm then [they] would and should be punished under the provisions of the local 
law." Id. The FLA's firearms transportation legislation was likely inspired from a booklet of 
"positive federal firearms laws" put together by the Florida Sportsmen's Association years 
earlier. See Letter from James E. Edwards, Florida Sportsmen's Association Legislative 
Chairman, to Robert L.F. Sikes, Jan. 12, 1966, in Robert L.F. Sikes Papers, box 282, folder 
Firearms 1966 (Pensacola, FL: University of West Florida Archives) [hereinafter Sikes Papers]; 
James E. Edwards, "Positive Gun Laws," Florida Sportsmen's Association (Dec. 1965), in Sikes 
Papers, box 282, Folder Firearms 1966. One law, titled "Lawful Transport of Firearms Bill," 
would have allowed certain classes of persons to transport firearms in interstate commerce—to 
include law enforcement, military, government officials, sportsmen and hunters engaged in 
hunting or target shooting, and people changing residences—in contravention of state and local 
laws for a short period of time. Edwards, "Positive Gun Laws," in Sikes Papers, box 282, folder 
Firearms 1966, at 5-6. However, such classes of persons were required to transport the firearm 
in a "secure[] and completely enclosed . . . case or container[.]" Id. at 6. For another useful 
source showing how sportsmen were merely fighting for a basic right to transport firearms, see 
Alan S. Krug, Model Firearms Legislation, in FACT PACK II ON FIREARMS OWNERSHIP, supra 
note 125, at 32–33. 
 129  The full proposed amendment read, "[t]he right to possession of firearms by the people 
of the state for protection of their homes and their persons and for recreational purposes having 
existed since the founding of the state and the nation, and that right having been guaranteed by 
the Constitution of the United States, it is hereby confirmed by this Constitution and the 
legislature shall make no law abridging the right of the people to possess and use firearms for 
lawful purposes." See No. 253: A Proposition to Amend Article One of the Constitution, In 
Relation to the Right to Bear Arms, May 15, 1967, in Stanley Spisiak Papers, box 22, folder 8, 
Gun Legislation (Buffalo, NY: Buffalo History Museum) [hereinafter Spisiak Papers]; see also 
Bill Roden, Adirondack Sportsman, POST-STAR (Glens Falls, NY), June 22, 1967, at 15; 
HENRICK N. DULLEA, CHARTER REVISION IN THE EMPIRE STATE: THE POLITICS OF NEW YORK'S 
1967 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 257–58 (1997). The proposed amendment did not pass the 
Constitutional Convention. Rather, the delegates by a vote of ninety-nine to fifty-four approved 
a resolution in favor of stricter firearms controls. See More Control Over Firearms, ITHACA J., 
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Alliance, Spisiak was no stranger to standing up for gun rights and, in the process, 
opposing gun controls.130 However, in accord with the sportsmen of the era, Spisiak 
did not interpret the right to keep and bear arms as including a right to preparatory 
armed carriage in public places.131 "The imposition of reasonable restrictions on the 
carrying of firearms is not at all inconsistent with preserving the right to possess and, 
in proper circumstances, use a gun," stated Spisiak.132 Additionally, Spisiak noted that, 
therefore: 
 
Local ordinances forbidding the carrying of loaded guns on the streets of a 
city, or prohibiting the discharge of firearms within city or village limits 
and laws prohibiting the transporting of guns, loaded and ready to fire in 
automobiles are all reasonable restrictions with which no gun owner has a 
quarrel.133  
 
Spisiak's opinion was aligned with that of the NRA. NRA President Harold 
Glassen's speech at Duke University's Law Forum evidences this.134 In discussing the 
constitutional limits of the Second Amendment, Glassen asked the Duke students and 
faculty in attendance, "Does [the right to keep and bear arms] mean that every 
individual has a right to carry a gun at all times, concealed or openly?"135 Glassen then 
answered his own question with "[o]bviously not."136 
This is not to say that every gun-rights supporter living at that time supported 
restrictions on carrying firearms in public places. Historically speaking, there have 
                                                          
Sept. 26, 1967, at 8; Convention Backs Restrictions on Firearms Sale, POUGHKEEPSIE J., Sept. 
26, 1967, at 5. 
 130  See Conservation Unit Expanding Program at County Fair, SUN AND ERIE COUNTY 
INDEPENDENT (Hamburg, NY), July 31, 1952, at 12; Spisiak Papers, box 3, folders 1–4, Allied 
Sportsmen of Western New York Records; Spisiak Papers, box 3, folder 11, Allied Sportsmen 
of Western New York Constitution. 
 131  See CHARLES, ARMED IN AMERICA, supra note 5, at 210–11; see also Oscar Godbut, 
Wood, Field and Stream: Sportsmen Are Not Expected to Complain about Proposed Curbs on 
Weapons, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1964, at 24 (stating that sportsmen would not object to a New 
York City law prohibiting the carrying of a "loaded rifle or shotgun" unless it was in a case, and 
similar laws were "ideal safety measures"); Sportsmen's Bill of Rights!, AIM & FIRE, supra note 
128, at 2 (not objecting to laws requiring persons traveling with firearms to have them cased 
and unloaded).  
 132  Stanley Spisiak, Re: Proposition 253-B, undated, in Spisiak Papers, supra note 128, box 
22, folder 8, Gun Legislation. 
 133  Id. 
 134  Harold Glassen, Remarks Before Duke Law Forum, Feb. 18, 1969, in Harold Glassen 
Papers, box 1, at 8 (Ann Arbor, MI: Bentley Historical Library-University of Michigan) 
[hereinafter Glassen Papers]. 
 135  Id. at 7. 
 136  Id. at 8; see also [Summary of NRA's Position on Gun Controls], undated, in Glassen 
Papers, supra note 134, box 1, at 1–2 ("NRA opposes discretionary permit to acquire or possess 
[firearms] . . . . We do not oppose state laws on carrying . . . We recognized state's right to 
strictly control carrying of concealed weapons"). 
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always been gun-rights supporters who believed the "right to keep and bear arms" 
encompassed a right to carry firearms anywhere and everywhere.137 Until the mid-
1980s, however, the belief that the Second Amendment protected a right to armed 
carriage was shared only by an insular minority of gun-rights supporters.138 Even in 
the turbulent 1960s—when some extreme gun-rights advocates were challenging the 
political status quo on the constitutionality of firearms restrictions—the idea that the 
Second Amendment protected a right to carry firearms in public places was only 
accepted on the outskirts of the political fringe.139 In fact, at the time, to even advance 
such an idea to lawmakers was seen as a political death sentence for gun-rights 
advocacy.140 In the words of E.B. Mann, who in the 1960s and 1970s served as editor-
in-chief of multiple shooting magazines and served on the boards of directors of 
multiple gun-rights advocacy organizations, to "insist . . . [on] the inclusion of an 
unlicensed right to carry would inevitably foredoom [the future of gun rights] to 
failure. [Such a right] would be abused by many more people than it could benefit; 
and every abuse would do us all incalculable damage."141 
What this history demonstrates is that Posner's history-in-law justification for 
giving Second Amendment rights outside the home the same force of law as inside the 
home is not so much about adhering to principled history and tradition, but about 
selecting a useable past from which to reinforce a jurisprudential outcome. Much like 
the Second Circuit in Kachalsky, Posner could have taken the historical lessons of the 
twentieth-century and concluded that armed carriage regulations outside the home 
qualify as longstanding, and therefore any Second Amendment rights outside the 
home are much more limited than inside the home.142 However, Posner adopted a 
highly selective approach to history-in-law, an approach that can lead to very different 
results depending upon such factors as time, era, and region.143   
While the distinction between Posner's and the Second Circuit's approach to 
history-in-law is doctrinally important (given that it produced two very different 
standards of review), it is far from certain whether it would have prevented the Illinois 
                                                          
 137  For some examples, see CHARLES, ARMED IN AMERICA, supra note 5, at 147–48, 167–69, 
171–72, 210. 
 138  See infra note 139.  
 139  See, e.g., William B. Edwards, Why Not Have a Pro-Gun Law?, GUNS MAGAZINE, Sept. 
1957, at 22, 53–54 ("Contrary to what some of the more rabid pro-gun guys claim, [the Second 
Amendment] does not mean that everyone can go around carrying a gun. It does not mean that 
everyone cannot go around carrying a gun, either. The application of its meaning is in the 
expression ‘well-regulated militia.' . . . . The word ‘militia' does refer to everyone between 18 
and 45 or 50 years of age. But secondly, the amendment does not say that ‘everybody ought to 
carry a gun.'"); E.B. Mann, The Pro-Gun Law Takes Shape!, GUNS MAGAZINE, Aug. 1964, at 
15, 58 ("we must reject the writers (perhaps a half dozen) who have berated our lack of courage 
in not fighting for the right to carry without license").  
 140  E.B. Mann, A Pro-Gun Firearms Act, GUNS MAGAZINE, May 1964, at 16, 62.  
 141  Id. For more on why the NRA and other gun-rights advocates supported armed carriage 
restrictions as a general rule of thumb, see CHARLES, ARMED IN AMERICA, supra note 5, at 211. 
 142  Compare Kachalsky v. Cty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 94–96 (2d Cir. 2012), with 
Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 941 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 143  CHARLES, HISTORICISM, supra note 13, at 115–16; Charles, Faces, Take Two, supra note 
4, at 481. 
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law from being struck down as unconstitutional.144 On the one hand, history-in-law 
supports concluding that the Illinois law is a constitutional exercise of state police 
power, that is, if one accepts at face value the statements of chief gun rights advocates 
regarding armed carriage for most of the twentieth-century. Time and time again, these 
advocates conceded that the Second Amendment was not intended to protect a right 
to carry operable firearms in public places.145 Only ancillary carry rights such as 
carrying firearms while hunting or transporting inoperable firearms from place to 
place were deemed protected.146 The Illinois law appears to have accounted for these 
ancillary carry rights. On the other hand, history-in-law also supports striking down 
the Illinois law as unconstitutional, that is, if one accepts late twentieth-century 
historical developments as authoritative.147 By the turn of the twentieth-century it was 
generally accepted, as a matter of law, that although state and local governments 
                                                          
 144  Compare Moore, 702 F.3d at 941 ("the court in Kachalsky used the distinction between 
self-protection inside and outside the home mainly to suggest that a standard less demanding 
than ‘strict scrutiny' should govern the constitutionality of laws limiting the carrying of guns 
outside the home; our analysis is not based on degrees of scrutiny, but on Illinois's failure to 
justify the most restrictive gun law of any of the 50 states."), with id. at 947–54 (Williams, J., 
dissenting) (upholding the law under intermediate scrutiny); see also Dorf, Does Heller Protect 
a Right to Carry Guns, supra note 2, at 230 ("accepting Heller, we must begin with at least a 
presumption against any firearms ban. The harm addressed by a ban on carrying firearms in 
public must be at least as substantial as the harm addressed by a ban on firearms in the home."). 
 145  See Kates, Handgun Prohibition, supra note 84, at 267; Basic Facts of Firearms 
Controls, AM. RIFLEMAN, Feb. 1964, at 14; Merritt A. Edson, The Right to Bear Arms, AM. 
RIFLEMAN, July 1955, at 16; Merritt A. Edson, To Keep and Bear Arms, AM. RIFLEMAN, Aug. 
1952, at 16; Harold W. Glassen, Right to Bear Arms Is Older than the Second Amendment, AM. 
RIFLEMAN, Apr. 1973, at 22; There Ought to Be a Law!, AM. RIFLEMAN, Oct. 1956, at 16; 
Transporting Your Firearms, AM. RIFLEMAN, June 1970, at 41; see also Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari at 9, Quilici v. Vill. of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1982) (No. 82-1934) 
("[B]ased on 18th Century usage . . . the Amendment's guarantee is plainly individual in nature, 
and . . . it extends to the keeping of small arms for any legitimate purpose—but that individuals 
may carry them outside the home only in the course of militia service."). 
 146  See, e.g., NRA Basic Policy, AM. RIFLEMAN, July 1964, at 31 ("The NRA is opposed to 
the theory that a target shooter, hunter, or collector, in order to transport a handgun for lawful 
purposes, should be required to meet the conditions for a permit to carry a concealed weapon . 
. . ."); Edson, To Keep and Bear Arms, supra note 145, at 16 ("The right to own a personal 
weapon amounts to little without the corresponding right to carry it from place to place—from 
home to range, from tournament to tournament, in the upland country in search for birds, or in 
the deepest wilds in the hunt for game."). 
 147  See Charles, Faces, Take Two, supra note 4, at 471–74. From the early to the mid-
twentieth century, there were a myriad of approaches by state and local governments pertaining 
to the preparatory armed carriage of firearms in public. Some state and local jurisdictions 
prohibited the preparatory armed carriage of firearms altogether, whether done openly or 
concealed. Some required a license to carry, whether done openly or concealed. Meanwhile, 
others prohibited the preparatory concealed carriage of firearms, yet permitted their open 
carriage so long as the person maintained a license to do so. For the varying approaches to 
armed carriage from the early to mid-twentieth century, see F.J.K. Restrictions on the Right to 
Bear Arms: State and Federal Firearms Legislation, 98 U. PA. L. REV. 905, 909–10 (1950); Sam 
B. Warner, The Uniform Pistol Act, 29 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 529, 539–43 (1938); Digest 
of State Firearms Laws, Part I and Part II, AM. RIFLEMAN, Nov. 1936, at 26–27; Digest of State 
Firearms Laws, Part III and Part IV, AM. RIFLEMAN, Jan. 1937, at 32–33. 
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maintained broad police power to regulate dangerous weapons in the interest of public 
safety, they could not completely extinguish individuals from exercising their right to 
self-defense in extreme cases.148 The Illinois law being challenged in Moore did not 
provide any self-defense exception.149 
D. Peterson v. Martinez—Consensus History 
In 2013, the Tenth Circuit decided Peterson v. Martinez, which involved a 
constitutional challenge to Colorado's concealed carry law as it applied to out-of-state 
residents.150 The plaintiff, a resident of Washington State, was denied a Colorado 
concealed carry license on the grounds that he did not meet Colorado's statutory 
residency requirement.151 Subsequently, the plaintiff sued on multiple grounds; one of 
which was the law violated the Second Amendment because it prohibited most out-
of-state citizens "any meaningful opportunity . . . to bear arms" in Colorado.152 The 
Tenth Circuit approached the plaintiff's Second Amendment claim much in the same 
way that other circuit courts have done. It started at step one of a two-step inquiry.153 
At this step, much like the Seventh Circuit in Moore, the Tenth Circuit afforded 
considerable weight to Heller's historical pronouncements.154  
Where the Tenth Circuit distinguished itself, however, was by limiting the step one 
inquiry to the concealed carriage of firearms.155 This made the Second Amendment 
challenge an easy one for the Tenth Circuit to dismiss.156 From the Tenth Circuit's 
perspective, not only did Heller positively cite to a number of nineteenth-century cases 
upholding concealed carriage bans, but legal scholars and historians from across the 
ideological spectrum agree that concealed carry laws are some of the most 
longstanding firearms restrictions in American history.157  
The Tenth Circuit applied what can best be described as a consensus history 
approach.158 It is an approach that is the least susceptible to criticism as a matter of 
history-in-law because it only relies on those broader facets of history that are 
undisputed.159 As for any history-in-law criticism of Peterson, there is nothing that 
                                                          
 148  CHARLES, ARMED IN AMERICA, supra note 5, at 312. 
 149  See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/24-1(a)(4), (10), -1.6(a). 
 150  Peterson, 707 F.3d at 1202. 
 151  Id. 
 152  Id. at 1202–03. 
 153  Id. at 1211. 
 154  Id. at 1207–10. 
 155  Id. at 1211. 
 156  Id. ("Given [Supreme Court dicta] and the Supreme Court's admonition in Heller that 
‘nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions,' we conclude 
that Peterson's Second Amendment claim fails at step on of our two-step analysis: the Second 
Amendment does not confer a right to carry concealed weapons.") (citations omitted). 
 157  Id. at 1207–12. 
 158  See Charles, History in Law, supra note 42, at 48 (stating the consensus approach relies 
"on those broader facets of the evidentiary record that are not in historical dispute."). 
 159  See Nelson, History and Neutrality, supra note 34, at 1277–83; see also Posner, Past-
Dependency, supra note 40, at 595 ("There is no problem with judges using history when there 
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stands out. If anything, the Tenth Circuit should be commended for taking the history-
in-law path of least resistance.  
But even if the Tenth Circuit adopted a different history-in-law approach in 
Peterson, it would not make much of a difference. Regardless of whether the Tenth 
Circuit narrowly tailored the historical inquiry like the Eleventh Circuit, used history 
as a guidepost as did the Second Circuit, or relied exclusively on Heller's historical 
pronouncements like the Seventh Circuit, the jurisprudential outcome would remain 
the same. The outcome being that, throughout most of American history, the concealed 
carriage of dangerous weapons in public places has been subject to regulation under 
the government's police power, and therefore, the concealed carriage of dangerous 
weapons in public is outside the Second Amendment's protective scope.160  
E. Peruta v. County of San Diego—Consensus History Defeats Choice of History  
If the consensus approach adopted by the Tenth Circuit is the least susceptible to 
history-in-law criticism, it begets the question of what history-in-law approach is the 
most susceptible? The answer for many historians is originalism, which is a form of 
constitutional interpretation and construction that views the Constitution's text as a 
past to be preserved for the present.161 While there are many history-in-law criticisms 
of originalism, two are chief among them.162 The first is, although historical texts, 
evidence, and sources are the foundation of any originalist inquiry, the manner in 
which those historical texts, evidence, and sources are interpreted and utilized is not 
                                                          
is a consensus among professional historians."); Flaherty, supra note 36, at 554 ("If historical 
scholarship in a given area has settled on a certain account, or more likely, on a framework for 
debate, historical assertions that acknowledge that account or framework will simply be more 
persuasive."). 
 160  See, e.g., Charles, Faces, Take Two, supra note 4, at 401–65. 
 161  See JOHN O. MCGINNIS & MICHAEL RAPPAPORT, ORIGINALISM AND THE GOOD 
CONSTITUTION 117 (Harvard Univ. Press, 2013) ("Originalist interpretive theories argue that the 
actual meaning of the Constitution is fixed as of the time of its enactment."); Jack M. Balkin, 
The New Originalism and the Uses of History, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 641, 647 (2013) 
("According to the originalist model of authority, constitutional interpretations are legitimate to 
the extent that they are consistent with what is fixed at the time of adoption; they are illegitimate 
to the extent that they are not."); Randy E. Barnett, The Gravitational Force of Originalism, 82 
FORDHAM L. REV. 411, 412 (2013) ("New Originalism stands for the proposition that the 
meaning of a written constitution should remain the same until it is properly changed."); Nelson 
Lund, The Second Amendment, Heller, and Originalist Jurisprudence, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1343, 
1372 (2009) ("The core of originalism is the proposition that text and history impose 
meaningful, binding constraints on interpretive discretion."); Keith E. Whittington, 
Originalism: A Critical Introduction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 375, 377–78 (2013) (stating that 
originalists agree that the text "historically fixed" is at the heart of originalism); see also PAUL 
W. KAHN, LEGITIMACY AND HISTORY: SELF-GOVERNMENT IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL 
THEORY 59 (Yale Univ. Press, 1992). 
 162  For some prominent historical criticisms of new originalism, see Jack N. Rakove, Joe 
the Ploughman Reads the Constitution, or, The Poverty of Public Meaning Originalism, 48 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 575 (2011); Saul Cornell, The People's Constitution vs. the Lawyer's 
Constitution: Popular Constitutionalism and the Original Debate Over Originalism, 23 YALE 
J. L. & HUM. 295 (2011); see also H. Jefferson Powell, Rules for Originalists, 73 VA. L. REV. 
659 (1987) (providing criticisms of original intent originalism that in many instances equally 
apply to new originalism). 
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one and the same with history.163 The reason for this requires contrasting originalism's 
purpose, with that of history. While the purpose of history is to preserve the past for 
the sake of preserving the past—that is to provide a highly contextualized 
understanding of the past—the purpose of originalism is to merely harness the 
authoritative power of history to provide answers to constitutional questions.164 To 
state it more simply, originalism is not history. It is a fact that originalism's chief 
proponents openly concede.165 
This brings us to the second chief criticism of originalism. Because originalism is 
about producing jurisprudential outcomes—to include jurisprudential outcomes that 
history cannot remotely answer—originalism is often susceptible to manipulation.166 
This can be easily achieved by stacking the evidentiary deck in one's favor, all the 
while ignoring historical context.167 Methodologically speaking, this is accomplished 
when originalists synthesize copious amounts of unrelated historical texts in search of 
a common meaning.168 This common meaning is then used to bend, alter, or omit 
historical evidence in a way that produces subjective outcomes.169 
                                                          
 163  See, e.g., Lee J. Strang, Originalism's Promise, and Its Limits, 63 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 81, 
98 (2014). 
 164  See Patrick J. Charles, The ‘Originalism is Not History' Disclaimer, 63 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 
ET CETERA 1, 6–7 (2015). 
 165  See, e.g., Kurt T. Lash, The Fourteenth Amendment, Original Meaning Originalism and 
How to Approach the Historical Record: A Response to David Upham, LIBR. OF L. & LIBERTY 
(Oct. 8, 2014), http://www.libertylawsite.org/2014/10/08/the-fourteenth-amendment-original-
meaning-originalism-and-how-to-approach-the-historical-record-a-response-to-david-upham/ 
(noting that originalism is not about getting history right, but about "the original meaning of the 
text . . . by investigating the historical usage of terms . . . to determine the likely understanding 
of a competent speaker of the English language."); Michael Rappaport, Gordon Wood on 
History and Originalism, LIBR. OF L. & LIBERTY (Oct. 24, 2013), 
http://www.libertylawsite.org/2013/10/24/gordon-wood-on-history-and-originalism/ (stating 
that new originalism is about the "investigation of legal meanings" rather than an attempt to 
"understand the past to the full extent that a historian needs to."); see also Gary Lawson, No 
History, No Certainty, No Legitimacy . . . No Problem: Originalism and the Limits of Legal 
Theory, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1551, 1559 (2012). 
 166  Charles, The ‘Originalism is Not History' Disclaimer, supra note 164, at 6–10. 
 167  See, e.g., Eric Berger, Originalism's Pretenses, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 329, 331, 345–65 
(2013); Rakove, Joe the Ploughman, supra note 162, at 578; see also Larry Kramer, Two (More) 
Problems with Originalism, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 907, 907 (2008); Caleb Nelson, 
Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 520 (2003). 
 168  New originalism refers to this as determining a text's "public meaning" or "public 
understanding." See Keith Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 599 
(2004); Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611 (1999); Gary 
Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327 (2002). 
 169  A prime example is the First Amendment's Press Clause. Compare Patrick J. Charles & 
Kevin F. O'Neill, Saving the Press Clause from Ruin: The Customary Origins of a "Free Press" 
as Interface to the Present and Future, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 1691, 1732 (2012) (undergoing a 
contextual history approach), with Eugene Volokh, ‘The Freedom…of the Press,' From 1791 to 
1868 to Now: Freedom for the Press as an Industry or the Press as a Technology, 160 U. PA. 
L. REV. 459, 535–40 (2011) (undergoing a new originalism approach). For more on how new 
originalism's focus on text often leads results that contradict what a thorough historical inquiry 
provides, see Stephen M. Feldman, Constitutional Interpretation and History: New Originalism 
30https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol67/iss2/7
2019] THE FACES OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT 227 
 
Understanding these chief history-in-law criticisms of originalism are important, 
for they pervade the Ninth Circuit's decision in Peruta v. County San Diego 
(hereinafter Peruta I).170 At issue in the case was the constitutionality of California's 
"proper cause" requirement for the concealed carrying of a handgun.171 Much like in 
New York, California's law affords local officials discretion in determining whether 
an individual needed to carry a concealed firearm in public places before being 
permitted to do so.172 Also, much like in New York, California's law was challenged 
on the grounds that affording local officials such discretion was an affront to the 
Second Amendment.173 
In a split opinion written by Judge Diarmuid O'Scannlain, the Ninth Circuit ruled 
that California's "proper cause" law was unconstitutional, not because "concealed 
carry per se" was "outside the scope of the right to bear arms," but because California 
law also prohibited the open carriage of an operable firearm in public.174 To 
O'Scannlain, this fact was crucial to the outcome of the case, to which he stated that:  
 
Peruta seeks a concealed carry permit because that the only type of permit 
available in the state. As the California legislature has limited its permitting 
scheme to concealed carry—and has thus expressed a preference for the 
manner of arms-bearing—a narrow challenge to San Diego County 
regulations on concealed carry . . . is permissible.175  
 
To support this outcome, O'Scannlain relied almost exclusively on  originalist 
methodologies. O'Scannlain started his opinion by analyzing the original public 
meaning of the phrase "bear arms."176 Ultimately, O'Scannlain concluded, in accord 
with Heller, that to "bear arms" is to "carry arms," and such a conclusion "strongly" 
infers that the Second Amendment "secures a right to carry a firearm in some fashion 
outside the home."177 From there, O'Scannlain managed to fashion a one-sided 
narrative in which the Second Amendment outside the home and inside the home were 
historically understood to be one and the same.178 O'Scannlain accomplished this by 
breaking virtually every history-in-law objectivity rule, including omitting historical 
                                                          
or Eclecticism?, 28 BYU J. PUB. L. 283, 288–89 (2014); Stephen M. Griffin, Rebooting 
Originalism, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1185, 1214–15 (2008); Helen Irving, Constitutional 
Interpretation, the High Court, and the Discipline of History, 41 FED. L. REV. 95, 97 (2013). 
 170  Peruta v. Cty. of San Diego (Peruta I), 742 F.3d 1144, 1172 (9th Cir. 2014), rev’d en 
banc, 824 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 2016); see Darrell A.H. Miller, Peruta, the Home-Bound Second 
Amendment, and Fractal Originalism, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 238, 239 (2014). 
 171  Peruta I, 742 F.3d at 1147–49. 
 172  CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 26150, 26155 (2012). 
 173  Peruta I, 742 F.3d at 1196.  
 174  Id. 
 175  Id. at 1172–73. 
 176  Id. at 1152–53. 
 177  Id. at 1153. 
 178  Id. at 1170. 
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evidence, fabricating history, explaining away conflicting historical evidence, and so 
forth, all under the false flag of having conducted the most "complete historical 
analysis of the scope and nature of the Second Amendment right outside the home."179   
 It would have been understandable if O'Scannlain would have followed the path 
of Posner and declared that the history of the Second Amendment outside the home 
was settled as a precedential matter.180 O'Scannlain, however, went demonstrably 
further by picking and choosing which historical sources are right, or consistent with 
a broad right to armed individual self-defense, and which sources are wrong, or 
contradict the recognition of such a broad right.181 Equally concerning is that, at no 
point, did O'Scannlain even attempt to examine how the American tradition of armed 
carriage evolved, when it evolved, how it evolved, and why it evolved.182 Rather, 
O'Scannlain focused intently on highlighting a handful of nineteenth-century cases, 
treatises and texts (often selectively quoting them) that supported a one-sided 
historical narrative.183  
There are indeed other history-in-law concerns with O'Scannlain's opinion; the 
most notable being the opinion's assessment of English history and tradition.184 
According to O'Scannlain, English law only prohibited the carriage of "uncommon, 
frightening weapons," but "wearing ordinary weapons in ordinary circumstances 
posed no problem."185 O'Scannlain supports this proposition by relying on a strand of 
scholarship, generally referred to as the "Standard Model" Second Amendment in 
academic circles,186 which claims that the 1328 Statute of Northampton was almost 
never enforced, and when it was enforced, it was only in instances where the carrying 
of arms was done in a reckless manner that terrified the people.187  
                                                          
 179  Id. at 1173; see also id. at 1175 (criticizing other circuit courts opinions on the Second 
Amendment outside the home for "evading an in-depth analysis of history and tradition"). 
 180  See Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 943 (7th Cir. 2012) (Williams, J., dissenting) ("The 
majority opinion presents one reading of Heller and McDonald in light of the question presented 
here, and its reading is not unreasonable."). 
 181  Miller, supra note 170, at 239–40. 
 182  See Peruta I, 742 F.3d at 1147–79.  
 183  Compare id. at 1157–66, with id. at 1185–90 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 184  See id. at 1154. 
 185  Id. 
 186  See Don B. Kates, A Modern Historiography of the Second Amendment, 56 UCLA L. 
REV. 1211, 1212 (2009). The first commentator to coin the term "Standard Model" was Glenn 
Harlan Reynolds. See Glenn Harlan Reynolds, A Critical Guide to the Second Amendment, 62 
TENN. L. REV. 461, 463 (1995). 
 187  See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, The First and Second Amendments, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 
SIDEBAR 97, 101 (2009); JOYCE LEE MALCOLM, TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS: THE ORIGINS OF AN 
ANGLO-AMERICAN RIGHT 105 (1994). For a background history on how this interpretation of the 
Statute of Northampton developed in Standard Model Second Amendment circles, see Charles, 
Faces, Take Two, supra note 4, at 392–93, 466–69; Charles, Historiographical Crisis, supra 
note 4, at 1800–06. 
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What O'Scannlain overlooks, however, is that the Standard Model's historical take 
on the Statute of Northampton has been thoroughly debunked.188 The fact of the matter 
is that the Statute of Northampton was frequently enforced as a prohibition on carrying 
dangerous weapons in the public concourse.189 To this effect, the royal proclamations 
of Henry IV, Henry VI, Elizabeth I, and James I confirm its enforcement.190 Elizabeth 
I's proclamations are particularly significant, given that the Statute of Northampton's 
restriction was extended to modern weaponry, to include firearms, pistols, and 
concealable weapons.191 James I reinforced this rule of law, but it was Elizabeth I's 
proclamations that legal commentators took notice of from the late sixteenth century 
through the eighteenth century.192 This history was either purposely omitted, or 
                                                          
 188  See Peruta I, 742 F.3d at 1182–84 (Thomas, J., dissenting). To date, there have been two 
scholarly attempts to salvage a limited reading of the Statute of Northampton. See Kopel, The 
First Century of Right to Arms Litigation, supra note 4, at 133–40; NICHOLAS J. JOHNSON ET 
AL., FIREARMS LAW AND THE SECOND AMENDMENT: REGULATION, RIGHTS, AND POLICY 91–99 
(2017). However, these scholarly attempts omit key historical evidence that rebuts their overall 
findings. See Tim Harris, The Right to Bear Arms in English and Historical Context, A RIGHT 
TO BEAR ARMS?: THE CONTESTED ROLE OF HISTORY IN CONTEMPORARY DEBATES ON THE 
SECOND AMENDMENT (Jennifer Tucker, Barton C. Hacker, and Margaret Vining eds., 
forthcoming 2019) (on file with author); Charles, Faces, Take Two, supra note 4, at 379–401, 
accord CHARLES, ARMED IN AMERICA, supra note 5, at 114–20 (formally crediting Harris for 
having corrected the history surrounding Sir John Knight's case). 
 189  Charles, Faces of the Second Amendment, supra note 4, at 11–19. 
 190  Id. at 16–17, 20–23. 
 191  See CALENDAR OF STATE PAPERS DOMESTIC: ELIZABETH, 1601–03, WITH ADDENDA 
1547–65, at 214 (June 1602) (Mary Anne Everett Green ed., 1870); BY THE QUENNE ELIZABETH 
I: A PROCLAMATION AGAINST THE CARRIAGE OF DAGS, AND FOR REFORMATION OF SOME OTHER 
GREAT DISORDERS 1 (Christopher Barker, London 1594); BY THE QUENNE ELIZABETH I: A 
PROCLAMATION AGAINST THE COMMON USE OF DAGGES, HANDGUNNES, HARQUEBUZES, 
CALLIUERS, AND COTES OF DEFENCE 1 (Christopher Barker, London 1579); see also 
INSTRUCTIONS TO THE CONSTABLES OF RYE UPON THE LATE PROCLAMATION AGAINST THE 
COMMON USE OF "DAGGES, HANDGUNNES, HARQUEBUTS, CALIVERS AND COATS OF DEFENCE" 
(The National Archives, East Sussex Record Office 1578–1579) (on file with author) ("Ye are 
to have a dilligent care to suche as ye shall see to carry any dagges, pistolles, harquebusies, 
calivers and suche leike in the stretes or other places within the liberties (excepte at the days of 
common musters and to the places of exercise for the shot) and if ye fynde eny to carry eny such 
peces to staie them and to cease the said peces, and them to present to Mr. Maior or one of the 
jurates of your ward."); BY THE QUENE [ELIZABETH I], FOR AS MUCH AS CONTRARY TO GOOD 
ORDER AND EXPRESSED LAWES MADE BY PARLIAMENTE IN THE XXXIII YERE OF THE RAIGNE OF 
THE QUENES MAJESTIES MOST NOBLE FATHER OF WORTHY MEMORY KYNG HENRY THE EIGHT 1 
(1559) ("Many men do daily . . . ryde with Handgonnes & Dagges, under the length of three 
quarters of a yarde, whereupon have folowed occasions for sundrye lewde and evyll persons, 
with such unlawfull Gonnes and Dagges now in time of peace to execute greate and notable 
Robberies, and horrible murders . . . Her Majestie consyderying, witht he advyse of her 
Counsayle, howe beneficiall a lawe the same is, and specially at this tyme moste nedefull of 
dewe execution, and howe negligently it is of late observed: Strayghtly therefore chargeth and 
commandeth, not onely all maner her loving subjects fro[m] henceforth to have good and 
specyall regarde to the due execution of the same Statute, and of every part thereof . . . ."). 
 192  See, e.g., MICHAEL DALTON, THE COUNTREY JUSTICE, CONTAINING THE PRACTICES OF THE 
JUSTICES OF THE PEACE OUT OF THEIR SESSIONS 129 (London, Printed for the Society of 
Stationers, 1618) ("All such as shall go or ryde armed (offensively) in Fayres, Markets, or 
elsewhere; or shall weare or carry any Dagges or Pistolls charged: it seemeth any Constable 
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carelessly overlooked, by the strand of Second Amendment scholarship that 
O'Scannlain relied upon.  
This historiographical oversight on the Statute of Northampton, although 
important in distinguishing myth from fact, is minor compared to O'Scannlain's use of 
early nineteenth-century history. To the untrained eye, O'Scannlain's analysis of 
nineteenth-century case law may appear valid.193 There were indeed a number of 
Antebellum Era court decisions that constitutionally distinguished between the open 
and concealed carriage of dangerous weapons.194 While the former was sometimes 
deemed constitutionally protected, the latter was not.195 This was not always the 
case,196 but from the early to mid-nineteenth century, based largely on these court 
decisions, there were regions and pockets within the United States that understood the 
Second Amendment as constitutionally protecting some aspects of open carriage.197 
                                                          
seeing this, may arrest them and may carrie them before the Justice of the Peace. And the Justice 
may binde them to the peace, yeah though those persons were so armed or weaponed for their 
defence; for they might have had the peace against the other persons: and besides, it striketh a 
feare and terror into the Kings subjects."); JOSEPH KEBLE, AN ASSISTANCE TO THE JUSTICES OF 
THE PEACE FOR THE EASIER PERFORMANCE OF THEIR DUTY 224 (London, W. Rawlings, et al. eds., 
2d ed. 1689). ("if any person whatsoever (except the Kings Servants and Ministers in his 
presence, or in executing his Precepts or other Officers, or such as shall assist them, and except 
it be upon the Hue-and-cry make to keep the peace, &c.) shall be so bold as to go or ride Armed, 
by night or by day, in Fairs, Markets, or any other places . . . then any Constable, or any of the 
said Officers may take such Armour from him for the Kings use, and may also commit him to 
the Goal; and therefore it shall be good in this behalf for these Offices to stay and Arrest all 
such persons as they shall find to carry Dags or Pistols, or to be appareled with Privy-Coats or 
Doublets"); WILLIAM LAMBARDE, THE DUTIES OF CONSTABLES, BORSHOLDERS, TYTHINGMEN, 
AND SUCH OTHER LOW AND LAY MINISTERS OF THE PEACE 12-13 (1602) ("if any person 
whatsoever (except the king's servants and ministers in her presence, or in executing her 
precepts, or other offices, or such as shall assist them and except it be upon Hue and Crie made 
to keep the peace, and that in places where acts against the Peace do happen) shall be so bold, 
as to goe, or ride armed, by night, or by day, in Faires, Markets, or any other places: then any 
Constable, or any other of the said Officers, may take such Armour from him, for the Queenes 
use, & may also commit him to the Gaole. And therefore, it shall be good in this behalfe, for 
the Officers to stay and arrest all such persons as they shall find to carry Dags or Pistols, or to 
be appareled with privie coates, or doublets: as by the proclamation (of Queen Eliz.)."; 
FERDINANDO PULTON, DE PACE REGIS ET REGNI VIZ 4 (London, Printed for the Companie of 
Stationers, 1609) (writing the Statute of Northampton served "not onely to preserve peace, & to 
eschew quarrels, but also to take away the instruments of fighting and batterie, and to cut off all 
meanes that may tend in affraie or feare of the people."). 
 193  Peruta I, 742 F.3d at 1156–60. 
 194  See, e.g., State v. Reid, 1 Ala. 612, 622 (1840); Nunn v. State, 1 Ga 243, 259 (1846); 
State v. Chandler, 5 La. Ann. 489, 490 (1850). 
 195  Id. 
 196  See, e.g., State v. Buzzard, 4 Ark. 18, 27 (1842) (rejecting the open carriage-concealed 
carriage distinction unless the armed carriage was in support of the common defense); Aymette 
v. State, 21 Tenn. 154, 159 (1840) (same). 
 197  Charles, Faces, Take Two, supra note 4, at 407–08. 
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Herein lies the chief history-in-law problem with O'Scannlain's opinion—it is an 
early to mid-nineteenth century reflection of only a portion of the United States.198 
The attitudes of the rest of the United States are cast aside as insignificant.199 This is 
not to say that it is never acceptable for jurists to choose one historical narrative over 
another. For the law, unlike history, requires providing definitive answers to questions, 
even when the evidence does not speak with one voice.200 But, when choosing one 
historical narrative over another, a jurist should at a minimum explain why the 
historical narrative chosen is more historically persuasive or jurisprudentially 
acceptable than the other.201 O'Scannlain failed to do this, and he further failed to 
explore the historical background of the open carriage-concealed carriage distinction. 
If O'Scannlain would have done this, he would have learned it was largely based on 
southern notions of vengeance and honor through dueling, as well as maintaining the 
institution of slavery.202 
Unbeknownst to O'Scannlain, his failure to historically expound upon the open 
carriage-concealed carriage distinction set the stage for one of the most historically 
inverse court opinions in modern history. This is because, in surveying the Antebellum 
Era, O'Scannlain embraced a historical narrative tied to the institution of slavery. Yet, 
when surveying the post-Civil War Era, O'Scannlain selected a historical narrative tied 
to the abolition of slavery. In particular, O'Scannlain morally defended recognizing 
broad Second Amendment rights outside the home by holding up the historical 
example of the Black Codes, which were sets of laws adopted after the Civil War, 
primarily in the South, with the intent of subjugating free blacks.203 In a number of 
states, the Black Codes included prohibitions on free blacks owning, using, or carrying 
firearms in private or public.204  
                                                          
 198  There are other history-in-law problems with O'Scannlain's use of nineteenth-century 
case law, particularly O'Scannlain's coverage of Bliss v. Commonwealth, 2 Litt. 90 (1822). 
O'Scannlain frames the case as being "especially significant" to the nineteenth-century 
understanding of the Second Amendment. Peruta I, 742 F.3d at 1156 (quoting Lund, The 
Second Amendment, supra note 161, at 1360). What O'Scannlain overlooks is that Bliss was a 
complete outlier in constitutional law. See Patrick J. Charles, Restoring "Life, Liberty, and the 
Pursuit of Happiness" in Our Constitutional Jurisprudence: An Exercise in Legal History, 20 
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 457, 502-17 (2011) (examining late eighteenth-century conceptions 
of constitutional interpretation). Moreover, the Bliss opinion was uniformly rejected by every 
nineteenth-century court that followed, as well as by the Kentucky legislature. See Cornell, The 
Early American Origins of the Modern Gun Control Debate, supra note 61, at 586. 
 199  Peruta I, 742 F.3d at 1182 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting that "[c]are is . . . required to 
avoid the danger inherent in any exercise of historiography; that we assemble history to fit a 
pre-conceived theory."). 
 200  CHARLES, HISTORICISM, supra note 13, at 9; see also Barry Friedman, Book Review: The 
Turn to History, 72 N.Y.U.L. REV. 928, 947 (1997) ("Lawyers are different from historians: 
historians ask questions out of curiosity of the past, lawyers use the past to score advocacy 
points in the present."). 
 201  CHARLES, HISTORICISM, supra note 13, at 116–18 (discussing the objectivity and 
legitimacy considerations when choosing between two historical narratives). 
 202  Ruben & Cornell, Firearm Regionalism, supra note 4, at 124–28. 
 203  Peruta I, 742 F.3d at 1161–63. 
 204  For more on the history of Black Codes, see Barry A. Crouch, "All the Vile Passions": 
The Texas Black Code of 1866, 97 THE SOUTHWESTERN HISTORICAL Q. 12 (1993); Joe M. 
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Placing the inverse nature of O'Scannlain's choice of history aside, there is also a 
factual issue with O'Scannlain's historical reliance on the Black Codes. While 
O'Scannlain is correct that the Black Codes were indeed racially motived and an 
atrocious violation of civil rights, it is quite the historical leap of faith for O'Scannlain 
to assume that the Black Codes, and all nineteenth-century armed carriage laws, are 
somehow one and the same.205 There is no substantiated evidence, at least not in 
historical context, to support such a theory.206 To be clear, racism was not the impetus 
for the overwhelming majority of nineteenth-century armed carriage laws. Quelling 
violence, preventing crime, and mitigating public injury were, however.207  
The overall point to be made is, despite O'Scannlain flaunting his historical 
analysis on the Second Amendment outside the home as being both "complete" and 
"in-depth," his analysis is anything but.208 As noted earlier, O'Scannlain's opinion 
ignores that much of the United States did not subscribe to the open carriage-concealed 
carriage distinction.209 Rather, these parts of the United States viewed preparatory 
armed carriage in public places, whether done openly or concealed, to be a disturbance 
of the public peace. But, what is most concerning regarding O'Scannlain's choice of 
history is it would essentially undo nearly two centuries of constitutional jurisprudence 
on armed carriage.  
The fact of the matter is, by the close of the nineteenth-century, the Antebellum 
South's open carriage-concealed carriage distinction was no longer jurisprudentially 
prevalent.210 Even in much of the South, the open carriage-concealed carriage 
distinction was gradually replaced with a national standard on the law and armed 
carriage, a standard that provided state and local governments broad police powers to 
                                                          
Richardson, Florida Black Codes, 47 THE FLA. HIST. Q. 365 (1969); THEODORE BRANTNER 
WILSON, THE BLACK CODES OF THE SOUTH (1965); James B. Browning, The North Carolina 
Black Code, 15 THE JOURNAL OF NEGRO HISTORY 461 (1930). 
 205  For the relevance of the Black Codes and understanding the nineteenth-century 
conception of the Second Amendment, see CHARLES, ARMED IN AMERICA, supra note 5, at 136–
39.  
 206  For decades, those scholars writing in support of the Standard Model Second 
Amendment have falsely claimed that all gun controls are racist, seemingly with the intent of 
demonizing gun control. For some influential Standard Model works making this claim, see 
DAVID P. KOPEL, THE TRUTH ABOUT GUN CONTROL 11–15 (2013); STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, 
SECURING CIVIL RIGHTS (2010); Robert J. Control & Raymond T. Diamond, "Never Intended to 
be Applied to the White Population": Firearms Regulation and Racial Disparity—The 
Redeemed South's Legacy to a National Jurisprudence?, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1307 (1995); 
Clayton E. Cramer, The Racist Roots of Gun Control, 4 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 17 (1995); 
Robert J. Control and Raymond T. Diamond, The Second Amendment: Toward an Afro-
Americanist Reconsideration 80 GEO. L.J. 336 (1991). 
 207  See Cornell, The Right to Carry Firearms Outside the Home, supra note 4, at 1724; 
Carole Emberton, The Limits of Incorporation: Violence, Gun Rights, and Gun Regulation in 
the Reconstruction South, 17 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 615, 621–22 (2006); see also CHARLES, 
ARMED IN AMERICA, supra note 5, at 143–65 (discussing the social, cultural, and political factors 
behind nineteenth-century armed carriage laws). 
 208  Peruta I, 742 F.3d at 1173, 1175. 
 209  See id. at 1171. 
 210  CHARLES, ARMED IN AMERICA, supra note 5, at 150–56. 
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regulate dangerous weapons, particularly in public places, so long as they did not 
utterly destroy the armed citizenry model of the right to arms or fail to allow for self-
defense in extreme cases.211 As the eminent jurist John Forrest Dillon summarized in 
the first law review article addressing this subject:  
 
It is within common experience that there are circumstances under which 
to disarm a citizen would be to leave his life at the mercy of a treacherous 
and plotting enemy. If such a state of facts were clearly proven, it is obvious 
it would be contrary to all our notions of right and justice to punish the 
carrying of arms [in that instance], although it may have infringed the letter 
of some statute.212  
 
In all other cases, however, Dillon noted that state and local governments were 
acting within their authority "to regulate the bearing of arms in such manner as [they] 
may see fit, or to restrain it altogether."213 This national standard on the law and armed 
carriage carried over into the twentieth-century and, as outlined earlier, remained 
largely undisputed until the late 1970s.214  
Understanding the broader history of armed carriage is important because it once 
again illustrates how one's choice of history can lead to very different outcomes, both 
as a matter of law and history. The first illustration of this was outlined in discussing 
Posner's opinion in Moore.215 O'Scannlain followed suit in Peruta I by choosing one 
historical time and era (and geographic region) above others.216 In so finding, 
                                                          
 211  Id. 
 212  John Forrest Dillon, The Right to Keep and Bear Arms for Public and Private Defence, 
1 CENT. L.J. 259, 286 (1874). 
 213  Id. at 296; see also THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS: OR THE 
WRONGS WHICH ARISE INDEPENDENT OF CONTRACT 301 (Callaghan 1879) ("Neither military nor 
civil law can take from the citizen the right to bear arms for the common defense. This is an 
inherited and traditionary right, guaranteed also by the State and federal Constitutions. But it 
extends no further than to keep and bear those arms, which are suited and proper for the general 
defense of the community against invasion and oppression, and it does not include the carrying 
of such weapons as are specially suited for deadly individual encounters. Therefore, State laws 
which forbid the carrying of such weapons concealed are no invasion of the rights of 
citizenship."); JOHN NORTON POMEROY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF 
THE UNITED STATES 152–53 (Houghton, Mifflin & Co. 1868) ("But all such provisions, all such 
guaranties, must be construed with reference to their intent and design. This [Second 
Amendment] is certainly not violated by laws forbidding persons to carry dangerous or 
concealed weapons, or laws forbidding the accumulation of quantities of arms with the design 
to use them in a riotous or seditious manner."); JOEL TIFFANY, A TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT 
AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 394 (Weed et al., 1867) (the "right in the people to keep and bear 
arms, although secured by . . . the constitution, is held in subjection to the public safety and 
welfare."). 
 214  See supra pp. 25–29. 
 215  See supra pp. 23–25. 
 216  See Peruta v. Cty. of San Diego (Peruta I), 742 F. 3d 1144, 1156 (9th Cir. 2014). 
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O'Scannlain effectively muted the bulk of the historical record relating to armed 
carriage.217  
The ramifications of O'Scannlain's opinion, however, were short-lived. Peruta I 
was granted a rehearing en banc (hereinafter Peruta II), where a consensus history 
approach defeated O'Scannlain's choice of history approach.218 What tilted the scales 
for the Ninth Circuit en banc court to side in favor of the consensus history approach 
was the manner the constitutional issue was framed. While O'Scannlain had framed 
the issue as whether a responsible, law-abiding citizen has a right under the Second 
Amendment to carry a firearm in public for self-defense,219 the en banc court took a 
much narrower approach, and instead framed the issue as to whether the Second 
Amendment protects the ability to carry concealed firearms in public.220  
On their face, the difference in how the court framed the issue may seem 
negligible. But, as seen in the Eleventh Circuit's opinion in Georgiacarry.org and the 
Tenth Circuit's opinion in Peterson, the difference is quite significant as a matter of 
history-in-law.221 The reason for this is rather straightforward. The more abstract one 
frames a legal question, the more complex, and often times contradicting, the answer 
will be.222 This rule also applies to any historical question.223 The broader one frames 
the historical question, the more likely it is that one will find conflicting or competing 
narratives. This then places the person framing the historical question with one of two 
options.224 The first option would be to choose one historical narrative over the 
other(s).225 In doing so, however, to ensure historical objectivity, accuracy, and 
transparency, it is important that the person making the choice explain why the 
historical narrative chosen is correct, or, at a minimum, the better alternative. This 
requires conducting a thorough, contextual analysis of the different, competing 
historical narratives.226 But, as noted earlier, this is a task that few in the legal 
profession are equipped to undertake.227 
                                                          
 217  Id. at 1182–91 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 218  Peruta v. Cty. of San Diego (Peruta II), 824 F.3d 919, 924–42 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc).  
 219  Peruta I, 742 F.3d at 1150. 
 220  Peruta II, 824 F.3d at 927. 
 221  GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. Georgia, 687 F.3d 1244, 1261–64 (11th Cir. 2012); Peterson 
v. Martinez, 707 F.3d 1197, 1207–12 (10th Cir. 2013). 
 222  See, e.g., Bryan A. Garner, The Deep Issue: A New Approach to Framing Legal 
Questions, 5 SCRIBES J. LEGAL WRITING 1 (1994); J. Christopher Rideout, Discipline Building 
and Disciplinary Values: Thoughts on Legal Writing at Year Twenty-Five of the Legal Writing 
Institute, 16 LEGAL WRITING 477 (2010); see also Martha F. Davis, Law, Issue Frames and 
Social Movements: Three Case Studies, 14 J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 363, 364–68 (2011). 
 223  Nelson, History and Neutrality, supra note 34, at 1247 (noting that a "historian's account 
of the past" are "colored by the questions" asked of it, and "different interpretations of the past 
are possible if different questions are asked of it–.–.–.–."). 
 224  CHARLES, HISTORICISM, supra note 13, at 115–16. 
 225  Id. at 116. 
 226  Id. at 87–98, 109–18. 
 227  See supra pp. 7–9; see also Sutton, The Role of History, supra note 34, at 119 (noting it 
is a difficult task for jurists to "distinguish the scholar who has devoted a career to a historical 
38https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol67/iss2/7
2019] THE FACES OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT 235 
 
This leaves us with the second of the two options when faced with conflicting or 
competing historical narratives—to find a consensus within the conflict. This involves 
relying only on those broader facets of history that are not up for dispute.228 Here, 
history remains relevant in finding an answer, but to a lesser degree, and in a way, is 
more viewpoint neutral.229 In light of these considerations, the Peruta II court felt the 
second option was the better choice. Not only was the case an applied challenge to a 
denial of a California concealed carry license (and not an applied challenge to open 
carriage), but, by selecting the second option, the en banc court was able to forgo the 
dilemma of having to choose between dueling histories.230 Instead, the court was able 
to rely on copious amounts of the historical evidence showing that the concealed 
carriage of dangerous weapons fell outside the scope of the Second Amendment.231  
In coming to this determination, it is worth noting that Peruta II purposefully 
sidestepped the broader question of how, if at all, the Second Amendment applied 
outside the home.232 This has subjected the Peruta II decision to some criticism.233 
But, what this criticism overlooks is the jurisprudential benefits of courts, like the 
Peruta II court, from adopting a restrained history-in-law approach.234 First and 
foremost, if past is prologue, the track records of courts employing history-in-law 
                                                          
episode from the dilettante for the scholar who has an axe to grind. Just as there is junk science, 
there is junk history."); Tyler et al., A Dialogue with Federal Judges, supra note 34, at 1908 
(Judge Sutton) ("we should be skeptical of law office history, supposed historians claiming to 
be real historians, or history written in the context of, and for, a specific case. But sometimes 
that's all you have."). 
 228  CHARLES, HISTORICISM, supra note 13, at 116. 
 229  Nelson, History and Neutrality, supra note 34, at 1280 ("There will be times . . . when 
two [historical] arguments are genuinely in conflict. On these occasions, a neutral judge must 
strive to resolve the conflict by searching for a broader principle of consensus that embraces the 
two competing ones and explains their apparent inconsistencies. Because a judge will not be 
preferring one conflicting position over another but simply identifying a larger one that 
identifies both, his neutrality will be preserved."). 
 230  Peruta v. County of San Diego: Ninth Circuit Holds Concealed Carry Is Not Protected 
by the Second Amendment, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1024, 1029 (2017) ("The court's historical 
conclusions and subsequent disagreement with the dissent also rely heavily on the premise of 
narrow framing."). 
 231  Peruta v. Cty. of San Diego (Peruta II), 824 F.3d 919, 939 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) 
("The historical materials . . . are remarkably consistent . . . the Second Amendment right to 
keep and bear arms does not include, in any degree, the right of a member of the general public 
to carry concealed firearms in public."). 
 232  Id. at 927 ("We do not reach the question whether the Second Amendment protects some 
ability to carry firearms in public, such as open carry."); id. at 939 ("There may or may not be 
a Second Amendment right for a member of the general public to carry a firearm openly in 
public. The Supreme Court has not answered that question, and we do not answer it here."). 
 233  For some criticisms of the Peruta en banc decision, see Joseph Greenlee, Interpreting 
Peruta v. San Diego, FED. SOC'Y BLOG (June 14, 2016), https://fedsoc.org/commentary/blog-
posts/interpreting-peruta-v-county-of-san-diego; David Kopel, Peruta v. San Diego, Analyzed, 
WASH. POST (June 11, 2016). https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-
conspiracy/wp/2016/06/11/peruta-v-san-diego-analyzed/?utm_term=.ffdd37ccf30d. 
 234  See, e.g., Kelly, Clio and the Court, supra note 36, at 157–58; Wyzanski, History and 
Law, supra note 13, at 239. 
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shows us that a restrained approach minimizes the potential for mythmaking.235 
Second, and more importantly, because the potential for mythmaking is sufficiently 
diminished under a restrained approach, the accuracy, and therefore the legitimacy of 
the court's opinion, will more likely withstand future scrutiny. The opposite holds true 
if a court's history-in-law analysis is inaccurate or omits important information that 
could alter the opinion's conclusion. This is because in such instances, lower courts 
are precedentially bound to rely on this inaccurate or deficient history. This in turn 
creates a self-perpetuating chain of ill-founded jurisprudence.236  
F. Wrenn v. District of Columbia—Explaining Away History 
By the close of 2016, with Peruta II having upheld California's "proper cause" 
concealed carriage law, the circuit courts agreed that armed carriage laws requiring a 
"proper cause" or "justifiable need" were a constitutional exercise of state and local 
government's police power.237 This unanimity, however, was short-lived. In a split 
opinion, the District of Columbia (DC) Circuit held in Wrenn v. District of Columbia 
that the carrying of firearms "beyond the home, even in populated areas, even without 
special need, falls within" the "core" of the Second Amendment.238 The key to the DC 
Circuit arriving at this conclusion was framing the constitutional issue much in the 
same way Judge O'Scannlain had in Peruta I.239 Rather than frame the issue narrowly 
as a challenge to a concealed carriage law, the DC Circuit inquired whether there was, 
in some form or another, a Second Amendment right to armed self-defense outside the 
home.240 
In a number of respects, the Wrenn opinion mirrors that of Peruta I. This includes 
the history-in-law analysis.241 For instance, like the Ninth Circuit in Peruta I, the DC 
Circuit in Wrenn focused intently on the Antebellum Era.242 In addition, the DC Circuit 
categorically dismissed any conflicting historical evidence as having no 
jurisprudential weight.243 However, the DC Circuit did distinguish itself from Peruta 
I in its willingness to explain away history.244 What explaining away history entails is 
                                                          
 235  See Charles, History in Law, supra note 12, at 3–13. 
 236  CHARLES, HISTORICISM, supra note 13, at 90; see also Konig, Heller, Guns, and History, 
supra note 35, at 177–78. 
 237  CHARLES, HISTORICISM, supra note 13, at 90.  
 238  Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650, 664 (D.C. Cir. 2016); see also id. at 661 
("the individual right to carry common firearms beyond the home for self-defense—even in 
densely populated areas, even for those lacking special self-defense needs—falls within the core 
of the Second Amendment protections."). 
 239  Compare Peruta v. Cty. of San Diego (Peruta II), 824 F.3d 919, 939 (9th Cir. 2016) (en 
banc), with Wrenn, 864 F.3d at 664. 
 240  Wrenn, 864 F.3d at 657–59, 662. 
 241  Compare Peruta v. Cty. of San Diego (Peruta I), 742 F.3d 1144, 1156 (9th Cir. 2014), 
with Wrenn, 864 F.3d at 664. 
 242  Wrenn, 864 F.3d at 658. 
 243  Id. at 658–61. 
 244  Id. 
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lawyering the content of historical texts to bolster a particular legal argument, rather 
than providing substantiated historical evidence that actually substantiates it.245  
As it pertains to the Wrenn decision in particular, two examples stand out. The first 
example of the DC Circuit explaining away history involves the law and armed 
carriage from the enactment of the 1328 Statute of Northampton to the ratification of 
the Bill of Rights in 1791.246 Initially, the DC Circuit declined the invitation to 
examine the "dense historical weeds" of four centuries of armed carriage laws.247 The 
rationale for this being the legal perils of engaging in conflicting history-in-law 
analysis outweighed the benefits.248 But the DC Circuit then suddenly reversed course 
and accepted a reading of history in which the Statute of Northampton was understood 
as only banning the of carrying of weapons in a dangerous or threatening manner.249 
As historical support for this narrow interpretation, the DC Circuit relied on two 
eighteenth-century legal treatises that incorporate the language "terrify the people" 
when addressing the prosecutorial scope of the Statute of Northampton; language the 
court felt proved the peaceable carrying of dangerous weapons in public was deemed 
to be legally permissive.250  
However, in coming to this historical conclusion, the DC Circuit failed to address 
how such language was most often used in Anglo-American law, particularly in cases 
of armed carriage. If the DC Circuit would have explored this matter further, they 
would have learned that any "terrify" or "fear" language was mere boilerplate language 
referring to an affray, or what was otherwise known as a public (not private) offense, 
that would be a breach of the public peace.251 Additionally, the DC Circuit would have 
learned that, in most instances, the act of carrying dangerous weapons in the public 
concourse was deemed legally sufficient in amounting to a violation of the Statute of 
Northampton.252 
                                                          
 245  See CHARLES, HISTORICISM, supra note 13, at 87–90.  
 246  Wrenn, 864 F.3d at 659. 
 247  Id. 
 248  Id. at 660 ("The District offers its replies, to which the plaintiffs issue sur-replies, and on 
and on, until for every point there is an equal and opposite counterpoint."). 
 249  Id. 
 250  See 1 WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 1716–1721 136 
(Prof. Books Ltd. 1973) ("no wearing of Arms is within the meaning of this Statute, unless it be 
accompanied with such circumstances as are apt to terrify the People."); 3 JAMES WILSON, THE 
WORKS OF THE HONOURABLE JAMES WILSON, L.L.D. 79 (Bird Wilson ed., Lorenzo Press 1804) 
("In some cases, there may be an affray, where there is no actual violence; as where a man arms 
himself with dangerous and unusual weapons, in such a manner, as will naturally diffuse a 
terrour among the people."). 
 251  See, e.g., 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 145 
(photo reprint 1979) (1769); HAWKINS, supra note 250, at 134. See also Mark Anthony 
Frassetto, To the Terror of the People: Public Disorder Crimes and the Original Public 
Understanding of the Second Amendment, 43 S. ILL. U. L.J. 61 (2018). 
 252  See, e.g., DALTON, THE COUNTREY JUSTICE, supra note 192, at 129; Harris, The Right to 
Bear Arms, supra note 187, at 4; WILLIAM LAMBARD, EIRENARCHA: OR OF THE OFFICE OF THE 
JUSTICES IN FOURE BOOKS 135 (Thomas Wright & Bonham Norton 1599). 
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Placing these historical facts aside, even if we isolate the history-in-law inquiry 
and focus solely on the content within the two legal treatises, a thorough, more 
contextual reading rebuts the DC Circuit's historical conclusion. First, it is important 
to point out that the two legal treatises are virtually one in the same as it pertains to 
the Statute of Northampton. This is because one of the legal treatises—James Wilson's 
lectures on the law—is merely paraphrasing of the other, William Hawkins' A Treatise 
of the Pleas of the Crown.253 Second, in reading Hawkins's section on the Statute of 
Northampton, it becomes clear that the portion the DC Circuit cites is only part of a 
narrow exception to the general rule, not the general rule itself.254 Thus, accepting the 
DC Circuit's historical interpretation requires deleting most of Hawkins's other 
passages on the matter.255 Simply put, to accept the DC Circuit's historical 
interpretation would mean that Hawkins intended to make his other legal exceptions 
to the Statute of Northampton superfluous.256 Third, the DC Circuit's historical 
conclusion ignores that Hawkins clearly distinguished between self-defense in private 
and public. In private—that is at one's dwelling or home—the common law permitted 
the assembling of friends for self-defense,257 whether armed or unarmed. 258 In public, 
however, this was not the case: 
 
[A]n Assembly of a Man's Friends for the Defence of his person, against 
those who threaten to beat him if he go to such a Market is unlawful; for he 
who is in Fear of such Insults, must provide for his Safety, by demanding 
the Surety of the Peace against the Persons by whom he is threatened, and 
not make use of such violent Methods, which cannot but be attended with 
the Danger of raising Tumults and Disorders to the Disturbance of the 
Publick Peace: Yet an Assembly of a Man's Friends in his own House, for 
the Defence of the Possession thereof, against those who threaten to make 
an unlawful Entry thereinto, or for the Defence of his Person against those 
                                                          
 253  James Wilson not only paraphrases Hawkins, but also cites to him. See 3 WILSON, supra 
note 250, at 79 (citing 1 HAWKINS, supra note 250, at 135). This is also the case in the original 
notebooks maintained by Wilson's son, Bird Wilson, from which THE WORKS OF THE 
HONOURABLE JAMES WILSON was published in 1804. See James Wilson, Notebook 45, at 14 
(Free Library of Philadelphia) (on file with author). 
 254  Wrenn, 864 F.3d at 660.  
 255  HAWKINS, supra note 250, 134–36, accord Charles, Faces, Take Two, supra note 4, at 
399–400. 
 256  CHARLES, ARMED IN AMERICA, supra note 5, at 115–16. 
 257  See Charles, Statute of Northampton, supra note 4, at 24–25 (discussing the development 
of the castle doctrine in English common law). 
 258  HAWKINS, supra note 250, at 136 ("That a Man cannot excuse the wearing such Armour 
in Publick, by alledging that such a one threatened him, and that he wears it for the Safety of 
his Person from his Assault; but it hath been resolved, That no one shall incur the Penalty of the 
said Statute [of Northampton] for assembling his Neighbors and Friends in his own House, 
against those who threaten to do him any Violence therein, because a Man's House is his 
Castle."). 
42https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol67/iss2/7
2019] THE FACES OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT 239 
 
who threaten to beat him therein, is indulged by Law; for a Man's House is 
looked upon as his Castle.259 
 
Another problem with the DC Circuit's historical conclusion is its attempt to equate 
the Statute of Northampton with the crime of assault with a deadly weapon.260 Yet, as 
the treatises of Hawkins, Wilson, Michael Dalton, and William Blackstone outline, 
the two acts were legally distinguishable. The former—assault—required the act of 
force and violence; the latter—the Statute of Northampton—did not.261 In light of 
these observations, it is flabbergasting how the DC Circuit came to the historical 
conclusion that it did. The DC Circuit essentially accepted historical myth over 
historical fact, all because of an ahistorical, twenty-first century reading of the 
boilerplate language "terrify the people."  
This brings us to the second example of the DC Circuit explaining away history, 
specifically, nineteenth-century variants of the Statute of Northampton, or what the 
                                                          
 259  Id. at 158. The legal distinction between public and private self-defense up through the 
eighteenth-century is also outlined in the duty to retreat. In public, before exercising the right 
of self-defense, one was required to first retreat. This was not the case in one's home. See 
Charles, Statute of Northampton, supra note 4, at 25–26. 
 260  See Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650, 659–660 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
 261  Compare 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 120 
(photo. report 1979) (1768) (describing an assault as "an attempt or offer to beat another, without 
touching him: as if one lifts up his cane, or his fist, in a threatening manner at another"), with 4 
BLACKSTONE, supra note 251, at 148–49 ("of riding or going armed, with dangerous or unusual 
weapons, is a crime against the public peace, by terrifying the good people of the land; and is 
particularly prohibited by the Statute of Northampton . . . in like manner as, by the laws of 
Solon, every Athenian was finable who walked about the city in armour."); compare DALTON, 
THE COUNTREY JUSTICE, supra note 192, at 128 (stating sureties for the peace may be enforced 
"if any Constable shall perceive any other persons (in his presence) to be about to break the 
peace, either by drawing weapons, or by striking, or assaulting one another . . . he may take 
assistance, & carry them all before the Justice to find sureties for the peace . . . ."), with id. 
(stating sureties of the peace may be enforced by a constable "of such as in his presence shall 
goe or ride Armed offensively, . . . for these are accompted to be in affray and feare of the 
people, and a means of the breach of the Peace . . . . "); compare HAWKINS, supra note 250, at 
133–34 (including in the definition of assault as "an Attempt, or Offer, with Force and Violence 
to do a corporal Hurt to another; as by striking at him with, or without, a Weapon, or presenting 
a Gun at him, at such a Distance to which the Gun will carry, or pointing a Pitch-fork at him, 
standing within the Reach of it, or by holding up one's Fist at him, or by any other such Act 
done in an angry threatening Manner"), with id. at 135 (citing the Statute of Northampton in 
writing, "in some Cases there may be an Affray where there is no actual Violence; as where a 
Man arms himself with dangerous and unusual Weapons, in such a Manner as will naturally 
cause a Terror to the People"); compare Wilson, supra note 253, Notebook 45, at 10–11 ("An 
Assault is an Attempt or Offer, with Force and Violence, to do a corporal Hurt to another; as by 
striking at him . . . by pointing a Pitch Fork at him, if he be within its Reach, by presenting a 
Gun at him, if he be within the Distance, to which it will carry, or by any other Act of a similar 
Kind done in an angry and threatening Manner.") (citing HAWKINS, supra note 250, at 133 and 
3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 261, at 120), with id. at 13–14 ("In some cases, there may be an 
affray [or "Fighting of Persons in a public Place to the Terror of the Citizens"], where there is 
no actual Violence, as where a Man arms himself with dangerous and unusual Weapons, in such 
a Manner, as will naturally diffuse Terror among the People.") (citing HAWKINS, supra note 250, 
at 135). 
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DC Circuit referred to as "surety laws."262 As outlined in Part II.B, these laws were 
less restrictive than the concealed carry prohibitions that existed in other jurisdictions. 
Although these laws indeed prohibited the act of preparatory armed carriage in public, 
they afforded individuals the ability to carry weapons if they were faced with a 
"reasonable" fear of assault or injury to their person, family or property.263 In such 
instances, the burden fell on the person carrying the weapon to demonstrate that their 
fear of assault or injury was "imminent."264 If the fear was not found to be imminent, 
the court would require surety of the peace or surety of good behavior, which involved 
posting a bond (which could be substituted with real property, goods and/or chattel) 
for such a period of time as directed.265 Those that could post the bond were left free 
to their own recognizance and the bond would be returned only if the person did not 
breach the peace again for the time specified.266 However, those who were unable to 
post the required bond could be placed in the gaol, fined, or both.267 And given that 
the bond could be as high as $200 (roughly the monetary equivalent of $5,400 today), 
many, if not most persons living in the nineteenth-century would have been forced to 
suffer the latter punishment.268  
Also, a plain reading of these nineteenth-century variants of the Statute of 
Northampton show their intent and purpose is rather straightforward—to prevent the 
habitual carrying of arms, as well as ensure the peace, safety, health, and welfare of 
the public.269 The DC Circuit, however, arrived at a much different conclusion. 
                                                          
 262  Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650, 661 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
 263  See supra pp. 17–19.  
 264  Historically, the reason for this was the English common law required a person to first 
seek surety of the peace, rather than go armed in public, if they maintained reasonable fear of 
assault or injury from another. See KEBLE, supra note 62, at 646; see also id. at 410 (Justices 
"will not grant any Writ for Surety of the Peace, without making an Oath that he is in fear of 
bodily harm. Nor the Justices of the Peace ought not to Grant any Warrant to cause a man to 
find Surety of the Peace, at the request of any Person, unless the Party who requireth it, will 
make an Oath, that he requireth it for safety of his Body, and not for malice."). 
 265  See, e.g., JOHN C. B. DAVIS, THE MASSACHUSETTS JUSTICE: A TREATISE UPON THE 
POWERS AND DUTIES OF JUSTICES OF THE PEACE 199–202 (Warren Lazell 1847; GENERAL LAWS, 
AND MEMORIAL RESOLUTIONS OF THE TERRITORY OF DAKOTA, PASSED AT THE SECOND SESSION 
OF THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY, COMMENCED AT THE TOWN OF YANKTON DECEMBER 1, 1862 
AND CONCLUDED JANUARY 8, 1863 95–96 (Kingsbury & Ziebach, 1862–03); JOSHUA 
WATERMAN, THE WISCONSIN AND IOWA JUSTICE, BEING A TREATISE ON THE CIVIL AND CRIMINAL 
JURISDICTION OF JUSTICES OF THE PEACE, WRITTEN EXPRESSLY FOR THE STATES OF WISCONSIN 
AND IOWA, CONTAINING DIRECTIONS AND PRACTICAL FORMS FOR EVERY CASE WHICH CAN ARISE 
BEFORE A JUSTICE, 619–21 (Banks, Gould & Co., 1853). For the intricacies of the common law 
surety of the peace, see 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 251, at 248-54; DALTON, THE COUNTREY 
JUSTICE, supra note 192, at 379–415 (1727); HAWKINS, supra note 250, at 126–33. 
 266  See WATERMAN, supra note 265, at 621. 
 267  See id. at 616. 
 268  See id. at 621. 
 269  See, e.g., 1870 W. VA. LAWS ch. 153, § 8; accord THE REVISED STATUTES OF WEST 
VIRGINIA IN FORCE DECEMBER, 1878, ALPHABETICALLY ARRANGED (John F. Kelly ed., W.J. 
Gilbert 1879) ("If a justice shall, from his own observation, or upon information of others, have 
good reason to believe that any person in his county is habitually carrying about his person 
concealed weapons, such as dirks, bowie-knives, pistols, or other dangerous weapons, it shall 
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According to the DC Circuit, the nineteenth-century variants of the Statute of 
Northampton did nothing to "deny a responsible person carrying rights" unless the 
person posed a public threat.270 And even in those instances, at least according to the 
DC Circuit, the person "could go on carrying without criminal penalty" so long as the 
person posted a monetary bond.271 In other words, the DC Circuit interpreted the 
nineteenth century variants of the Statute of Northampton as only shrinking the 
carrying rights of the "(allegedly) reckless."272 
What evidence or authority did the DC Circuit provide in support to this historical 
conclusion? The answer is nothing, not one historical source.273 It is one thing for a 
court to choose one competing or conflicting historical narrative over another. It is 
quite another to make up history altogether. This is essentially what the DC Circuit 
did. Granted, only few historical examples of the nineteenth-century variants of the 
Statute of Northampton being enforced have survived the test of time.274 However, for 
whatever reason, the DC Circuit thought it was prudent to set these historical examples 
aside, without any explanation as to why, and then replace them with an interpretation 
that is historically unsubstantiated.275  
In addition to having no historical evidence, the DC Circuit's reading of nineteenth-
century variants of the Statute of Northampton fails for other reasons. For one, it 
ignores the fact that these laws evolved in one of two ways; both of which were meant 
to expressly limit armed carriage unless it was absolutely necessary. One preferred 
evolution was for cities and localities to enact armed carriage licensing laws.276 As 
outlined in Part II.B, these laws required individuals to first obtain a license before 
carrying dangerous weapons in public.277 In most cases, the granting of these licenses 
was at the discretion of a local government official, and the person applying for the 
license had to demonstrate a justifiable need to do so, as well as provide proof of their 
good character.278 The other evolution of nineteenth-century variants of the Statute of 
Northampton involved eliminating the surety of the peace process altogether, and 
replacing it with fine, forfeiture of weapon, or both.279 This evolution is rather 
                                                          
be the duty of such justice to cause such person to be arrested and brought before him, and if 
such person upon trial shall be guilty, he shall be fined not exceeding ten dollars."). 
 270  Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650, 661 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
 271  Id. 
 272  Id. 
 273  See generally id.  
 274  See CHARLES, ARMED IN AMERICA, supra note 5, at 143. 
 275  See Wrenn, 864 F.3d at 661.  
 276  See supra text accompanying note 93.  
 277  See id. 
 278  See id. 
 279  See, e.g., THE CODE OF WEST VIRGINIA 897–08 (John A. Warth ed., 2d ed., W. Va. Prtg. 
Co. 1891) ("If a person carry about his person any revolver or other pistol, dirk, bowie knife, 
razor, slung shot, billy, metallic or other false knuckles, or any other dangerous or deadly 
weapon of like kind or character, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and fined not less than 
twenty-five nor more than two hundred dollars, and may, at the discretion of the court, be 
confined in jail not less than one nor more than twelve months; and if any person shall sell or 
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significant, for it contradicts the DC Circuit's belief that the sole purpose of the 
nineteenth-century variants of the Statute of Northampton was to only burden the 
"reckless."280  
Another reason the DC Circuit's reading of the nineteenth-century variants of the 
Statute of Northampton falters, and perhaps the most obvious, it is a completely 
backwards reading of the law. In most, if not all of these laws, they are merely one 
                                                          
furnish any such weapon as is hereinbefore mentioned to a person whom he knows, or has 
reason, from his appearance or otherwise, to believe to be under the age of twenty-one years, 
he shall be punished as hereinbefore provided; but nothing herein contained shall be so 
construed as to prevent any person from keeping or carrying about his dwelling house or 
premises, any such revolver or other pistol, or from carrying the same from the place of purchase 
to his dwelling house, or from his dwelling house to any place where repairing is done, to have 
it repaired and back again. And if upon the trial of an indictment for carrying any such pistol, 
dirk, razor or bowie knife, the defendant shall prove to the satisfaction of the jury that he is a 
quiet and peaceable citizen, of good character and standing in the community in which he lives, 
and at the time he was found with such pistol, dirk, razor or bowie knife, as charged in the 
indictment he had good cause to believe and did believe that he was in danger of death or great 
bodily harm at the hands of another person, and that he was in good faith, carrying such weapon 
for self-defense and for no other purpose, the jury shall find him not guilty. But nothing in this 
section contained shall be so construed as to prevent any officer charged with the execution of 
the laws of the State, from carrying a revolver or other pistol, dirk or bowie knife."); Ordinance 
No. 22: An Ordinance Relating to the Promotion of the Public Peace, (passed Feb. 7, 1888), 
THE CHARTER AND ORDINANCES OF THE CITY OF NEW ULM, MINNESOTA 110–11 (Jos. A. 
Eckstein ed., New Ulm Post Print 1887) ("It shall be unlawful for any person, within the limits 
of this city to carry or wear under his clothes or concealed about his person, any pistol, dirk, 
sling-shot, or knuckle of brass or other metal, or any other dangerous or deadly weapon. Any 
such weapon duly adjudged by any justice court of said city to have been worn or carried by 
any person in violation of this section, shall be adjudged and declared forfeited or confiscated 
to the city of New Ulm; and every such person so offending, on conviction, may in addition to 
the penalty hereinafter described, be required to furnish sureties for keeping the peace for a term 
not exceeding six months . . . . The prohibition in the preceding section shall not apply to police, 
peace, and other officers of courts, whose duty may be to secure warrants or make arrests, nor 
to persons whose business or occupation may require the carrying of weapons for protection. 
Nothing in the ordinances of this city shall be construed to prohibit within the city limits any 
firing of a gun, pistol or other firearm when done in the lawful defense of person, property or 
family, or in the necessary enforcement of the laws."); Ordinance No. 74: An Ordinance 
Relating to Breaches of the Peace, Disorderly Conduct and the Carrying of Concealed Weapons 
(passed May 24, 1870), 1884 CITY CHARTER OF THE CITY OF HASTINGS: TOGETHER WITH 
ORDINANCES OF SAID CITY 75 (Hastings Daily News Printers, 1884) ("Any person who shall go 
armed within the incorporated limits of said city of Hastings with a dirk, dagger, sword, pistol 
or pistols, or shall carry a slung-shot or metal knuckles or other offensive or dangerous weapon, 
without reasonable cause to fear an assault or other injury to his person or to his family or 
property, shall, upon conviction before said justice, be punished by a fine not exceeding one 
hundred dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding three months, or both, in the discretion of 
the justice."); Ordinances of the Village of Bottineau, Bottineau Co., Dakota (adopted Dec. 7, 
1888), BOTTINEAU PIONEER, Dec. 13, 1888 ("Any person found armed within the corporate 
limits of the village of Bottineau with a dirk, dagger, sword, pistol or pistols, or other offensive 
or dangerous weapons, without reasonable cause to fear an assault or other injury of violence to 
his person or to his family or property, shall, upon conviction before said justice, be punished 
by a fine not exceeding ten dollars, or by imprisonment in the village jail not exceeding term of 
thirty days."); see also State v. Workman, 35 W. Va. 367 (1891). 
 280  Wrenn, 864 F.3d at 661. 
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part of a larger statute on surety of the peace.281 According to the DC Circuit, despite 
the law expressly prohibiting going publicly armed except under limited 
circumstances, the law must be read in reverse and affording everyone "robust carry 
rights."282 If the DC Circuit's reading is indeed historically valid, then the other 
"breaches of the peace" referred to in the surety laws must also be recognized as 
constitutionally protected behavior. This would mean affrays, threatening to "kill or 
beat another, or to commit any violence or outrage" against another's person or 
property, are all constitutionally protected behavior unless done in a reckless or 
threatening manner.283 But, this would be a rather backwards reading of the law. The 
point being, that the DC Circuit committed one of the greatest history-in-law sins—it 
interpreted a historical text without any historical context whatsoever, and further 
failed to provide an even rudimentary understanding of how the surety of the peace 
functioned for centuries.284  
These two examples of the DC Circuit explaining away history are rather 
significant. Both proved crucial in striking down the District of Columbia's "proper 
cause" or "justifiable need" licensing requirement as unconstitutional, yet neither 
example is historically substantiated. This sufficiently calls into question the overall 
legitimacy of the DC Circuit's opinion. And the history-in-law problems do not end 
there. The DC Circuit also ignored the fact that "proper cause" or "justifiable need" 
licensing laws are arguably longstanding and therefore presumptively constitutional 
under Heller—that is, if laws dating back to the mid to late nineteenth-century qualify 
as longstanding.285  
In the case of the District of Columbia, the first armed carriage licensing law 
appeared in 1892.286 It stipulated that concealed carry licenses were to be granted by 
a judge only after "satisfactory proof" was provided and a monetary bond was 
posted.287 The law remained in force for decades.288 Then, in 1922, at a time when 
rising gang violence prompted public outcry for additional firearms restrictions, it 
appeared that the 1892 law may be amended or replaced by what was known as the 
                                                          
 281  Id. at 659. 
 282  Id. at 661. 
 283  See, e.g., 2 THE COMPILED LAWS OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN 1572 (Thomas M. Cooley 
ed., Homer & Kerr 1857); THE REVISED STATUTES OF THE STATE OF WISCONSIN 719 (C. Latham 
Sholes 1849); 2 THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF THE STATE OF MINNESOTA 1025 (A.H. Bissell ed., 
Callaghan & Co. 1873).  
 284  See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 251, at 248–54; DALTON, THE COUNTREY JUSTICE, supra 
note 192, at 379–415, chs. 116–24 (1727); HAWKINS, supra note 250, at 126–33. 
 285  See Charles, Faces, Take Two, supra note 4, at 419–22 n.245. 
 286  "Carrying or Selling of Deadly or Dangerous Weapons Within the District of Columbia, 
and for Other Purposes," 30 Stat. L. 405, reprinted in SUPPLEMENT TO THE REVISED STATUTES 
OF THE U.S. at 753 (vol. 2, no. 6, 54th Cong, 1st Sess. 1895–1896). For a useful legislative 
history, see Frassetto, The First Congressional Debate on Public Carry, supra note 4, at 342-
52. 
 287  Id. at 753. 
 288  There were attempts, however, to amend the law in hopes of further deterring the carrying 
of dangerous weapons within the District. See, e.g., 1 REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS OF THE 
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 376–77 (Gov't Prtg. Office, 1904). 
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Capper Bill.289 Named after its sponsor, Kansas Senator Arthur Capper, the Capper 
Bill would have substantially overhauled the District's firearms laws.290 As it pertained 
to armed carriage, however, the Capper Bill was not all that different from the 1892 
law.291 The Capper Bill required applicants to be "suitable," a "bona fide" resident of 
the jurisdiction reviewing the license, as well as provide a "good reason" for being 
granted an armed carriage license.292 If a respective applicant provided false 
information to retrieve the license, the applicant would be imprisoned for "not less 
than five nor more than ten years."293 The Capper Bill also provided a penalty of one 
year imprisonment for anyone that carried a concealed weapon without a license.294 
Here is where the story gets interesting. The Capper Bill was not drafted by Senator 
Capper, or even by gun control advocates, but by the United States Revolver 
Association (USRA)—the first organization to advance the cause of gun rights.295 The 
USRA referred the Capper Bill, to include its proper cause licensing regime, as "sane" 
and "reasonable" firearms legislation.296 "The fact that any person found carrying a 
concealed weapon without a license would be subject to a mandatory sentence of not 
less than a year in prison, instead of a moderate fine, would practically do away with 
the carrying of arms by any but those entitled to do so," touted the USRA.297  
Congress decided to pass on enacting the Capper Bill for the District of 
Columbia.298 It was, however, enthusiastically received elsewhere in the United States 
by proponents of gun rights and gun control alike.299 As a result, it led to what was, at 
                                                          
 289  CHARLES, ARMED IN AMERICA, supra note 5, at 192. 
 290  Id. at 193. 
 291  The one exception to this being the armed carriage provisions were extended to 
transportation in motor vehicles. See A Bill to Provide for Uniform Revolver Sales: Based Upon 
Senate Bill 4012 Introduced in the U.S. Senate Sept. 20, 1922, §§ 7–8, in Charles Lewis Gilman 
Papers Box 2, Gun Law Correspondence (St. Paul, MN: Minnesota Historical Society) 
[hereinafter Gilman Papers]. Other versions of the Capper Bill can be found in the following 
sources. See The California Law, Assembly Bill No. 263, Ch. 339 (approved June 13, 1923), 
HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS 733–42 (1924); S.B. No. 256 
(approved Mar. 7, 1923), LAWS PASSED AT THE EIGHTEENTH SESSION OF LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY 
OF THE STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA 379–83 (Knight Prtg. Co. 1923). 
 292  A Bill to Provide for Uniform Revolver Sales, supra note 291, at §§ 6–8. 
 293  Id. at § 13. 
 294  Id. at § 2. 
 295  CHARLES, ARMED IN AMERICA, supra note 5, at 189–90. 
 296  Id.; see also U.S. Revolver Ass'n, Sane Revolver Regulation, Bulletin No. 1, undated, in 
Gilman Papers, box 2, folder Gun Law Correspondence ("Such a measure as this embodies sane 
and effective Revolver Regulation, and it might well be adopted as a model for similar 
legislation throughout the nation."). 
 297  Bulletin from U.S. Revolver Ass'n, Sane Regulation of Revolver Sales: Why Revolver 
Sales Should be Uniform," Bulletin No. 2, Jan. 24, 1923, in Gilman Papers, box 2, folder Gun 
Law Correspondence. 
 298  HANDBOOK OF THE NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS AND THE 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-FIFTH ANNUAL MEETING (Aug. 25–31, 1925), at 854.  
 299  CHARLES, ARMED IN AMERICA, supra note 5, at 192–93. 
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the time, the largest overhaul of firearms law in American history.300 Additionally, the 
popularity of the Capper Bill prompted the National Conference of Commissioners 
(NCC) to explore its own model firearms legislation: the Uniform Firearms Act 
(UFA).301  
It was at this juncture that today's most prominent gun rights advocacy 
organization, the NRA, entered the political fray.302 The NCC's first draft of the UFA 
was deemed unacceptable to the NRA.303 What the NRA specifically disdained was 
the provision requiring a license to purchase a pistol.304 The other provisions, however, 
were agreeable—that is so long as the NRA was able to tweak the language in a 
manner that was more favorable to sportsmen, hunters, and gun owners.305 In the end, 
the NCC agreed to virtually all of the NRA's changes, and in 1930, the NCC adopted 
the final version by a vote of 28–4.306 As it pertained to armed carriage, the UFA was 
almost identical to the Capper Bill. It too required an applicant to show proper cause 
before being granted a concealed carry license.307  
In the years that followed, the NRA touted the UFA as model firearms legislation 
that every state should adopt.308 This included lobbying Congress to enact the UFA 
for the District of Columbia.309 Before the Senate, NRA Executive Vice President 
Milton A. Reckord testified in favor of the UFA's "proper cause" armed carriage 
licensing provision, stating: 
You need a law to get to the crooks and to the fellow who is carrying a 
pistol down the street and shooting somebody. This bill will provide for the 
dealer being licensed and a record of every pistol that is sold, and it requires 
that every person, whether he is an honest citizen or not—and we are all 
supposed to be honest citizens—who gets a pistol, must get a license to 
carry it. You are required to get a license, if you desire, for any purpose at 
                                                          
 300  The states of California, Connecticut, Indiana, Michigan, New Hampshire, New Jersey, 
North Dakota, Oregon, and West Virginia all adopted versions of the Capper Bill. See ADAM 
WINKLER, GUNFIGHT: THE BATTLE OVER THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS IN AMERICA 208 (2011). 
 301  Charles V. Imlay, The Uniform Firearms Act, 12 A.B.A. J. 767, 767–69 (1926). 
 302  See CHARLES, ARMED IN AMERICA, supra note 5, at 194–95. The NRA initially 
cooperated with the U.S. Revolver Ass'n in this regard. See, e.g., Jack Rohan, N.R.A. Directors 
Meet, AM. RIFLEMAN, Mar. 1927, at 101. 
 303  CHARLES, ARMED IN AMERICA, supra note 5, at 195. 
 304  See, e.g., Charles V. Imlay, Uniform Firearms Act Reaffirmed, 16 A.B.A. J. 799, 801 
(1930); Milton A. Reckord, The Truth About the Firearms Situation and a Suggestion for Its 
Practical Solution, AM. RIFLEMAN, Apr. 1, 1927, at 4. 
 305  CHARLES, ARMED IN AMERICA, supra note 5, at 195. 
 306  Id. 
 307  See UNIF. FIREARMS ACT: DRAFTED BY THE NAT'L CONF. OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. STATE 
LAWS 4 (1930). For the NCC's explanation as to why it drafted the armed carriage provisions 
the way that it did, see id. at 10–12. 
 308  With the NRA's backing, the UFA was adopted in many states, including Alabama, 
Arkansas, Indiana, Maryland, Montana, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Virginia, Washington, 
and Wisconsin. See WINKLER, supra note 300, at 209. 
 309  See generally CHARLES, ARMED IN AMERICA, supra note 5, at 197. 
49Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2019
246 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:197 
 
all, to carry a pistol concealed, in the District of Columbia, and we believe 
that is all you need. If I am an honest citizen, you do not need to have my 
gun registered, if I have it at my home; but if, for any purpose, for any 
reason, I want to carry that pistol on the street, then under this bill I have to 
go down to the police commissioner and be licensed to carry it. If I shoot 
anything on the street with that pistol and I am licensed, they have all the 
records of the gun, and there is no question about it.310 
With the NRA onboard, the UFA faced little, if any, pushback from the gun rights 
community, and easily passed Congress.311 For the next four decades, the "proper 
cause" provision remained in force within the District.312 The only significant change 
occurred in 1943, when Congress passed a law extending the armed carriage licensing 
requirement to cover the open carriage of pistols.313 Much like in 1932, the NRA did 
not oppose its passage, and even issued a statement stating that such a law was 
necessary to close a legal loophole that criminals exploit: 
The amendment will merely make it easier to secure convictions in the case 
of criminals carrying a concealed weapon who, upon the approach of the 
police, remove the weapon from its concealed position and place it in the 
open. Courts in some jurisdictions have held that a person could not be 
convicted under a concealed-weapons statute if the weapon was carried 
openly in a holster or in the hand or if it was openly exposed in a vehicle. 
The amendment is designed to close this loophole. 
. . . 
It is the conclusion of the NRA that there is no objection from the 
standpoint of sportsmen to the existing bill or to the amendment.314 
                                                          
 310  Control of Firearms Sales: Hearing Before the Committee on the District of Columbia 
United States Senate on S. 2751, 72nd Cong., 12, 13 (1932). It should be noted that the NRA 
opposed an earlier draft requiring the posting of a $500 bond as a condition of obtaining an 
armed carriage license. See Anti-Firearms Legislation Endangered By Dissensions, EVENING 
STAR (D.C.), Nov. 12, 1931, at B1; Puny Laws on Weapons, EVENING STAR (DC), Oct. 29, 1931, 
at A2. 
 311  See Capital Adopts Pistol Law as National Model: Hope to See States Copy Restrictions 
on Purchase of Firearms, BROOK. DAILY EAGLE, July 14, 1932, at 18; N.R.A. Directors Hold 
Sixty-First Annual Meeting, AM. RIFLEMAN, Mar. 1932, at 7, 8 (noting that "after many 
conferences" the NRA reached an agreement with Congress and the District's commissioners 
on the passage of the UFA). 
 312  Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650, 667 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
 313  D.C. Pub. L. No. 182, ch. 296, 57 Stat. 586 (1943) ("No person shall within the District 
of Columbia carry either openly or concealed on or about his person, except in his dwelling 
house or place of business or on other land, possessed by him, a pistol, without a license therefor 
issued as hereinafter provided, or any deadly or dangerous weapon capable of being so 
concealed."). 
 314  D.C. Legislation, AM. RIFLEMAN, Dec. 1943, at 37. The NRA made sure to note that the 
amendment would not apply to long guns, such as shotguns. This was intentional as not to 
interfere with the carrying of long guns for shooting and hunting. See CHARLES, ARMED IN 
AMERICA, supra note 5, at 202. In 1951, when the District of Columbia commissioners once 
more pushed for an amendment to the law that would have required a license to purchase a 
handgun, the NRA was presented with an opportunity to testify. Hereto though, the NRA did 
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It was not until 1976 that the District's armed carriage licensing provision was 
repealed and replaced with what was virtually a complete ban on both the purchasing 
and the carrying of handguns.315 In 2008, Heller struck down the purchasing ban, but 
the armed carriage ban remained—that is until 2014, when a federal district court 
struck it down as unconstitutional.316 Subsequently, the District enacted a new armed 
carriage law, one that effectively returned to the pre-1976 "proper cause" or 
"justifiable need" standard.317 
The history of the District's "proper cause" armed carriage law is important in two 
respects. First, it confirms that contrary to Wrenn, the District's "proper cause" law 
was longstanding—at least more longstanding than many of the firearms laws on the 
statute books today,318 to include firearms laws that the DC Circuit has upheld as 
constitutionally permissive under intermediate scrutiny.319 In fact, the District's 
"proper cause" law is significantly more longstanding than the historical example of 
firearms licensing, which the DC Circuit in Wrenn cited in striking down the law.320 
Firearms licensing laws were not a common fixture in statute and ordinance books 
                                                          
not state any objection to the District's licensing of open carriage. See "Statement of Milton J. 
Reckord, National Rifle Association," in TO PROVIDE FOR THE MORE EFFECTIVE PREVENTION, 
DETECTION, AND PUNISHMENT OF CRIME IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES ON H.R. 3586, 82ND CONG. 82–87 (1951). The same was true of other 
attempts to amend the District's law to include a license to purchase requirement. See Executive 
Director's Report, AM. RIFLEMAN, May 1954, at 34, 35; New Firearms Bills, AM. RIFLEMAN, 
June 1953, at 25, 31; A Report on NRA Operations 1952, AM. RIFLEMAN, May 1953, at 20, 21. 
 315  D.C. CODE §§ 7-2502.01(a), 7-2502.02(a)(4) (2001); Frassetto, The First Congressional 
Debate on Public Carry, supra note 4, at 352. 
 316  Palmer v. District of Columbia, 59 F. Supp. 3d 173, 183 (D.D.C. 2014). 
 317  Frassetto, The First Congressional Debate on Public Carry, supra note 4, at 352–53; 
David O'Boyle, The Right to Bear Arms, WASH. LAWYER (Oct. 2015), 
https://www.dcbar.org/bar-resources/publications/washington-lawyer/articles/october-2015-
gun-laws.cfm  
 318  Two examples are laws regulating the mail order of firearms and laws regulating machine 
guns. The first law regulating the mail order sale of firearms was enacted in 1927. See CHARLES, 
ARMED IN AMERICA, supra note 5, at 212. The first laws regulating machine guns appeared not 
long after with the spread of the Uniform Machine Gun Act, which was subsequently canonized 
in federal law with the passage of the 1934 National Firearms Act. Id. at 215. 
 319  See, e.g., Heller v. District of Columbia, 801 F.3d 264, 280–81 (D.C. Cir. 2015) 
(upholding fingerprint, registration, and registration fee requirements to purchase a firearm, as 
well as training requirements); Schrader v. Holder, 704 F.3d 980, 981 (D.C. Cir. 2013) 
(upholding a ban on common-law misdemeanants owning firearms); Heller v. District of 
Columbia, 670 F.3d 1244, 1262–64 (2011) (upholding DC's ban on assault weapons and large 
capacity magazines). 
 320  Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650, 667 (D.C. Cir. 2017) ("As the Second 
Amendment's core lies the right of responsible citizens to carry firearms for personal self-
defense beyond the home, subject to longstanding restrictions. These traditional limits include, 
for instance, licensing requirements, but not bans on carrying in urban areas like D.C. or bans 
on carrying absent a special need for self-defense.").  
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until the early twentieth-century, that is, decades after the spread of the first "proper 
cause" armed carriage licensing laws.321  
The second reason the history of the District's "proper cause" armed carriage law 
is important is because it shines a light on the historical irony of Wrenn. The irony 
being that the very organization that was responsible for the District maintaining a 
"proper cause" licensing law for decades—the NRA—was the very same organization 
that constitutionally derailed it.322 Given this fact, it is fair to say that Wrenn is not so 
much about getting history right, as it is misremembering the past to fit a preconceived 
historical narrative, or reverse engineering the past in a way that sets aside the valuable 
lessons of history. 
It is historically irrefutable that for most of the twentieth century the NRA did not 
dispute the constitutionality of "proper cause" armed carriage licensing laws.323 The 
NRA, much like the USRA, encouraged state and local governments to enact such 
laws as "sane" legislation.324 Certainly, the NRA was of the opinion that having more 
                                                          
 321  See CHARLES, ARMED IN AMERICA, supra note 5, at 157–58, 174–76. 
 322  Wrenn was a consolidated case. The NRA and the Second Amendment Foundation 
(SAF) had separate lawsuits at the district court level. See Grace v. District of Columbia, 187 
F. Supp. 3d 124 (D.D.C. 2016); Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 167 F. Supp. 3d 86 (D.D.C. 
2016).  
 323  See supra pp. 25–29 and accompanying footnotes; see also Edson, The Right to Bear 
Arms, supra note 145, at 14 ("We [the NRA] do not hold, nor have we ever held, that the right 
to keep and bear arms carries with it the right to go about armed without reason . . . or the right 
of the law-abiding citizen to do whatever he wants whenever he wants without control of any 
kind.") (emphasis added); id. ("Going about armed with a concealed weapon is a privilege which 
the community properly reserves for those possessed of good reason. The fact that we are 
required to show reason for being granted the privilege of going armed with a concealed weapon 
should not be interpreted as an infringement upon the right to keep and bear arms.") (emphasis 
added). The only instance this author could find where the NRA published an article calling into 
question the constitutionality of armed carriage licensing laws was written by Washington Judge 
Bartlett Rummel, who would later go on to serve as NRA President. See Bartlett Rummel, Pistol 
Licensing Laws: Do They Deny Your Right to Self-Defense? AM. RIFLEMAN, Apr. 1961, at 23–
24. In the article, at no point did Rummel expressly state that armed carriage licensing laws are 
facially unconstitutional. Rummel did, however, propose the question to readers that it may be 
unconstitutional to penalize someone under such laws if the firearm was in fact carried and used 
in justifiable self-defense. Id. at 24 ("Although a person has a right to defend his family, himself, 
or his property, even to the extent of taking a life, it appears that . . . what might be justifiable 
homicide could still be a violation of the licensing law. Reconciling these two conceptions 
presents a difficult intellectual problem, and one which would be hard to explain to those who 
believe in the right of the citizen to bear arms for the purpose of legitimate defense."). 
 324  See, e.g., Pioneer Co-operation, 1931 Model, AM. RIFLEMAN, June 1931, at 6; Sportsmen 
Plan ‘Sane" Law Substitute for Sullivan Act, N.Y. HERALD TRIBUNE, Jan. 19, 1932, at 6; 
Sportsmen's Victory, AM. RIFLEMAN, Aug. 1930, at 4; Congratulations Gentlemen, AM. 
RIFLEMAN, May 1930, at 6; see also There Ought to Be a Law, supra note 145, at 16 (noting it 
is "generally accepted fact that some degree of control over the use of firearms is both proper 
and necessary . . . . Today, few would assert that no control whatever would be practical and 
proper."). Additionally, it is worth noting that in 1937 editions of American Rifleman, the NRA 
ran advertisements asking sportsmen, hunters, and gun owners to "back" the organization's 
"fight for sane gun laws." For some examples, see NRA Membership Advertisement, AM. 
RIFLEMAN, Apr. 1937, at 68; NRA Membership Advertisement, AM. RIFLEMAN, Mar. 1937, at 
72. 
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armed citizens was preferred to having less as a criminal deterrent.325 This policy 
preference was frequently conveyed within the pages of the NRA's flagship magazine 
American Rifleman.326 The NRA, however, made sure to hedge its preference of 
having more publicly armed citizens on the conditions that the person be law-abiding, 
properly trained in the use and handling of firearms, and have a justifiable reason for 
doing so.327 The NRA denounced, with particular force, the promiscuous or habitual 
                                                          
 325  In the mid-1930s, the NRA touted how it worked to assist NRA members in obtaining 
carrying licenses to and from firing ranges. See, e.g., N.R.A. Service, AM. RIFLEMAN, Jan. 1936, 
at 3 (stating the NRA's legislative division "carries on the organized fight against unsound anti-
gun laws, encourages legislation for the aid of civilian rifle practice and assists members to 
obtain permits to carry firearms to and from a range in states requiring such permits."); N.R.A. 
Service, AM. RIFLEMAN, Jan. 1934, at 3 (same). 
 326  The NRA's preference for having more citizens armed appeared in frequently the in 
American Rifleman going back to the 1920s. See, e.g., Shades of the Pioneers!, AM. RIFLEMAN, 
Sept. 1934, at 4 (informing NRA members to recall the "days when the pioneer vigilantes with 
the aid of the Peacemaker established law and order" to the see the "value" of having a "pistol 
in the hands of an honest citizen"); The Attorney General Is Inconsistent, AM. RIFLEMAN, Jan. 
1934, at 4 (claiming crime would be effectively "stamped out by an aroused armed citizenry, 
either called to the aid of the police as possemen, or, as in the days of the Old West, disgusted 
with corrupt police officials and organized into their own law-enforcement groups—the 
Vigilantes."); Bandits Fear Armed Resistance, AM. RIFLEMAN, Dec. 1931, at 36; Who Says 
Armed Resistance Is Futile?, AM. RIFLEMAN, Dec. 1931, at 34; F. Theodore Dexter, Facing an 
Armed Citizen, AM. RIFLEMAN, Jan. 1930, at 24; —And They Thought He Wouldn't Fight! AM. 
RIFLEMAN, Mar. 1928, at 18; Jack Rohan, No Freedom for Crooks, AM. RIFLEMAN, Jan. 1, 1927, 
at 9–11; Philip B. Sharpe, Thug Medicine, AM. RIFLEMAN, Nov. 15, 1926, at 5; Page Magistrate 
McAdoo, AM. RIFLEMAN, Aug. 1, 1926, at 8. Beginning in 1932, the NRA conveyed its 
preference of arming more citizens in a reoccurring American Rifleman column titled "Guns vs. 
Bandits." See, e.g., Guns vs. Bandits, AM. RIFLEMAN, Mar. 1941, at 36; Guns vs. Bandits, AM. 
RIFLEMAN, May. 1936, at 38; Guns vs. Bandits, AM. RIFLEMAN, Jan. 1934, at 40; Guns vs. 
Bandits, AM. RIFLEMAN, Mar. 1933, at 28; Guns vs. Bandits, AM. RIFLEMAN, May 1932, at 31. 
Later, in 1958, the NRA once more advanced this view in the American Rifleman column titled 
"The Armed Citizen." See Walter J. Howe, The Armed Citizen, AM. RIFLEMAN, Sept. 1958, at 
32. The NRA felt the column showed that "law enforcement officers cannot at all times be 
where they are needed to protect life or property in danger of serious violation," and thus there 
were "many instances" where "the citizen has no choice but to defend himself with a gun." Id. 
Years later, the NRA slightly modified its defense of "The Armed Citizen" column on the 
grounds that there are "instances in which the mere presence of a firearm in the hands of a 
resolute citizen prevented crime without bloodshed." The Silent Protectors, AM. RIFLEMAN, Jan. 
1971, at 28; see also The Armed Citizen, AM. RIFLEMAN, Nov. 1965, at 16 ("To the law-abiding 
gun owner," being an armed citizen "means the wherewithal to protect himself, his family, and 
his property . . . . The law-abiding citizen who elects to defend himself and his loved ones, in 
the case of need arises, should learn proper gun handling and, also, should establish in his own 
mind the exact conditions under which his firearms will be used. By so doing, he better prepares 
himself to apply the fundamental right of self-defense and joins the ranks of the armed citizen."). 
 327  See, e.g., A Day in Chicago, AM. RIFLEMAN, Oct. 15, 1926, at 8; You Can't Fool the 
Editors All the Time, AM. RIFLEMAN, May 15, 1925, at 14 ("The American Rifleman does not 
oppose wise regulatory measures with regard to powerful weapons in crowded communities. 
No body of men in the country understands the need for wise regulation better than this staff."); 
The Question of Intent, AM. RIFLEMAN, Mar. 15, 1925, at 13; see also Laws Won't Cut Hunting 
Deaths, Officials Agree, SAN BERNARDINO CTY. SUN, Oct. 29, 1949, at 8 (NRA Executive 
Director C.B. Lister stressing that "a man who isn't familiar with his gun has no right to be out 
among hundreds of hunters."); C.B. Lister, The Nazi Deadline, AM. RIFLEMAN, Feb. 1942, at 7 
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toting of firearms.328 This, by and large, remained the status quo until 1985, when the 
NRA, after having conducted a member "straw poll," made the political decision to 
advocate for more liberalized armed carriage laws—laws that statutorily required 
government officials to issue concealed carry licenses regardless of the applicant's 
need or purpose.329 
                                                          
("The only person who can be trusted to handle a gun safely in an emergency is a person who 
has learned to subconsciously handle that gun safely through practice when no emergency 
existed."); see also Our Friends—The Policemen, AM. RIFLEMAN, July 1931, at 6 ("Regulate 
the sale of arms, and license those who wish to carry them. That, in a nutshell, is the N.R.A. 
point of view."); Firearms Legislation, AM. RIFLEMAN, Mar. 1941, at 22 (endorsing a 
Massachusetts bill as "desirable" that imposed a penalty on anyone who carried a firearm while 
intoxicated). Other firearms or criminal experts agreed with the NRA on this point. See, e.g., 
Calvin Goddard, The Pistol Bogey, 1 AM. J. POLICE SCI. 178, 187 (1930); H.C. Ridgely, Why 
Not Carry Firearms? OUTDOOR LIFE, Dec. 1926, at 464; The Talk of the Day, N.Y. TRIB., July 
29, 1912, at 6 (detective William J. Burns, who later became head of the FBI, stating, "It is no 
exaggeration to claim that three-fourths of our pistol homicides can be prevented by checking 
‘gun-toting.' Pass laws enabling responsible citizens who can show cause for arming themselves 
to obtain licenses to carry revolvers."). This included sporting and hunting editor Charles L. 
Gilman, who frequently wrote against "anti-gun" or "anti-firearms" legislation. See "Uniform 
Law—Purchase License," undated, in Gilman Papers, box 2, folder Gun Law Correspondence 
(Gilman, a sporting and hunting writer, and NRA supporter, noting that a "license to carry 
should be granted only upon satisfactory proof of necessity"); Letter from Charles L. Gilman to 
Minnesota State Representative Nels T. Moen, Mar. 17, 1923, in Gilman Papers, box 2, folder 
Gun Law Correspondence (discouraging gun-toting and noting that the "novice gun-owner had 
better be left where he will keep his gun at home and get acquainted with it."). For some of 
Gilman's writings critical of firearms legislation, see Charles L. Gilman, Forest, Stream, and 
Target: Safety—For Crooks, MINNEAPOLIS STAR, Apr. 7, 1928, at 22; Charles L. Gilman, 
Forest, Stream, and Target: Anti-Gun Drive On, MINNEAPOLIS STAR, June 18, 1928, at 16; 
Charles L. Gilman, Forest, Stream, and Target: Anti-Pistol Legislation, MINNEAPOLIS STAR, 
Apr. 17, 1926, at 9. What the NRA did not support were armed carriage licensing laws where 
state or local authorities exercised unbound discretion to grant or deny armed carriage licenses, 
without any right to appeal. See, e.g., C.B. Lister, The Shooter's No. 1 Problem: An Editorial 
on Anti-Firearms Legislation of Vital Importance to Every True Sportsman, OFFICIAL GUN 
BOOK 4, 5 (Charles L. Jacobs ed., Crown 1950); NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION, THE PRO AND 
CON OF FIREARMS LEGISLATION 4 (1940). 
 328  See, e.g., National Firearms Act: Hearing Before the Committee on Ways and Means on 
H.R. 9066, 73rd Cong., 59 (1934) (statement of NRA President Karl T. Frederick) ("I have 
never believed in the general practice of carrying weapons . . . I do not believe in the general 
promiscuous toting of guns. I think it should be sharply restricted and only under licenses."); 
Reckord, The Truth About the Firearms Situation, supra note 304, at 4 (noting that "[f]ew 
citizens" need to "go armed except under unusual circumstances involving grave 
responsibilities"); see also Lister, The Shooter's No. 1 Problem, supra note 327, at 5 
(acknowledging that the uniform firearms laws being pushed by the NRA and USRA were 
considered to be a "reasonable method of discouraging promiscuous gun-toting," which did not 
"interfere with the reputable citizen who wanted a pistol for protection or target shooting.").  
 329  David Conover, To Keep and Bear Arms, AM. RIFLEMAN, Sept. 1985, at 40–41; see also 
CHARLES, ARMED IN AMERICA, supra note 5, at 283, 308. As early as the mid-1960s, the NRA 
expressed a preference for such laws. See, e.g., NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION, THE GUN LAW 
PROBLEM 14 (1967) (expressing a policy preference for armed carriage laws that make the 
issuance of a carry license "mandatory" once all "conditions" have been met). However, it was 
not until 1987 that the NRA began pushing state legislature to pass these types of armed carriage 
laws. See Charles, Faces, Take Two, supra note 4, at 473.  
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The overall point to be made is simply this—contrary to the DC Circuit's opinion 
in Wrenn, history-in-law does not command courts to conclude that "proper cause" 
armed carriage licensing laws are unconstitutional. Such laws have been in American 
statute and ordinance books far longer than most firearms restrictions—restrictions 
that an overwhelming majority of courts find constitutional today.330 Moreover, for 
many years the constitutionality of these laws was unquestioned, not even by gun 
rights advocacy organizations, which held them up as reasonable and constitutionally 
sound for decades.  
G. Young v. Hawaii—Choice of History Strikes Back  
In the 2018 case Hawaii v. Young, the Ninth Circuit was once again presented with 
a Second Amendment outside the home claim.331 This time, the issue was the 
constitutionality of Hawaii's "proper cause" licensing requirement for the open 
carriage of firearms in public,332 an issue that Peruta II left open.333 In line with 
previous Second Amendment outside the home challenges, the plaintiffs argued that 
any "proper cause" or "justifiable need" requirement to publicly carry firearms 
burdened the "core" of the Second Amendment, and was therefore unconstitutional.334 
Meanwhile, the defendants argued that Hawaii's "proper cause" requirement was 
longstanding, upheld by a majority of circuit courts, and therefore constitutionally 
permissive.335 A divided Ninth Circuit panel ultimately agreed with the defendants, 
holding, "[w]hile the concealed carry of firearms categorically falls outside [the 
protection] of the Second Amendment . . . the Second Amendment encompasses a 
right to carry a firearm openly in public for self-defense."336 
Much like Peruta II, the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Young is primarily rooted in 
history. For court watchers and legal commentators, this was to be expected. What 
was surprising was Young's rejection of Peruta II's approach to history-in-law.337 
Rather than adhere to consensus history, the Young majority embraced choice of 
history.338 The reason for the reversal can be attributed to the author of the Young 
                                                          
 330  See, e.g., N.Y. Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. City of N.Y., 883 F.3d 45, 55 (2d Cir. 2018); Hooks 
v. United States, 191 A.3d 1141, 1144 (D.C. 2018). 
 331  See Young v. Hawaii, 896 F.3d 1044, 1048 (9th Cir. 2018). 
 332  HAW. REV. STAT. § 134-9(a) (2018) ("In an exceptional case . . . [w]here the urgency or 
the need has been sufficiently indicated, the respective chief of police may grant to an applicant 
of good moral character who . . . is engaged in the protection of life and property, and is not 
prohibited under section 134-7 from the ownership or possession of a firearm, a license to carry 
a pistol or revolver and ammunition therefor unconcealed on the person within the county where 
the license is granted.") (emphasis added). 
 333  Young, 896 F.3d at 1049–51; Peruta v. Cty. of San Diego (Peruta II) 824 F.3d 919, 927, 
939 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc). 
 334  Young, 896 F.3d at 1049. 
 335  Id. at 1051.  
 336  Id. at 1068. 
 337  Eric M. Ruben & Saul Cornell, Firearm Regionalism and Public Carry: Placing 
Southern Antebellum Case Law in Context, YALE L.J. FORUM 121, 134 (2015).  
 338  See Young, 896 F.3d at 1048. 
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opinion, Judge Diarmuid O'Scannlain, whose choice of history approach in Peruta I 
was rejected and overruled by Peruta II.339  
What is also surprising about Young was the court's refusal to accept history-in-
law as precedent. One of the first lessons any first-year law student learns is that 
precedent is precedent, regardless of the interpretational tools that produced it, history-
in-law included.340 Yet, Young appears to reject this very basic principle, as can be 
seen upon comparing Young with the Peruta II's treatment of certain historical events 
and eras.341 For example, despite Peruta II finding the English history of armed 
carriage to be instructive, the Young court dismissed this history on the grounds that 
the English right to arms was more restrictive than the Second Amendment.342 Similar 
history-in-law conflicts appear in other sections of Young.343 While comparing and 
contrasting these conflicts is certainly worthwhile, this article addresses most of them 
in other sections within this article.344 Therefore, rather than rehash these conflicts, 
this section will focus on critiquing the Young court's central historical 
pronouncement. This being that history shows the "right to carry a firearm openly for 
self-defense falls within the core of the Second Amendment."345  
The Young court is indeed on solid historical footing if the history-in-law inquiry 
is limited to a particular historical era—the Antebellum Era—and a certain geographic 
area—the historical South.346 This is undisputed. There are, however, a number of 
objectivity and transparency problems with the Young court's choice of history. First, 
such a choice of history ignores the law, cultural norms, and attitudes of the rest of the 
United States. Second, it negates all the history that followed, particularly how, from 
the mid to late-nineteenth century, southern lawmakers worked to reverse the culture 
                                                          
 339  See Peruta II, 824 F.3d at 939. 
 340  See Mark Edwin Burge, Without Precedent: Legal Analysis in the Age of Non-Judicial 
Dispute Resolution, 15 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 143, 144 (2013). 
 341  Young, 896 F.3d at 1050. 
 342  Additionally, in coming to this history-in-law conclusion, the Young court adopted a 
history of English armed carriage that expressly contradicts with the findings of the Peruta en 
banc court. Compare Peruta II, 824 F.3d at 929–32, with Young, 896 F.3d at 1063–65. 
 343  For some examples, compare Peruta II, 824 F.3d at 931 (finding that Sir John Knight 
was acquitted from prosecution under the Statute of Northampton because he was a government 
official), with Young, 896 F.3d at 1064 (finding that Sir John Knight was acquitted from 
prosecution under the Statute of Northampton because he did not carry arms in a terrifying 
manner); compare Peruta II, 824 F.3d at 935–36 (negatively treating Bliss v. Commonwealth, 
2 Litt. 90 (1822)), with Young, 896 F.3d at 1055 (positively treating Bliss v. Commonwealth).  
 344  For some examples, compare infra pp. 17–19, 48–50, with Young, 896 F.3d at 1061–62 
(examining surety laws); compare supra pp. 18–22, with Young, 896 F.3d at 1059–61, 1063 
n.14 (examining the relevance of post-Civil War armed carriage laws); compare infra pp. 46–
49, with Young, 896 F.3d at 1065–66 (examining late eighteenth and early nineteenth century 
legal treatises on armed carriage). 
 345  Young, 896 F.3d at 1070; see also id. at 1068 ("Concluding our analysis of text and 
review of history . . . [o]nce [the Second Amendment is] identified as an individual right focused 
on self-defense, the right to bear arms must guarantee some right to self-defense in public."). 
 346  See Charles, Faces, Take Two, supra note 4, at 410–14. 
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of violence, vengeance, and dueling that permeated the Antebellum Era.347 To 
categorically dismiss this history, as the Young court did, would mean that most 
lessons, norms, and traditions borne from the past are irrelevant.  
The Young court would have been on much better historical footing if it would 
have concluded that, throughout the nineteenth century, regulations pertaining to the 
concealed carriage of firearms were far more prevalent than their open carriage,348 and 
therefore laws pertaining to the open carriage of firearms, unlike the concealed 
carriage of firearms, should be examined under some heightened level of means-ends 
scrutiny.349 The Young court, however, failed to engage in any historical nuance.350 
Instead, the Young court made a conscious effort to present the historical evidence in 
a one-sided manner. In doing so, the Young court summarily dismissed any and all 
historical evidence that did not align with the Antebellum South's open carriage-
concealed carriage conception of the right to arms.  
The observation that the Young court would have been on much better historical 
footing by noting the prevalence of concealed carriage regulations in the nineteenth 
century should not be interpreted as meaning the Young court would be on the best, 
most contextual historical footing. The reason for this is two-fold. First, as gun 
violence became more prevalent from the late nineteenth-century through the early 
twentieth century, state and local governments began enacting new restrictions on all 
facets of armed carriage, particularly in places of public assembly.351 Second, the 
                                                          
 347  See CHARLES, ARMED IN AMERICA, supra note 5, at 150–55; see also H.V. REDFIELD, 
HOMICIDE, NORTH AND SOUTH: BEING A COMPARATIVE VIEW OF CRIME AGAINST THE PERSON IN 
SEVERAL PARTS OF THE UNITED STATES 193–207 (J.B. Lippincott & Co., 1880) (discussing the 
cultural and legal differences on the law and armed carriage between the North and South, and 
urging the latter to come in line with the former). 
 348  See, e.g., Ordinance No. 88, WILSON CTY. CITIZEN (Fredonia, KS), Mar. 16, 1888, at 3 
(passed on Mar. 8, 1888) ("Every person who shall be guilty of carrying any revolver, pistol, 
dirk, bowie knife or other deadly weapon upon his person, concealed or otherwise, except 
ministerial officers in the discharge of their duties, and travelers who do not remain more than 
twenty-four hours in the city aforesaid, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor."); Ordinance 
No. 2, GALENA MINER (KS), July 2, 1881, at 2 (passed on June 27, 1881) ("Any person who 
shall carry a pistol, dirk or other deadly weapon within the limits of this city shall be deemed 
guilty of a misdemeanor, and, upon conviction thereof, be fined in any sum not less than five 
nor more than fifty dollars."). Beginning in the late nineteenth-century, cities were at the 
forefront in regulating the open carriage of firearms in public places, and a number of state 
legislatures afforded these cities the legal authority to do so. See, e.g., CHARTER OF THE CITY OF 
DALLAS 42 (John F. Worlby, 1899) (authorizing the city council to "regulate, control, and 
prohibit the carrying of firearms and other weapons within the city limits."); 1 GEN. STATUTES 
OF THE STATE OF KAN. 1897, at 421 (W. C. Webb, 1897) (authorizing cities to "prohibit and 
punish the carrying of firearms, or other deadly weapons, concealed or otherwise"); THE 
STATUTES OF OKLAHOMA 1890, at 161 (State Capitol Printing Co., 1897) (authorizing cities to 
"prohibit and punish the carrying of firearms, or other deadly weapons, concealed or 
otherwise"); LAWS OF MO., PASSED AT THE REGULAR SESS. OF THE TWENTY-NINTH GEN. 
ASSEMB. 166 (Regan & Carter, 187) (authorizing cities to "prohibit and punish the carrying of 
firearms and other deadly weapons, concealed or otherwise"). 
 349  The Young court did ultimately analyze Hawaii's "proper cause" law under intermediate 
scrutiny in striking down the law as unconstitutional. See Young, 896 F.3d at 1064–72. 
 350  See generally Young, 896 F.3d at 1044. 
 351  See Charles, Faces, Take Two, supra note 4, at 415–23 see also infra note 400. 
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constitutionality of these laws, although disputed by some,352 was never sufficiently 
called into legal question.353 Not even gun rights advocates disputed the 
constitutionality of armed carriage restrictions.354 
This history is rather important because it set into motion, and ultimately 
cemented, the legal norm that the right to arms was subject to reasonable regulation.355 
And one such category of reasonable regulation was restricting, or preventing 
altogether, the preparatory carriage of firearms in public places.356 This reasonable 
regulation understanding of armed carriage restrictions remained unabated until the 
                                                          
 352  See CHARLES, ARMED IN AMERICA, supra note 5, at 167–69, 184–85, 210. 
 353  See, e.g., J. Weston Allen, "Firearms: An Address," in HOMER STILLE CUMMINGS, 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S CONFERENCE ON CRIME: HELD DECEMBER 10-13, 
1934 IN MEMORIAL CONTINENTAL HALL, WASHINGTON, D.C. 254, 261–62 (1934) ("The 
requirement of a license to carry concealed weapons, which has long been enforced in many 
jurisdictions, is a direct limitation upon the right to bear arms, but no one will claim that it is in 
violation of the constitution.") (emphasis); John Brabner-Smith, Firearm Regulation, 1 L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 400, 413 (1933) ("in . . . the United States . . . it is recognized that, in the 
proper exercise of the police power, the carrying of weapons by the individual may be regulated, 
restricted, and even prohibited by statute."); Daniel J. McKenna, The Right to Keep and Bear 
Arms, 12 MARQ. L. REV. 138, 143–44 (1928) ("There are certain forms of weapon regulation so 
proper and necessary that they are universally conceded . . . [such as] against wearing arms in 
church, court, polling-place, etc."); Lucilius A. Emery, The Constitutional Right to Keep and 
Bear Arms, 28 HARV. L. REV. 473, 476 (1914) ("The single individual or the unorganized crowd, 
in carrying weapons, is not spoke of or thought of as ‘bearing arms.'"); Presser v. Illinois, 116 
U.S. 252, 267–68 (1886) ("It cannot be successfully questioned that the state governments, 
unless restrained by their own constitutions, have the power to regulate or prohibit associations 
and meetings of the people, except in the case of peaceable assemblies to perform the duties or 
exercise the privileges of citizens of the United States, and have also the power to control and 
regulate the organization, drilling, and parading of military bodies and associations, except 
when such bodies or associations, are authorized by the militia laws of the United States. The 
exercise of this power by the states is necessary to the public peace, safety, and good order."); 
State Authority Over Assemblages—Various Decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court, N.Y. 
TRIBUNE, Jan. 5, 1886, at 2 (summarizing the holding in Presser as "the right of the State to 
prevent the armed assemblage of its citizens and their parading as military companies when not 
organized as such under the laws of the State or the United States"). But see In re Brickey, 8 
Idaho 597, 599 (1902) (holding that the government cannot prohibit every manner of armed 
carriage in public). 
 354  See supra pp. 25–29 and accompanying notes. 
 355  See generally Patrick J. Charles, The "Reasonable Regulation" Right to Arms: The Gun 
Rights Second Amendment Before the Standard Model, A RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS?: THE 
CONTESTED ROLE OF HISTORY IN CONTEMPORARY DEBATES ON THE SECOND AMENDMENT 
(Jennifer Tucker, Barton C. Hacker, and Margaret Vining eds., forthcoming 2019). 
 356  See, e.g., Glassen, Right to Bear Arms Is Older than the Second Amendment, supra note 
145, at 23 ("all the State courts of last resort, insofar as I know without exception, have 
recognized that the constitutional right of the people, of the individual, to keep and bear arms is 
subject to the police power of the States. "Police power" simply means that the State has the 
right of reasonable regulation for the general health, welfare and safety of its citizens. The key 
word here is "reasonable" and this has been quite universally interpreted to include within such 
police power tight regulations on the carrying of concealed firearms, the carrying thereof in 
public places and the carrying of firearms in automobiles . . . ."); see also supra pp. 25–29 and 
accompanying notes. 
58https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol67/iss2/7
2019] THE FACES OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT 255 
 
advent of the Standard Model Second Amendment in the late-twentieth century.357 
From the Standard Model Second Amendment spawned two historical claims as it 
relates to armed carriage.358 The first was that the Founding Fathers inherently 
understood the Second Amendment to protect the "peaceable" carrying of arms in 
public.359 The second was development of the open carriage-concealed carriage 
distinction in the nineteenth century.360 The first claim is historical hyperbole at 
best,361 and the second often omits the historical how and why the open carriage-
concealed carriage distinction fell into disrepute.362 
Once again, it is worth stating that, throughout much of the twentieth century, no 
one, not even gun rights advocates, objected to the demise of the open carriage-
concealed carriage distinction. As a matter of law, it was essentially a non-issue. In a 
1950 editorial, F.C. Daniel, the head of the NRA's Legislative Reporting Service, 
which was the organizational predecessor the NRA's Institute for Legislative Action 
admitted as much.363 While Daniel acknowledged there was some "academic" debate 
as to whether the Second Amendment protected an individual or collective right, he 
conceded it was "well established" that it was the "right of each state to impose police 
regulations on the distribution and carrying of lethal weapons[.]"364 Indeed, much like 
in the nineteenth century, throughout much of the twentieth century, if one were to 
examine all the armed carriage regulations in the United States, regulations pertaining 
to the concealed carriage of firearms were far more prevalent than open carriage 
regulations. But, this was not because the preparatory open carriage of arms was 
viewed as constitutionally protected. Rather, it was at the request of the gun rights 
community to ensure that armed carriage licensing provisions would not hamper 
                                                          
 357  See Charles, Faces, Take Two, supra note 4, at 466–78. 
 358  Id. at 467. 
 359  See, e.g., Kopel, The First Century of Right to Arms Litigation, supra note 4, at 130–40 
(advancing that the Founding Fathers enshrined the "peaceable" carrying of arms when ratifying 
the Second Amendment); David I. Caplan, Restoring the Balance: The Second Amendment 
Revisited, 5 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 31, 34 (1976) (advancing that the Second Amendment was 
understood as enshrining the right to "carry arms in a quiet and peaceful manner"). 
 360  See, e.g., CLAYTON CRAMER, CONCEALED WEAPON LAWS OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC 
(1999); David B. Kopel, The Second Amendment in the Nineteenth Century, 1998 B.Y.U.L. 
REV. 1359, 1413–14 (1998). 
 361  Compare Charles, Faces, Take Two, supra note 4, at 378–401, with Kopel, The First 
Century of Right to Arms Litigation, supra note 4, at 130–40. 
 362  Compare CHARLES, ARMED IN AMERICA, supra note 4, at 122–65, with Kopel, The First 
Century of Right to Arms Litigation, supra note 4, at 140–84. 
 363  F.C. Daniel, Registration of Private Guns Branded Usual Step Toward Imposition of 
Dictatorship, TAMPA BAY TIMES, May 14, 1950, at 19. 
 364  Id. ("The purely legalistic questions of whether or not the Constitution protects the right 
of the citizen to possess and bear arms is of only academic concern. Indeed, the right of each 
state to impose police regulations on the distribution and carrying of lethal weapons is well 
established. To be realistic, then, we must concern ourselves with the practical rather than the 
legalistic aspects of firearms regulation."); see also William Fulton, Sullivan Law Boon to Thugs 
40 Years Old, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Nov. 1, 1951, at 6F (former NRA President Karl T. Frederick 
conceding that the states maintained the police power to regulate firearms, including a "license 
to carry"). 
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sportsmen, hunters, and target shooters when taking part in hunting, recreational 
shooting, or marksmanship competitions.365  
In 1940, there was a nationwide attempt at model firearms legislation that would 
have changed the status quo, and regulate the open carriage of handguns in the same 
vein as their concealed carriage.366 Known as the Uniform Pistol Act (UPA), the model 
firearms legislation included a number of reforms, such as a license to purchase 
requirement and prohibiting known drunkards, drug addicts, and other undesirable 
classes from purchasing firearms.367 As it pertained to armed carriage, the UPA 
included two reforms. The first was extending the armed carriage licensing 
requirement to the open carriage of handguns.368 The second was the establishment of 
a target shooter's license.369  
Unlike when the UFA was drafted, those responsible for drafting the UPA did not 
consult with the NRA.370 This was seemingly intentional, for the UPA's architects 
were aware that the NRA would oppose any firearms legislation that included a license 
to purchase requirement.371 Unsurprisingly, given the UPA's inclusion of a license to 
purchase requirement, once the UPA was presented to state legislatures for 
                                                          
 365  This legal exception for sportsmen, hunters, and target shooters was included in both the 
Capper Bill and UFA. See A Bill to Provide for Uniform Revolver Sales, supra note 292, at § 
7 (noting the armed carriage licensing requirement "shall not apply to . . . organizations by law 
authorized to purchase or receive such weapons from the United States [i.e. NRA clubs and 
their members], or this State, nor to duly authorized military or civil organizations when 
parading, nor to the members therefor when at or going to or form their customary place of 
assembly."); UNIFORM FIREARMS ACT, supra note 308, at 4, § 6 (noting the armed carriage 
licensing requirement "shall not apply to…the regularly enrolled members of any organization 
duly authorized to purchase or receive such weapons from the United States or from this state, 
provided such members are at or are going to or from their places of assembly or target 
practice"); see also National Rifle Association, Legislative Bulletin: Georgia House Bill No. 
683, 1958, in John James Flynt, Jr. Papers, series 5, box 218, folder 9, Federal Firearms Act, 
1955–58 (Athens, GA: Richard B. Russell Library for Political Research and Studies) 
(criticizing H.B. 683's armed carriage licensing provision solely on the grounds that historically 
"shooters and sportsmen have not been required to be licensed in order to transport a pistol for 
target shooting purpose"); Art Knight, Sports of the Times, TIMES (San Mateo, CA), Mar. 1, 
1949, at 10 (objecting to a proposed California law that would have required a license to carry 
firearms for sporting, target shooting, and hunting). 
 366  See Note, The Uniform Pistol Act: A New Approach to Firearm Regulation, 54 HARV. L. 
REV. 123, 123 (1940); Warner, The Uniform Pistol Act, supra note 147, at 529–44. 
 367  The Uniform Pistol Act, supra note 366, at 123–29. 
 368  Warner, The Uniform Pistol Act, supra note 147, at 539–40. 
 369  The Uniform Pistol Act, supra note 366, at 129. 
 370  Id.  
 371  For more on the UPA's drafting process, see generally Donald S. Leonard Papers, box 
29, folder IACP Correspondence Firearms Legislation (Ann Arbor, MI: Bentley Historical 
Library-University of Michigan). 
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consideration,372 the NRA worked diligently to defeat it.373 Another reform within the 
UPA that the NRA opposed was the target shooter's license.374 Although the NRA did 
not speak for every sportsman, hunter, and target shooter in this regard,375 most within 
the gun rights community were unsupportive on any firearms legislation that impeded 
on the sport of shooting, particularly extending the legal requirements pertaining to 
armed carriage licensing laws to hunting and target shooting.376 In such instances, the 
                                                          
 372  See Legislatures Urged to Adopt Uniform Act for Firearms, CLARION-LEDGER (Jackson, 
MS), Oct. 24, 1940, at 9; New Law Controls Carrying of Arms: National Group Drafts Uniform 
Firearms Code, PHILA. INQUIRER, Sept. 7, 1940, at 7. 
 373  See, e.g., What the Lawmakers Are Doing, AM. RIFLEMAN, Mar. 1955, at 17, 18 (urging 
NRA members to oppose the UPA); Auburn Gun Club Seeks the Defeat of Firearms Bills, 
PRESS-TRIB., (Roseville, CA), Mar. 5, 1941, at 5; see also ALEXANDER DECONDE, GUN 
VIOLENCE IN AMERICA: THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL 132 (Northeastern Univ. Press, 2001). The 
NRA largely succeeded in this effort by lumping together the UPA with the Department of 
Justice's campaign for firearms registration laws at the state level. In doing so, the NRA 
audaciously claimed such laws were supported by Nazis and fifth columnists. See Firearms 
Restrictions, PRESS-TRIBUNE, (Roseville, CA), Mar. 12, 1941, at 12 (op-ed from sportsman 
noting that he received an NRA legislative bulletin to oppose the UPA on the grounds it would 
"put the law-abiding citizens at the mercy of the criminals and fifth columnists"); A.D. Rathbone 
IV, Let's Fight, SCI. AM., Feb. 1941, at 116; NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION, THE PRO AND CON 
OF FIREARMS LEGISLATION, supra note 327, at 15; Zero Hour, AM. RIFLEMAN, Dec. 1940, at 4; 
Politics and Propaganda, AM. RIFLEMAN, Sept. 1940, at 4.  
 374  See, e.g., NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION, THE GUN LAW PROBLEM, supra note 329, at 8; 
Frank C. Daniel, The Gun Law Problem, AM. RIFLEMAN, Feb. 1953, at 16, 18; Frank C. Daniel, 
Firearms Legislation, AM. RIFLEMAN, July 1951, at 15, 32. The UPA's target shooting license 
would have negated both the UFA's and Capper Bill's legal exception for rifle and pistol club 
members engaged in target shooting—an exception that the NRA and USRA had lobbied for. 
See "A Bill to Provide for Uniform Revolver Sales," supra note 291, at § 7; UNIFORM FIREARMS 
ACT, supra note 301, at 4, § 6. 
 375  See What's Wrong with Gun Laws, GUNS MAG., Aug. 1955, at 28, 56 (making the 
argument for a target shooter's license). 
 376  See Letter from Bender Hash, Utah State Rifle & Pistol Association Legislative 
Chairman, to Wallace F. Bennett, Aug. 5, 1966, in Wallace F. Bennett Papers, box 322, folder 
6, Firearms 1965-1966 (Salt Lake City, UT: University of Utah Special Collections) (encloses 
organizational statement of policy on firearms legislation, which opposes any law requiring an 
armed carriage license to carry a firearm at target ranges, hunting grounds, public shooting 
grounds, or to transport a firearm in an automobile); NRA Policy Statement on . . . Firearms 
Legislation, AM. RIFLEMAN, July 1958, at 35 ("The NRA is opposed to the theory that a target 
shooter, hunter, or collector, in order to transport a handgun for lawful purposes, should be 
required to meet the conditions for a permit to carry a weapon concealed on his person."); 
NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION, THE GUN LAW PROBLEM, supra note 329, at 13 (same); 
NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION, AMERICANS AND THEIR GUNS 301 (James E. Serven ed., 1967) 
(same); Daniel, The Gun Law Problem, supra note 374, at 46 (objecting to "proposals . . . to 
license the privilege of bearing a firearm openly and unconcealed for legitimate purposes."). It 
is a point of historical emphasis that as a matter of public safety, the NRA was against the 
carrying of long guns loaded or uncased unless the person was at the firing range or in the act 
of hunting. See NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION, IS YOUR PET GUN HOUSEBROKE? 3 (1959) 
(encouraging gun owners, as a matter of "gun safety," to always transport their firearms 
"unloaded—uncocked" and "carry cased or wrapped"); NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION, HUNTER 
SAFETY HANDBOOK 8 (1957) ("Guns should be unloaded before being put in a car. It is even 
better to case them as well . . . . Hunters stopping for any purpose should unload and open their 
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gun rights community generally defaulted to the NRA's mantra of education-over-
legislation.377  
At no point, however, did the NRA express dissatisfaction with the UPA extending 
the armed carriage licensing requirement to the open carriage of firearms in public 
places. If anything, history tells us that the NRA consented to such laws, as can be 
seen in 1943 when the NRA offered no objections to the District of Columbia 
amending the UFA to encompass open carriage.378 The same was true in 1967 when 
California clamped down on the open carriage of firearms after a group of thirty Black 
Panthers appeared visibly armed at State Capital Building.379 The NRA not only took 
                                                          
guns . . . ."); 1952 Uniform Hunter Casualty Report, AM. RIFLEMAN, Dec. 1952, at 21, 23 
("Carry only empty guns, taken down or with the action open"); NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION, 
RIFLE SHOOTING INSTRUCTION 20 (1940) ("I will never carry my gun loaded except when 
hunting and will then be sure that it is locked I the ‘safe' position."); NATIONAL RIFLE 
ASSOCIATION, GUNS IN YOUR HOME 3 (undated) ("When transporting firearms, break down 
whenever possible. Keep gun in a case or wrapped securely. Carry ammunition separately. 
Always carry guns—UNLOADED."); see also SPORTING ARMS AND AMMUNITION 
MANUFACTURERS' INSTITUTE, WHAT EVERY PARENT SHOULD KNOW WHEN A BOY OR GIRL 
WANTS A GUN!, at 16 (1954) ("Guns carried into camp or home, or when otherwise not in use, 
must always be unloaded; and taken down or have actions open; guns always should be carried 
in cases to the shooting area."). 
 377  See CHARLES, ARMED IN AMERICA, supra note 5, at 234–35. The NRA, however, was not 
opposed to requiring a person first completing hunter safety training before being issued a 
hunting license. See, e.g., 86th Annual Meetings, AM. RIFLEMAN, May 1957, at 22; A Busy Year 
with Gun Laws, AM. RIFLEMAN, July 1955, at 35, 36. 
 378  See D.C. Legislation, supra note 314, at 37; "To Amend the Law of the District of 
Columbia Relating to the Carrying of Concealed Weapons," ch. 296, Nov. 4, 1943, 57 STAT. 
586 ("No person shall within the District of Columbia carry either openly or concealed on or 
about his person, except in his dwelling house or place of business or on other land, possessed 
by him, a pistol, without a license therefor issued as hereinafter provided, or any deadly or 
dangerous weapon capable of being so concealed."). 
 379  For more on the Black Panthers openly carrying arms, see WINKLER, supra note 300, at 
237–45. For broader historical context it is worth noting that it was not only the actions of the 
Black Panthers that were concerning to California lawmakers and government officials. There 
were also reports of white communities—fearful of the Black Panthers and rioting—instituting 
armed patrols without the consent of local government officials. See Letter from Jack Lindsay, 
Legislative Secretary to Ronald Reagan, to Don Mulford, May 19, 1967, in Don Mulford 
Papers, series 1, Bill Files, folder A.B. 1591 (Sacramento, CA: California State Archives) 
[hereinafter Mulford Papers]; Letter from Don Mulford to Ronald Reagan, Apr. 21, 1967, in 
Mulford Papers, series 1, Bill Files, folder A.B. 1591; Letter from John A. Nejedly, Contra 
Costa County District Attorney, to Ronald Reagan, Apr. 20, 1967, in Mulford Papers, series 1, 
Bill Files, folder A.B. 1591; "Peace Gradually Returning to the Community of Clyde," Redlands 
Daily Facts (CA), Sep. 23, 1966, at 12; "Shots Boost Bay Tension on Vigilantes," San 
Francisco Examiner, Sep. 21, 1966, at 3. See also Letter from Don Mulford to Arthur E. de la 
Barra, Jun. 22, 1967, in Mulford Papers, series 1, Bill Files, folder A.B. 1591 ("The National 
Rifle Association helped me write [this open carriage firearms legislation], keeping in mind that 
the constitutional protection of citizens to bear arms is very definitely protected in this measure. 
Let me assure you also that there are no racial overtones in this measure. There are many groups 
that have been active in Californian with loaded weapons in public places and this bill is directed 
against all of them."); Notes of Don Mulford Meeting with E.F. Sloan, National Rifle 
Association Field Representative, on A.B. 1591, undated 1967, in Mulford Papers, series 1, Bill 
Files, folder A.B. 1591. 
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part in drafting California's open carriage firearms legislation, but was also crucial to 
ensuring its passage.380 In the words of Don Mulford, the Oakland, California 
Assemblyman who sponsored it, "[t]his legislation was specifically designed with the 
help of the National Rifle Association to protect our constitutional right to bear arms 
and yet to assist the law enforcement people who asked for this bill do to something 
about the armed bands of citizens who are walking our public streets and in public 
places with loaded weapons."381 
The fact that the NRA supported and sponsored legislation restricting the open 
carriage of firearms is not at all surprising considering that the chief gun rights 
advocates up through the late 1960s conceded that armed carriage in public places, 
whether done openly or concealed, was both good policy and constitutional.382 What 
it particularly informs is that through most of American history there was no serious 
legal dispute as to whether the open carriage of firearms in public places was subject 
to reasonable regulation. It is only recently that an alternative view has surfaced—a 
view that is primarily driven by the polarizing gun rights politics of the late twentieth-
century. Indeed, as mentioned earlier, there was a time and place in American history 
when the open carriage of firearms in public was perceived to be protected under the 
Second Amendment. But, this Antebellum Era conception of the right to keep and bear 
arms was not universally accepted, nor was it able to sustain itself into the late 
nineteenth century, and certainly not into the twentieth-century. Rather, the 
Antebellum Era open carriage-concealed carriage distinction in constitutional law was 
jurisprudentially upended by governmental police power.  
As it pertains to Young specifically, this history calls into question the overall 
legitimacy of holding the open carriage of firearms for self-defense as being within 
the "core of the Second Amendment."383 Much like in Wrenn, to reach this outcome, 
the Young court essentially had to reverse engineer the past in a way that completely 
set aside the larger lessons of history.384 Also like Wrenn, there is an irony to Young—
a more pervasive irony at that. Recall Justice Scalia's three arguments in defense of 
Heller: history-in-law is preferred because it (1) intrudes far less on the "democratic 
                                                          
 380  See Jack J. Basil, Illinois, California, Connecticut Enact Gun Laws with Sportsmen's 
Cooperation, AM. RIFLEMAN, Aug. 1967, at 54; Jack Welter, Tightening Reagan's Security Net, 
S. F. EXAMINER, May 12, 1967, at 10; Edwin S. Capps, Black Panthers' Gun Waving Just Hurt 
Their Own Cause, DAILY INDEP. J. (Sacramento, CA), May 10, 1967, at 34; Letter from Don 
Mulford to Frank P. Adams, Jun. 21, 1967, in Mulford Papers, series 1, Bill Files, folder A.B. 
1591 ("I am enclosing the most recent copy of the gun bill which was approved by the Assembly 
with the close cooperation and assistance of the NRA."); Letter from Don Mulford to John K. 
Jamison, May 24, 1967, in Mulford Papers, series 1, Bill Files, folder A.B. 1591 ("I have reason 
to believe that my bill will be approved and enacted into law. It has the support of the National 
Rifle Association and Governor Reagan has publicly stated that he will sign the bill when it 
reaches his desk."). 
 381  Letter from Don Mulford to John W. Bader, Jun. 22, 1967, in Mulford Papers, series 1, 
Bill Files, folder A.B. 1591. 
 382  See supra pp. 25–29 and accompanying notes. 
 383  Young v. Hawaii, 896 F.3d 1044, 1070 (9th Cir. 2018); see also id. at 1068 ("Concluding 
our analysis of text and review of history . . . [o]nce [the Second Amendment is] identified as 
an individual right focused on self-defense, the right to bear arms must guarantee some right to 
self-defense in public."). 
 384  See id. 
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process"; (2) is built upon reasoned facts; and (3) produces "less subjective" 
outcomes.385 The judicial principle that underlies each of these arguments is judicial 
restraint.386 Yet, Young—given is reverse engineering of the past and choice of history 
approach to history-in-law—is the very antithesis of judicial restraint.387 It is judicial 
activism under the guise of history.388 
This criticism of Young is not meant to negate the fact that the Second Amendment 
must exist in some form outside the home, nor is it meant to undermine the fact that 
the open carriage of firearms for hunting, target shooting or on one's own property has 
historically been given more legal deference than in the public concourse. What this 
criticism does strongly suggest, however, is that the Young court seems to have erred 
in striking down Hawaii's open carriage law on Second Amendment grounds. There 
are two history-in-law reasons for this. First, Hawaii's laws on armed carriage 
historically coincide with how gun rights advocates interpreted the Second 
Amendment for most of the twentieth-century—this being that any Second 
Amendment rights outside the home were limited to transporting weapons from home 
to business or from home to shooting recreation.389 There is nothing in Hawaii's laws 
on armed carriage that outright prohibits such actions.390 Second, as pointed out earlier 
in critiquing the Wrenn court, the "proper cause" or "justifiable need" standard in 
armed carriage laws is historically longstanding, and therefore presumptively 
constitutional.391 In fact, "proper cause" or "justifiable need" armed carriage laws have 
been on the statute and ordinance books longer than other firearms laws that the Ninth 
Circuit has signaled would qualify as longstanding.392 
                                                          
 385  McDonald v. City of Chi., 561 U.S. 742, 804–05 (Scalia, J., concurring); SCALIA AND 
GARNER, supra note 30, at 402. 
 386  See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 863–64 
(1989) (noting that "the main danger in judicial interpretation of the Constitution . . . is that the 
judges will mistake their own predilections for the law," and that "originalism . . . establishes a 
historical criterion that is conceptually quite separate from the preferences of the judge 
himself"). 
 387  See, e.g., McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 371–85 (1995) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (noting that even in cases where history may be read to support one outcome, 
adhering to longstanding historical tradition is the better history-in-law approach).  
 388  In this respect, Young somewhat resembles new originalism, which, in contrast to 
original intent originalism, places less emphasis on the importance of judicial restraint. See 
Keith E. Whittington, Originalism: A Critical Introduction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 375, 391 
(2017); Jamal Greene, Selling Originalism, 97 GEO. L.J. 657, 671–72 (2009). It should be noted, 
however, Young does not fully adhere to new originalist methodologies. 
 389  See supra note 146. 
 390  HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 134-5, 134-23, 134-24, 134-25, 134-26, 134-27 (allowing the 
transport of unloaded firearms in an enclosed container, to and from a place of repair, a target 
range, a licensed dealer, a firearms exhibit, a hunting ground, or a police station, and allowing 
the use of firearms for hunting and target shooting). 
 391  See supra pp. 17–22. 
 392  See Pena v. Lindley, 898 F.3d 969, 1003 (9th Cir. 2018) (noting that what qualifies as 
longstanding "may come from the early-twentieth century and need not trace their roots back to 
the Founding"); Fyock v. City of Sunnyvale, 779 F.3d 991, 997 (9th Cir. 2015) (stating that 
early twentieth-century laws "restricting the possession of firearms based on the number of 
rounds that the firearm could discharge" may qualify as longstanding); see also NRA of Am. v. 
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III. PRACTICAL ADVICE ON HISTORY-IN-LAW AND THE SECOND AMENDMENT 
OUTSIDE THE HOME 
As was seen in Part II, history-in-law, at least as courts generally practice it, is not 
always what it appears to be. What one may profess to be a contextual and factually-
based history, can turn out to be incomplete, inaccurate, ahistorical, hyperbolic, or 
mythical. This was the case for many of the circuit courts that used history-in-law to 
examine the Second Amendment outside the home. These circuit courts committed a 
variety of errors and missteps, including the cherry-picking of historical evidence, the 
minimizing or discarding of conflicting historical evidence as insignificant and 
unpersuasive, and even making up history altogether. In some cases, the errors and 
missteps would not have impacted the outcome of the case. In other cases, however, 
the errors and missteps resulted in analysis that would have turned out differently if 
all the historical evidence was provided and weighed objectively.  
The parade of errors and missteps on the Second Amendment outside the home is 
indeed a cautionary tale on the use of history-in-law. Some might even go so far as to 
say that this is proof that the consequences of using history-in-law outweigh the 
benefits. This line of argument appears legitimate until the realization sets in that the 
law and history are inseparably bound together. Precedent is history and history shapes 
precedent. The point to be made is that history-in-law is not going anywhere. Instead, 
we must try to overcome poor, inaccurate, and inadequate history-in-law with good, 
factual, and well-researched history-in-law. The question that remains is how does one 
produce the latter version of history-in-law rather than the former? 
The answer to this question is both simple and complex. On the one hand, the 
answer to ensuring good, factual, and well-researched history-in-law is simple and 
straightforward—by conducting a thorough, transparent, and objective based 
historical assessment. On the other hand, the answer is complex because what one 
person may, in their heart of hearts, believe is a thorough, transparent, and objective 
based historical assessment is anything but. Based on this author's experience, this is 
often the case because the legal professional or jurist conducting the history-in-law 
analysis is unable to delineate between what is academic history and what is junk or 
law-office history.  
What also contributes to history-in-law errors and missteps among legal 
professionals and jurists is an unfamiliarity with historiography. Yet, understanding 
the reefs and shoals of historiography is essential, for historiography informs us where 
respective historical theories, theses, and claims come from, how they were 
formulated, and if they are still viable or if they have been rebutted. It is similar to 
shepardizing case law, but in the study of history there is no research database or tool 
that legal professionals or jurists can refer to. Rather, when it comes to historiography, 
one must conduct the old-fashioned practice of reading copious amounts of historical 
literature, understanding the historical methodology behind each historical writing, 
and subsequently checking, comparing, and contrasting the historical sources within 
them. This academic exercise is not for the fly-by-night historian. Grappling with the 
historiography of a particular subject or event can take a seasoned historian years, or 
even a decade, to sort through.393  
                                                          
Bureau of Alcohol, 700 F.3d 185, 196 (5th Cir. 2012) ("Heller demonstrates that a regulation 
can be deemed ‘longstanding' even if it cannot boast a precise founding-era analogue."). 
 393  For more on historiography and the discipline of history, see JEREMY BLACK, CLIO'S 
BATTLES: HISTORIOGRAPHY IN PRACTICE (Indiana Univ. Press, 2015); GORDON S. WOOD, THE 
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 Despite the complexities and the time involved with the conducting of a thorough, 
transparent, and objective based historical assessment, there are two approaches to 
history-in-law that simplify the task for legal professionals and jurists, and ensure the 
history is, at least more often than not, framed correctly. The first approach can be 
found in the examples of Peruta II and Peterson, where the Ninth Circuit and Tenth 
Circuit each relied on consensus history.394 This approach is rather self-explanatory 
and straightforward, and does not require much elaboration, except to say having a 
basic understanding of historiography is useful in ensuring the history-in-law analysis 
is accurate and therefore legitimate.395  
The second approach, however, involves a little more nuance and the maintaining 
of historical consciousness. The Second Circuit employed this approach in Kachalsky 
and involves using the past as a guidepost to inform the present.396 Here, history is not 
so much an outcome determinative tool as it is means to formulate an informed 
historical framework from which to legally reason. While this guidepost approach to 
history-in-law may appear straightforward, it too requires understanding 
historiography. This is because the law is rarely stagnant. Rather, it is gradually 
updating and changing to meet the challenges, problems, and demands of a particular 
period. This particularly bodes true for the law pertaining to armed carriage.  
For centuries, the legal tenets of the 1328 Statute of Northampton and the flexible 
nature of the English common law was sufficient in dealing with armed carriage on 
both sides of the Atlantic.397 In the nineteenth-century, however, the law pertaining to 
armed carriage in the United States began to evolve and take on different forms. 
Initially, two enforcement models—concealed carriage prohibitions and nineteenth-
century variants of the Statute of Northampton—dominated the statute and ordinance 
books.398 Over time, these enforcement models were adapted and transformed to meet 
the needs of the times, as well as the cultural and moral norms of the respective 
jurisdictions they operated in.399 Some jurisdictions adopted armed carriage licensing 
                                                          
PURPOSE OF THE PAST: REFLECTIONS ON THE USES OF HISTORY (Penguin Press, 2008); PHILLIPP 
SCHOFIELD AND PETER LAMBERT, MAKING HISTORY: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY AND 
PRACTICES OF A DISCIPLINE (Routledge, 2004); PETER NOVICK, THAT NOBLE DREAM: THE 
‘OBJECTIVITY QUESTION' AND THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL PROFESSION (Cambridge Univ. Press, 
1988); BARBARA W. TUCHMAN, PRACTICING HISTORY: SELECTED ESSAYS (Alfred A. Knopf, 
1981); HERBERT BUTTERFIELD, MAN ON HIS PAST (Cambridge Univ. Press, 1955). 
 394  Peterson, 707 F.3d 1197, 1207–12 (10th Cir. 2013); Peruta v. Cty. of San Diego (Peruta 
II), 824 F.3d 919, 924–42 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc). 
 395  For more on the consensus approach to history-in-law, see Nelson, History and 
Neutrality, supra note 34, at 1277–83; CHARLES, HISTORICISM, supra note 13, at 20, 25, 85, 88, 
114–21. 
 396  For more on using the past as a guidepost to inform the present, see CHARLES, 
HISTORICISM, supra note 13, at 109–18. 
 397  Charles, Faces, Take Two, supra note 4, at 378–401. 
 398  Id. at 401–14. 
 399  Id. at 414–27.  
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laws.400 Some prohibited armed carriage in public places and assemblies' altogether.401 
Meanwhile, other jurisdictions modernized the English common law in a way that 
provided individuals with an outlet for armed self-defense in public places should a 
threat or danger be imminent.402  
This wide array of armed carriage laws remained the norm until the gun rights 
movement of the early twentieth-century sought legal uniformity as a means to protect 
traveling sportsmen and target shooters from unknowingly violating local armed 
carriage laws, and, in the process, assist law enforcement with the combatting of 
interstate criminal activity.403 From this desire for legal uniformity spawned the 
Capper Bill and the UFA, both of which required individuals to show a "proper cause" 
or "justifiable need" before being able to legally go armed in public places.404 These 
armed carriage laws remained the norm for more than half a century, and their 
constitutionality was unquestioned, until the advent of the Standard Model Second 
Amendment in the late twentieth-century.405 From the Standard Model Second 
                                                          
 400  Id. at 419–22. 
 401  See, e.g., An Act to Prevent the Carrying of Fire Arms and Other Deadly Weapons, Dec. 
2, 1875, in THE COMP. LAWS OF WYOMING 352 (H. Glafcke ed., 1876) ("That hereafter it shall 
be unlawful for any resident of any city, town or village, or for any one not a resident of any 
city, town or village, in said territory, but a sojourner therein, to bear upon his person, concealed 
or openly, any fire arm or deadly weapon, within the limits of any city, town or village."); THE 
REVISED ORDINANCES OF PAYSON CITY 107 (1877) ("Every person who shall wear, or carry upon 
his person any pistol, or other firearm, slungshot, false knuckles, bowieknife, dagger, or any 
other dangerous or deadly weapon within the limits of this city is guilty of an offense, and liable 
to a fine in any sum not exceeding twenty-five dollars"). 
 402  See, e.g., 1 THE PENAL CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE OF THE STATE OF TEXAS 120–24 
(Sam Andrew Wilson ed., 1896) (prohibiting armed carriage at public places and gatherings, 
but not applying to frontier counties or "the carrying of arms on one's own premises or place of 
business, nor to persons traveling, nor to one who has reasonable ground for fearing an unlawful 
attack upon his person, and the danger is so imminent and threatening . . . ."); CHARTER AND 
REVISED ORDINANCES OF THE CITY OF GALVESTON 283–84 (1875) (passed Aug. 19, 1878) ("That 
any person carrying on or about his person, saddle or vehicle, within the corporate limits of the 
city of Galveston, any pistol, dirk, dagger, slung-shot, sword-cane, spear, brass-knuckles, 
bowie-knife, or any other kind of knife manufactured or sold for the purposes of offense or 
defense, or carried for purposes of offense or defense, unless he has reasonable grounds for 
fearing an unlawful attack on his person, and that such attack shall be immediate and pressing . 
. . shall be fined in a sum of not less than twenty-five dollars, nor more than one hundred dollars, 
and in default of payment thereof shall be confined in the jail for a period of not less than ten 
days nor more than three months . . . That any person charged under the first section . . . who 
may offer to prove, by the way of defense, that he was in danger of attack on his person, or 
unlawful interference with his property, shall be required to show that such danger was 
immediate and pressing, and was of such a nature as to alarm a person of ordinary courage, and 
that such weapon so carried was borne openly and not concealed beneath the clothing; and if it 
shall appear that his danger had its origin in a difficulty first commenced by the accused, it shall 
not be considered as a legal defense."). 
 403  CHARLES, ARMED IN AMERICA, supra note 5, at 189–90. 
 404  Id. at 191–203. 
 405  Id. at 279–95. 
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Amendment spread the first "shall issue" armed carriage laws.406 And, more recently, 
using Heller and McDonald as a political springboard, a minority of jurisdictions have 
gone the way of eliminating armed carriage restrictions altogether.407  
There is one common thread that binds this history together, namely, armed 
carriage in public places has always been subject to some form of governmental 
regulation. Only the policies and politics guiding them have changed. This is 
especially true today. This common historical thread is the central guidepost from 
which the Second Circuit fashioned its analysis in Kachalsky, and understandably 
so.408 For if the Second Circuit would have gone the route of Ninth Circuit in Young, 
and adopted a choice of history approach, the Second Circuit would have had to 
explain why one particular time, geographic area, and set of cultural norms trumped 
all others. This is undoubtedly the chief deficiency with any choice of history 
approach. Even in those instances where one's choice of history is fully contextualized, 
the choice itself is biased to some degree. Perhaps the only exception is when the 
choice of history is contemporaneous with the law or constitutional provision being 
analyzed. Such a choice of history is generally excused and deemed acceptable among 
legal commentators because it seeks to shed light on how the drafters understood the 
law or constitutional provision in question. Conversely, any other choice of history is 
just that—a choice. And that choice can have unintended constitutional consequences 
if not fully weighed and considered.409 
This exception as to when the choice of history is proper will prompt some legal 
commentators to single out 1791, the year the Bill of Rights was ratified, as the right 
choice of history when examining the Second Amendment outside the home. This 
author is somewhat inclined to agree with this choice if, and only if, two important 
rules are followed.410 First, any choice of history approach should only be used to form 
a jurisprudential baseline from which to weigh the constitutionality of law. Choice of 
history should not be used as an outcome determinative tool. There is a practical reason 
for this.411 The past and the present are not the same, nor can they ever be. No matter 
what two historical moments in time are selected, compared, and contrasted, there will 
always be substantial differences between the two, whether those differences are 
demographical, societal, cultural, political, or technological. The differences are most 
striking when trying to compare and contrast 1791 with the present day. As this relates 
to armed carriage, the most obvious difference is the social costs associated with 
modern firearms are substantially greater than their late eighteenth-century, single-
                                                          
 406  Charles, Faces, Take Two, supra note 4, at 473. 
 407  Id. at 374.  
 408  Kachalsky v. Cty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 94–95 (2d Cir. 2012).  
 409  See Darrell A.H. Miller, Second Amendment Traditionalism and Desuetude, 14 GEO. J.L. 
& PUB. POL'Y 223, 224–26 (2016); Miller, Text, History, and Tradition, supra note 2, at 884–
86.  
 410  Charles, Faces of the Second Amendment, supra note 4, at 1–6, 41–43. 
 411  There is also a history-in-law reason for this rule. This reason being the Founding Fathers 
did not use history as an outcome determinative tool when adjudicating constitutional questions. 
See CHARLES, HISTORICISM, supra note 13, at 29–49; Toler, et al., Pre-Originalism, supra note 
14, at 304; Marie Carolyn Klinkhamer, The Use of History in the Supreme Court, 1789–1835, 
36 U. DET. L.J. 553, 554 (1959); Marie Carolyn Klinkhamer, John Marshall's Use of History, 6 
CATH. U. L. REV. 78, 88–95 (1956).  
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shot, muzzle-loading counterparts.412 A well-trained rifleman in 1791 would be able 
to fire off two, at most three, rounds per minute, and the rounds were only lethal up to 
one hundred yards.413 Meanwhile, today, as was seen in the case of the 2017 Las Vegas 
shooting, a modified semi-automatic rifle can be modified to fire nine rounds per 
second, and the rounds are lethal upwards of a mile.414 Needless to say, to make the 
laws governing armed carriage in 1791 the jurisprudential baseline when examining 
the constitutionality of today's armed carriage restrictions would be an exercise in 
futility.  
The same bodes true for weighing the constitutionality of other firearms laws. 
Consider that most firearms laws would not be on the statute and ordinance books 
today but for the increase in firearms related social costs. Yet, if 1791 is to be the 
jurisprudential baseline from which the constitutionality of all firearms laws are 
weighed—an approach that one sitting Supreme Court Justice has floated415—many, 
if not most, of today's firearms laws would be deemed unconstitutional, thus leaving 
federal, state, and local governments with nothing more than late eighteenth-century 
remedies to solve twenty-first century problems. 
This brings us to the second rule that should be followed when adopting a choice 
of history approach—the history-in-law analysis must be contextual and thorough, not 
ad hoc or built upon historical hyperbole.416 One notable example of the latter—that 
is a hyperbolic version of history—is how some gun rights advocates have equated the 
Founding Fathers writing positively about carrying firearms for hunting and travels as 
proof positive that the Second Amendment protects the preparatory "carrying of 
ordinary arms" for self-defense almost anywhere and everywhere.417 What is most 
astonishing about this historical claim is that these Second Amendment commentators 
arrived at this conclusion despite the Second Amendment never being implicated in 
the writings being quoted. The outlandishness of this line of thinking is notable. Just 
because eighteenth-century persons owned and used firearms, and carried those 
firearms at times, does not mean those same persons perceived it as a constitutionally 
protected right, particularly in densely populated public places.418 For historians, 
                                                          
 412  Charles, Faces of the Second Amendment, supra note 4, at 47. 
 413  James E. Hicks, United States Military Shoulder Arms, 1795–1935, 1 THE J. OF THE AM. 
MILITARY HIST. FOUND. 23, 30–31 (1937); see also Rosenthal, Limits of Second Amendment 
Originalism, supra note 4, at 1206–07. 
 414  Larry Buchanan et al., Nine Rounds a Second: How the Vegas Gunman Outfitted a Rifle 
to Fire Faster, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/10/02/us/vegas-guns.html.  
 415  Heller v. District of Columbia, 670 F.3d 1244, 1274–75 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, 
J., dissenting). 
 416  See Charles, Faces, Take Two, supra note 4, at 378–401, accord CHARLES, ARMED IN 
AMERICA, supra note 5, at 114–20 (correcting the history on Sir John Knight's case). 
 417  Brief of Amicus Curiae National Rifle Association of America, Inc. in Support of 
Petitioner at 11, Peruta v. California, (No. 16-894) (Feb. 16, 2017); see also STEPHEN P. 
HALBROOK, THE FOUNDERS' SECOND AMENDMENT: ORIGINS OF THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS 327–
28 (Ivan R. Dee, 2008); STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, A RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS: STATE AND FEDERAL 
BILL OF RIGHTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES 52–56 (Greenwood, 1989). 
 418  Such a conclusion completely sidesteps the fact that the Founding Fathers maintained a 
number of firearms restrictions with the purpose of preserving the public peace, preventing 
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jurists, legal scholars, or, for that matter, anyone to accept such writings as 
constitutional proof positive that there was a right to preparatory armed carriage in 
public places would essentially mean that any statement, made by any of the Founding 
Fathers, attesting to any action must be interpreted as enshrining a constitutional right 
to do so. But, to accept this premise would be to flip the entire academic discipline of 
history on its head. It would essentially make myths and facts intellectual equals, when 
they are not. Moreover, from a jurisprudential standpoint, it would open up a Pandora's 
Box of new rights and protections that the Constitution and Bill of Rights was never 
designed to remotely protect.   
Herein is the problem with the choice of history approach. Thus far, not one circuit 
court to apply it to the Second Amendment outside the home has proved capable of 
conducting an accurate, contextual and thorough history-in-law analysis. Instead, 
those circuit courts that have applied a choice of history approach have broken 
virtually every accepted objectivity norm within history academia. This failure to 
examine history objectively tilts the scales of justice against using the choice of history 
approach altogether, and brings us full circle back to the two history-in-law 
approaches that are more likely to at least frame history correctly—the consensus 
history approach and the guidepost history approach. This author only hopes that 
moving forward, the Supreme Court will take note in taking up the first Second 
Amendment case in nearly a decade. 
 
 
                                                          
deadly affrays, and advancing the public good. See Charles, Scribble Scrabble, supra note 4, at 
1822–35; Charles, Restoring "Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness", supra note 198, at 
477–522. 
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